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CHAPTER I 
 
THE SHOALS OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 
 
A definition of the political can be obtained only by 
discovering and defining the specifically political categories.  
In contrast to the various relatively independent endeavours 
of human thought and action, particularly the moral, 
aesthetic, and economic, the political has its own criteria 
which express themselves in a characteristic way.  The 
political must therefore rest on its own ultimate distinctions, 
to which all action with a specifically political meaning can 
be traced.  let us assume that in the realm of morality the 
final distinctions are between good and evil, in aesthetics 
beautiful and ugly, in economics profitable and unprofitable.  
The question then is whether there is also a special 
distinction which can serve as a simple criterion of the 
political and of what it consists.  The nature of such a 
political distinction is surely different from that of the others.  
It is independent of them and as such can speak clearly for 
itself. 
 
The specific political distinction to which political actions 
and motives can be reduced is that between friend and 
enemy.1  
 
Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the German 
theorist Carl Schmitt; Schmitt has become a kind of homo sacer to the 
theorists of the political left, in that his position is anathema - he is 
excluded from the scene of political debate tout court - yet his work 
contains challenges that, ostensibly, must be met by any theorist of 
democracy, be it radical, participatory, or other.  He cannot simply be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Carl	  Schmitt,	  The	  Concept	  of	  the	  Political,	  trans.,	  George	  Schwab	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1996).	  pp.	  25-­‐6	  
	  	   2	  
condemned or elided, but must be considered by proponents of any 
democratic theory - before he is ultimately reviled and rejected.  This is 
an ironic fate, to say the least, for a thinker who until recently was 
simply seen as an appendage of totalitarian barbarism: a fascist, pure 
and simple.  He therefore has been a kind of shadow-figure of that other 
famous dallier with the Nazis, Martin Heidegger, whose thinking has 
always been too intimately embedded within the broader project of 
philosophy, and too much the subtle philosophical integral on its own 
account, to suffer precisely the same fate: where Heidegger has been the 
unexpellable irritant, never settled nor removed, Schmitt has been much 
easier to dismember in the name of fruitful dialog.  He has been made to 
fit all too easily on a philosophical Procrustean bed: the vitality of his 
challenge to democracy is excised, preserved, taken up so as to test and 
strengthen the theory of radical democracy, while the fascist heart is left 
to serve as a horrific warning to liberalism's complacency. 
Chantal Mouffe, who, along with Ernesto Laclau, is probably most 
responsible for the recovery of Schmitt by theorists of radical democracy, 
says that "I am convinced that a confrontation with his thought will allow 
us to acknowledge - and therefore, be in a better position to try to 
negotiate - an important paradox inscribed in the very nature of liberal 
democracy."2    Mouffe thereby performs a theoretical amputation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Chantal	  Mouffe,	  "Carl	  Schmitt	  and	  the	  Paradox	  of	  Liberal	  Democracy,"	  in	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Carl	  
Schmitt,	  ed.	  Chantal	  Mouffe(London:	  Verso,	  1999).	  p.	  38.	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Schmitt: his political metaphysic is separated from his fascist normative 
politics, in the hopes that each can survive on its own and so reveal the 
connection between them to have been inessential, rather than bearing 
the internal relation that Schmitt thought them to have.  The Schmittian 
political metaphysic is in turn transplanted into Mouffe and Laclau's 
radical democratic theory as its own proper heart; the same maneuver 
shows the truth of Schmitt's original critique, that liberalism is 
chimerical, holding within itself an irresolvable aporia which always 
threatens to overtake it and transform it in practice into barbarism.   
I thoroughly disagree; it's my contention that when Schmitt would 
not have thought his criticisms any less applicable to radical vs. liberal 
democracy, and I think Mouffe and Laclau are wrong to to attempt to 
graft his political metaphysic onto any democratic theory whatsoever, for 
it is anti-democratic to its core.  As the progenitors of radical democratic 
theory, they have thereby produced a construct which cannot bear its 
philosophical burden, and which cannot offer normative prescriptions for 
a more democratic polity.   
    Schmitt, in The Concept of the Political, attends to the specificity 
of the political in a metaphysical register, discovering what he believes is 
the constitutive distinction that is special to its substance: that between 
friend and enemy.3  For a enemy to be an enemy it is necessary only that 
the enemy be recognized as what is alien or different: the enemy is the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Schmitt.	  p.	  26.	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stranger.  The enemy is not constituted by an disinterested normative 
judgment; it is "sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense 
way, existentially different and alien".4  This is a judgment that can be 
made only internally, within and by the political grouping,  and it is 
made on the basis of the enemy's appearing, in its difference, as a threat 
to what the group itself is.  This constitutes the "intensity" of the conflict 
between friend and enemy, that the enemy is always a potential 
destroyer.  For Schmitt, the life-and-death confrontation is politics, and 
it is at the moment at which the threat is faced as a threat to existence, 
to life, that the situation reaches its "most political".5  "To the enemy 
concept belongs the ever-present possibility of combat,"6 of what Schmitt 
calls, curiously, "physical killing"7   
    Because it defines the enemy on a principle of ultimately 
threatening difference, a political group must define its internal bonds of 
friendship by this shared, peaceable sameness, the sameness of the unit 
of defense.  My friend is she or he with whom I stand against the threat 
posed by the dangerously different enemy, against whose difference the 
person with whom I am standing comes to appear to me as the same.  
The group defines itself according to qualities that come into relief as 
fundamental similarities precisely because they are the qualities against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Ibid.	  p.	  27.	  5	  Ibid.	  p.	  29	  6	  Ibid.	  p.	  32	  7	  Ibid.	  p.	  33.	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which the enemy is seen to differ8 the collectivity of friends has no 
concrete being without the collectivity of enemies against which it 
stands.   
This sense of the political, because primordial and constitutive, is 
ineliminable.  It is both the lie and tragedy of liberal democracy that it 
cannot realize this, that what liberalism aims at is to erase its own 
identity as collectivity of friends of an enemy, instead seeing itself as a 
neutral space, a container, defined by the values of egalitarian tolerance 
and general respect for the law.  Schmitt notes that this is essentially a 
will to peaceful co-existence among competing subject-positions.  But the 
liberal state is simultaneously a political ideal that defines a relationship 
of friends and enemies, and therefore cannot avoid constituting itself on 
a principle of homogeneity over and against threatening outsiders.  A 
political group that holds as a value the will to peace and tolerance is a 
contradiction, and, worse, it is in a state of contradiction that it cannot 
recognize.  The will to peaceful co-existence, the ending of intergroup 
violence, is, in fact, the will to depoliticization of the world - but such a 
will is doomed.  Liberal democracy discloses its own political character by 
revealing a covered-over will to destroy the warlike: "if the will to abolish 
war is so strong that it no longer shuns war, then it has become a 
political motive".9The war to end war, however, must be an inhuman war, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Ibid.	  p.	  30	  9	  Ibid.	  p.	  36.	  
	  	   6	  
the most intense, because putatively final, conflict, and thereby the most 
destructive imaginable moment of political engagement:the most hideous 
and base possible form of conflict.  To Schmitt, then, the liberal, 
cosmopolitan will to peace hides within itself an impetus to the worst, 
most barbaric violence.  Liberalism is a will to total war. 
Chantal Mouffe, in enunciating her critique of liberalism, invokes 
Schmitt on this point: in covering over the ways in which liberalism still 
requires modes of terrible, even genocidal, conflict with those whom it 
constitutes as outsiders to its own project, liberal democracy is always 
engaged in the betrayal of its own ideal.  Mouffe identifies the paradox of 
liberal democracy in its inability to recognize its own need for 
constructing a hostile frontier between the interior and the exterior10 - 
between those included and those excluded.  A liberal-democratic nation-
state will, of course, have "others" in the form of aliens and strangers - 
enemies - and if it contains such aliens and strangers within its borders, 
it must be justified by its own political logic in silencing, binding, 
disenfranchising, or expelling them, since they, simply by virtue of their 
threatening differences with liberal values, are the enemy that liberalism 
cannot recognize as such and deal with in forthright confrontation.  And 
because this conflict cannot be brought to the surface and made visible 
as what it is, as constitutive of the political project as such, it cannot be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Mouffe.	  p.	  43	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mediated or transformed in a conscious fashion.  At best it can be 
repressively displaced. 
There are a number of ways to cash out the claim that liberalism 
must always create an excluded "other" and a concomitant frontier 
between the interior space of friendship and the exterior space of 
dangerous enemies.  In this way, Schmitt and Mouffe have struck on a 
unifying theme among many critics of liberal democracy.  What Mouffe 
calls the "Schmitt Paradox" has been  elaborated over the last generation 
of political theory: the critics of liberal democracy have been almost of 
one voice in pressing this point, in numerous guises.  Herbert Marcuse, 
writing in "Repressive Tolerance: A Critique of Pure Tolerance"11, has 
noted the contradiction inherent in any liberal democracy between the 
virtue of egalitarian tolerance for other points of view, and the necessity 
for maintenance of that liberal democracy as a positive value in itself. 
"Tolerance cannot be indiscriminate and equal with respect to the 
contents of expression, neither in word nor in deed: it cannot protect 
false words and wrong deeds which demonstrate that they contradict the 
possibilities of liberation".12  This "repressive tolerance" takes several 
forms: first, there is the danger of tolerating opinions and cabals, which 
aim at the destruction of the liberal project itself.  This is the most 
obvious level.  Just as importantly, however, "indiscriminate toleration" 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Herbert	  Marcuse,	  "Repressive	  Tolerance,"	  in	  A	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Tolerance,	  ed.	  Robert	  Paul	  Wolff(Boston:	  Beacon	  Press,	  1969).	  12	  Ibid.	  p.	  88.	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mimics the commodity form of the market, in which, in the immortal 
words of Marx, "all that is solid melts into the air": the market-relation, 
holds Marcuse, is inherently reactionary, in that the very forms of 
political cohesion which are constitutive of liberatory projects generally 
are melted in the overall form of commodified indifference.  And third, the 
the way in which liberal democracy requires the withdrawal of tolerance 
from anti-liberal projects - as in the first form of unallowable 
"indiscriminate toleration" I noted above - becomes, in the administered 
State, a formal equivalence between the intolerability of illiberal notions 
that are reactionary and those that are liberating, resulting in the 
destruction of possibilities for liberation at the very moment that 
liberalism is at its strongest in dealing with destructive, reactionary 
tendencies.  In each of these cases, liberal democracy is in the business 
of forming an inside and an outside to itself, and is further required, by 
its own internal needs, to administer the boundaries of groups of 
subjects within its purview: that is, it turns out that liberal democracy 
not only must create a frontier between its own interior and exterior out 
of its own particular political logic, it also must do so in the name of its 
own ability to exist; and, further, it must do the same for all 
subjectivities that constitute the demos itself.  On this analysis, the 
liberal state achieves its monism only by the roughest sort of extortion. 
We might take up another similar challenge to liberal democracy, 
this time from Michael Walzer.  Walzer, in "Welfare, Membership, and 
	  	   9	  
Need,"13 notes that there is a similar difficulty regarding the "inner and 
outer" of liberal democracy when approached from the point of view of 
distributive justice.  One way to analyze the legitimacy of the liberal state 
is by its success as a distributive economy, in meeting the needs of its 
constituent groups and individuals - material needs, needs for 
recognition, etc.  But, as Walzer notes, even material needs, and certainly 
needs for recognition, are coded by political values which are not 
necessarily - indeed, never actually are, in a pluralistic democracy - held 
in common; and because "distribution" within the context of a single 
state always means "redistribution," these values will come into conflict 
over the very function of meeting citizen's needs.  Even what gets 
recognized as what Walzer terms a "socially-recognized need,"14 (Walzer, 
214-215) will require that the state make executive decisions that will 
exclude from the field some needs that are as keenly felt by those who 
hold them as are any others; again, even in the distributive project, most 
basic to contractarian theories of the liberal state, there is always an 
included inside and a rejected outside. 
    The problematic dimension of political recognition is fully 
thematized in Axel Honneth's The Struggle for Recognition.15 Honneth 
notes that struggles for recognition - the development of and insistence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Michael	  Walzer,	  "Welfare,	  Membership,	  and	  Need,"	  in	  Liberalism	  and	  Its	  Critics,	  ed.	  Michael	  J.	  Sandel(New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  1984).	  	  14	  Ibid.	  pp.	  214-­‐215.	  15	  Axel	  Honneth,	  The	  Struggle	  for	  Recognition	  :	  The	  Moral	  Grammar	  of	  Social	  Conflicts	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Blackwell,	  1995).	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upon new forms of individual and group identity - is an ineliminable 
element of the political life of democracies; Honneth notes that the 
advancement of new claims of identity formation results in new claims of 
need upon the polity, which will inevitably be systematically mis-
represented by the executive ruler; it is the process of advancing these 
claims of need and getting them "socially recognized," in Walzer's 
terminology, that the very forms of subjectivity that make up the varying 
perspectives over which constitute democratic polities and over and 
against which liberal democratic governments must take an officially 
neutral point of view are constituted; thus, the continual struggle for the 
inside and the outside of the democratic polity is not just ineliminable, it 
is constitutive of the very pluralism against which liberal democracy is 
meant to be the guarantor of justice.16  In each attempt to provide for 
socially recognized needs of recognition, therefore, the government will be 
carving out socially-unrecognized and officially mis-recognized frontiers 
of discrimination, the experience of which continually produces the forms 
of subjectivity which liberal democracy continually fails to domesticate. 
Iris Marion Young, in her "Polity and Group Difference, a Critique 
of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship"17, arguing against Rawls' model of 
the veil of ignorance, takes the analysis to the individual level.  The motto 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Axel	  Honneth,	  The	  Struggle	  for	  Recognition	  :	  The	  Moral	  Grammar	  of	  Social	  Conflicts	  (Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  Polity	  Press,	  1995).	  pp.	  163-­‐165.	  17	  Iris	  Marion	  Young,	  "Polity	  and	  Group	  Difference:	  A	  Critique	  of	  the	  Ideal	  of	  Universal	  Citizenship,"	  in	  
Feminism	  &	  Political	  Theory,	  ed.	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein(Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1990).	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for liberal democracy, to Young, is "citizenship for everyone, and for 
everyone qua citizen."18  In a few brief pages, Young indicates that this 
logic is a logic not so much of partial but of complete exclusion of 
subjectivity from the public realm.  What "counts" for a liberal 
democratic government are universal rights, but what count for 
individuals are particular interests and identities.  If a liberal democratic 
state is constituted both by egalitarianism - political equality - and by 
taking up the project of distributive justice, the result will be, for most 
people in at least some respect, a situation of perpetual exclusion.  
"Distributive equity requires everyone to measured according to the same 
norms of desert, but in fact there are no "neutral" norms of behavior and 
performance."19  Where group differences in capacities, cognitive styles, 
behavior, and values  exist, equal treatment in the allocation of reward 
according to rules of merit will reinforce and perpetuate systematic 
disadvantage.    
Simon Critchley, in his book on political commitment, Infinitely 
Demanding20, notes that the distinction between the inner and the outer, 
the friend and the enemy, is necessary even for political action.  Critchley 
holds that the question of intra-group "binding,"21  the way subjects 
bound  to their own particular identities and projects come to attach 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Ibid.	  p.117.	  19	  Ibid.	  p.	  136.	  20	  Simon	  Critchley,	  Infinitely	  Demanding	  :	  Ethics	  of	  Commitment,	  Politics	  of	  Resistance	  (New	  York:	  Verso,	  2008).	  	  21	  Ibid.	  p.	  8-­‐9.	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themselves to, to take on as identity and as project, the affirmation and 
preservation of a political project, poses another problem for liberalism. 
The deliberately unlimited, anti-particularist, impartial "space" of liberal 
political deliberation, the zone in which a thousand schools of thought 
contend, is simply too indefinite to serve as such a binding locus. The 
very featurelessness of such a space seems to preclude it as an object of 
passionate cathexis; indeed, as a space of deliberation, it is not meant to 
be a cathected set of interests or a subject-position in its own right.  It is 
that neutrality which enfolds subject-positions with their own specificity.  
Critchley begins by wondering what future such a liberalism, with all its 
slackness and "drift"22 could possibly posses against anti-democratic  
religious fundamentalisms and "other forms of revolutionary 
vanguardism,"23  as he puts it. 
Slavoj Žižek's In Defense of Lost Causes24, puts the point most 
succinctly: "The democratic empty place and the discourse of totalitarian 
fullness are strictly correlative, two sides of the same coin"25  The space 
of liberal democracy is constituted like a bureaucratic overseer, making 
certain the rules are obeyed evenhandedly, even when the specific 
content of the propositions and movements passing before its unjudging 
gaze are outrageous: precisely at this point is the demand at its height.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Ibid.	  p.	  9.	  23	  Ibid.	  p.	  6.	  24	  Slavoj	  Žižek,	  In	  Defense	  of	  Lost	  Causes	  (New	  York:	  Verso,	  2008).	  	  	  25	  Ibid.	  p.	  101	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This is not a space of joy or of attachment of any kind; to experience 
"binding" to the liberal-democratic project means that one has gotten the 
project wrong.  It is here, though, that both Critchley and Žižek locate 
the collapsing, slackening tendency of European democracy: if the 
Negrian slogan is "no politics without specific movements," there is an 
aporia in the project itself: liberal democracy is precisely that which 
cannot see itself as a movement.  Its preservation and extension cannot 
therefore be taken up as a project for political action per se; it 
degenerates immediately into a project of mere administration of the 
status quo.   
 
 
    It is at the point that the theorists of radical democracy make 
their interventions.  In Laclau and Mouffe's  Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy26,  the concept of the political proposed is simply that political 
life is constituted by a network of power-relations which "escape 
structural determination": hegemony, a concept which means to Laclau 
and Mouffe almost the exact opposite of its usual meaning, that of 
systematic domination27.  Authoritarian politics are simply those which 
attempt to manipulate, seize, fix, and override the changing, mobile, 
contingent, contested relations of power as they actually are - to freeze 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Ernesto	  Laclau	  and	  Chantal	  Mouffe,	  Hegemony	  and	  Socialist	  Strategy	  :	  Towards	  a	  Radical	  
Democratic	  Politics	  (London:	  Verso,	  1985).	  27	  Ibid.	  p.	  34-­‐36.	  
	  	   14	  
the fluidity of power by the imposition of a schema of power-relations to 
which agents, in the activity, must defer28.  This is, of course, an 
impossibility, and in the attempt a dictatorial authority can only resort to 
terror and force - and in so doing reveals its limitations.  Radical 
democracy, rather, is the bringing into being of a form of politics which 
takes hegemony as its first principle, as the foundation and constitutive 
logic for "articulatory practices" which determine the "very principle of 
social division"29, and in turn lead to the formation of political 
antagonisms and identities which are "overdetermined"30 by the sheer 
plenitude of the valence of social space: the changing, mobile, contingent, 
contested, and displaced claims of selfhood and otherness that make up 
individual and group subject-positions which, once exposed to the new 
logic of radical pluralism, can never be subsumed once more under any 
"positive and unitary founding principle."31 
    This is why Laclau and Mouffe's extensive discussion of George 
Sorel is so revealing.  For Sorel, the general strike is to serve as an 
enabling myth, a myth which, as myth, cannot be disconfirmed, and so 
will ineluctably clarify both the true distinction between proletariat and 
bourgeoisie and the unity of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, even 
the face of ostensibly humanitarian economic gestures by a bourgeois 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Ibid.	  p.	  59.	  29	  Ibid.	  p.151.	  30	  Ibid.	  p.165.	  31	  Ibid.	  p.	  167.	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government.   In this way the idea of the general strike will be the 
impulse to the final confrontation between proletariat and capitalist 
interests, a confrontation that may or may not take the form of an actual 
general strike. Where Marx held that capitalism's contradictions would 
inevitably come to the fore, Sorel has a kind of regretful faith that 
capitalism, in its degenerate aspect, can continually cover up the reality 
of class conflict.32 But Marx and Sorel are united on the belief of that 
conflict's absolute reality; the only question is one of the formation of 
class consciousness.  Laclau and Mouffe, by contrast, see Marx's 
"scientific history" and Sorel's myth of the general strike as having the 
same status, as simply two ways of going about the reintroduction of a 
"totality"33 which, in Marx, only appeared to occupy the register of 
science, and which in Sorel is revealed as pure totalizing fiction.   
Indeed, it is in Sorel's use of the general strike as a myth opposed 
to the authoritarians, whose myth was that of the State, that Laclau and 
Mouffe see the danger: as merely fictive points of identity "agglutination", 
they are fungible - there is "no theoretical reason why the mythical 
reconstitution should not move in the direction of fascism."34  That may 
be true: but it is the emphasis on "theoretical" that is strange, as if there 
being no logical backstop in the theory is what really creates the danger 
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  Georges	  Sorel,	  Reflections	  on	  Violence,	  Cambridge	  Texts	  in	  the	  History	  of	  Political	  Thought	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999).	  	  33	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe.	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  40.	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  Ibid.	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of a political practice falling into error, of the left's conflating with the 
authoritarian right.  Of course, Laclau and Mouffe aren't seeking for such 
a theoretical backstop, because it is their belief that the logic of 
hegemony permits no such; in fact, what it permits is the recognition 
that all articulations of identity are, in a sense, fungible fictions.  The 
danger is for an articulation to appear as a fixity, as entirely "real," which 
Marx's class struggle, Sorel's general strike, and the fascist State are all 
intended to be.  And yet it is precisely the theory - the deconstructive and 
genealogical logic of articulation, applied to the subject's and the group's 
processes of identity formation - that is to prevent the antagonisms and 
contradictions of society from degenerating into mere violence.  As Laclau 
and Mouffe put it -  the endlessly unstable network of hegemony is the 
"real reality", such that the descriptions of discursive articulation they 
give in their work are what we might call"the really real politics".   
Radical democracy therefore has two simultaneous aims: first, to 
make of democracy again a movement, a site of passionate attachment 
on its own terms; and second, to abolish the liberal "structuring space" 
or "field" within which the various groupings of identity and interest 
operate according to shared assumptions and rules.  These rules are 
instead themselves to become sites of attachment or repulsion for 
subjects; the rules of the game are to be determined non-aoristically, as 
part of the political agon itself, revisably, and even without the 
assumption that the rules of the game will be more than local in extent 
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or even translatable across boundaries.  Indeed, the communicability of 
political standards is the political problem  sine qua non.  As Laclau puts 
it, recruiting Gramsci, the spaces various subjectivities can be said to 
occupy are themselves originated in acts of articulation by those 
subjects, and their growth and ramification becomes a process of 
internal and external negotiation of not-necessarily-translatable 
utterances.  "In Gramsci, politics is finally conceived as articulation, and 
through his concept of historical bloc a profound and radical complexity 
is introduced into the theorization of the social"35. Yet even Gramsci does 
not go far enough: "the ultimate core of the hegemonic subject's identity 
is [still] constituted at a point external to the space it articulates."36  It is 
to "deconstruct" this last "redoubt" of class-reductionism, that will allow 
the opening-out of classical Marxism into something much more 
"subversive": "Unfixity becomes the condition of every social identity...the 
sense of every social identity appears constantly deferred"37 
This, then, is the fundamental radical democratic project: Within 
Schmitt's overall understanding of "the political", soladaristic political 
groups are to engage with one another without preconceptions, in an 
indefinite - because always renegotiable - practice of articulation.  In 
essence, the Schmittian political reality is to be conjoined with the 
discursive logic of deconstruction, in such a way that claims of identity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Ibid.	  p.	  85.	  36	  Ibid.	  p.	  85.	  37	  Ibid.	  pp.	  85-­‐86.	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themselves, which, for Schmitt, are defined determinately and 
immediately by the confrontation with the dangerous enemy, become 
instead issues for doubt, contestation, and revision - both externally and 
internally.  The bonds of friendship become themselves subject to the 
same forces of imminent critique that problematize both the self-
understanding of political agents within a group and the overall status of 
the polity.  The effect, at least putatively, is to dissolve the very "logic of 
'the people'"38 which Schmitt's distinction of friend and enemy ultimately 
inscribes: if "I" and "we" are continually in the process of articulating 
what "I" and "we" are, are continually generating the discursive space in 
which "I" and "we" are negotiated, never achieving closure of identity or 
subject-position...what is left of the distinction "friend" and "enemy," of 
the "fullness" which is the counterpart of the emptiness of the liberal-
democratic space?   
    In a recent essay on Schmitt's theory of the "partisan", Laclau 
brings his thesis to bear.  What Schmitt got wrong was not that the 
political is essentially structured by the antagonism between friend and 
enemy39 (11), even that what is most to be feared from liberal democracy 
is depoliticization40, but that Schmitt did not understand that the 
boundary between the terms (and Laclau does see them as terms) must 
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be porous:  it is precisely the rigidity with which he posits this distinction 
that is at the root of the limitations [of Schmitt]41. For Laclau, the 
exemplary figure of this porousness on the field of antagonism (here, 
outright war) is the partisan - the way in which the partisan, in 
interrupting the distinction between enemy and civilian - between, 
therefore, combatant and noncombatant, between enemy and nonenemy 
- sets up a "break between two principles"42 in the identity of the power 
at war with the partisan - an identity, recall, brought into being not 
autochthonously but in the confrontation with the enemy, whose 
dangerous unity brings about the corresponding unity of the friends.   
    It is difficult to see, however, how this can be more than 
formally true: certainly the battle against partisans and fifth columns 
does not itself significantly interrupt the practice of making war; the 
history of the 20th century is the history of war conducted in the face of 
this "break" but without acknowledgement of it.  The difficulty was posed 
to the legal order of war, instead: an order that must be wholly irrelevant 
to Schmitt's notion of the political, which is simply the scene of groups in 
mortally significant battle with other groups; it is precisely the attempt to 
have an overarching law to regulate such antagonisms which is the 
disaster of liberalism.  Laclau seems to confuse the two: that by making 
the legal order of battle unstable, he imagines that the partisan has 	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  Ibid.	  p.11.	  	  42	  Ibid.	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  5.	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crumbled the rigidity of the distinction between friend and enemy, and so 
established that the true logic of the political, even on Schmitt's 
assumptions, must be hegemonic, and therefore tend away from the 
moment of decision rather than hastening it.  On this analysis war must 
really be, as Laclau says, "some sort of mobile metaphor"43. 
Schmitt certainly didn't think it was, and for a very precise reason.  
Laclau opines that the  articulatory overturning of the ideal of the subject 
as "a unitary, transparent and sutured entity"44 - the subject's 
genealogical deconstruction, in other words, as in the case of in which 
the subject faces the enemy partisan - "opens the way to the recognition 
of the specificity of the antagonisms constituted on the bases of different 
subject positions, and...the possibility of the deepening of a pluralist and 
democratic conception".45  But Schmitt had no difficulty with what he 
saw as the multiple and contingent commitments of the subject: these 
are not moments that suspend and problematize the moment of decision, 
but on the contrary are its origin: a multiplicity of divergent demands 
cannot all be sovereign over the individual, and so they force the political 
moment of choice, which materializes in the affirmation of political 
violence and "physical killing"46.  To Schmitt, these are exactly the  
moments of threat that show to us what is worth dying - and killing - for.   
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The moment that Laclau holds to be exemplary of the process of 
destabilizing the subject is, to Schmitt, just the opposite. 
In his brilliant commentary on Schmitt's The Concept of the 
Political, Leo Strauss47 finds a deep aporia at this point in Schmitt's 
analysis, one that can best be seen by tracking Schmitt's debt to Hobbes.  
In essence, according to Strauss, Schmitt has undone the polemical 
character of Hobbes' description of the bellum omnium contra omnes - for 
Hobbes, it is what both justifies and demands that individuals leave the 
state of nature and give up its freedoms in favor of living beneath the 
authority of the absolute sovereign.  In Schmitt, the bellum omnium is 
reduced to a simple description of the way human subjects and groups of 
subjects are, as a necessary destiny; the nature of political culture, 
therefore, is merely the organized expression of this nature.  In doing 
this, says Strauss, Schmitt shows what it is he is really trying to 
preserve; not the political as such, but seriousness within politics. For 
Schmitt "serious" means, ultimately, "mortal,"48 and political life without 
mortal danger is simply competition - the economization of politics, and 
the replacement of matters that are at least potentially of life and death 
with matters that can never be such, that are mere "entertainment."49  
For if there is no principle left over which one could even conceive of 
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fighting to the death with an enemy, there is nothing left but 
entertainment and talk about entertainment: the boring expression of 
genuine but utterly nonthreatening disagreement about mere 
"aesthetic"50 preferences.  When Schmitt dashes liberal, humanitarian 
morality to pieces, in order to expose the pre-moral, originary political 
distinction of friend vs. enemy, he does so in the name of another 
morality, that in fact quietly subtends his primordial distinction  - the 
serious, mortally important, search for the ends of political life, ends 
which are themselves of mortal significance. 
But it as this point that Schmitt's theory reveals a fundamental 
incapacity, entailing an opening to fascism.  Schmitt's continual polemic 
against the primacy of humanitarian morality over politics51, his 
insistence that friends and enemies are not defined by universalizing 
concepts but by sheer threatening difference, one from the other, 
disables the possibility of any political principle in particular filling the 
role.  What is left is merely the need that a political principle - a principle 
revealed comparatively, insofar as the enemy brings it into view by 
exhibiting its contrary  - be taken seriously enough to serve as a 
potential motivation for "physical killing."  For this, one principle is as 
good as another; what matters is that it become the origin of an 
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intergroup crisis, an emergency that threatens violence.  The ultimate 
principle of such politics, then, is the simple affirmation of violence itself.   
 
He who affirms the political as such respects all who want to 
fight; he is just as tolerant as the liberals - but with the 
opposite intention: whereas the liberal respects and tolerates 
all "honest"  convictions so long as they merely acknowledge 
the legal order, peace, as sacrosanct, he who affirms the 
political as such respects and tolerates all "serious" 
convictions, that is, all decisions oriented to the real 
possibility of war. Thus the affirmation of the political as 
such proves to be a liberalism with the opposite polarity.52 
 
What becomes sacrosanct is war: not discursive antagonism, but 
actual, "physical" barbarism.  Schmitt's politics reveals itself as the 
politics of the group in continual need of mere violence to create and 
maintain its identity.   
It is my contention that this problematic is inherited by theorists of 
radical democracy who base their views on those of Schmitt: their 
assimilation of Schmitt's metaphysic hors de combat reduces radical 
democracy's affirmation of the political to the affirmation of mere 
violence, and the attempt to invigorate within the Schmittian space of 
"the political" a practice of continual destabilizing articulation only 
makes matters worse.  The proposed defense, recall, was to break down 
and dissolve the putative unity of the political grouping, "the people," 
through deployment of deconstructive or genealogical tropes of identity 
critique, as in this quotation from Derrida: 	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through this genealogical deconstruction of the political (and 
through it to the democratic), one would seek to think, 
interpret, and implement another politics, another 
democracy...It would concern confidence, credit, credence, 
doxa or eudoxia, opinion or right opinion, the approbation 
given to filiation, at birth and at the origin, to generation, to 
the familiarity of the family, the proximity of the neighbour - 
to what axioms quickly inscribe under these words.  This is 
not to wage war on them and to see evil therein but to think 
and live a politics, a friendship, a justice which being by 
breaking with their naturalness or their homogeneity...53  
 
 
But the turning point within Schmitt's theory, the moment of 
political practice, of action, is precisely a decision about all these things, 
and ultimately, a decision that the crisis-point has been reached, that 
the forms of identity that confrontation with the other have elicited are 
now grounds for violence - because these difference appear precisely in 
the moment of moral danger, and they appear the more forthrightly the 
more the danger is dangerous.   There is explicitly no other determining 
ground of identity formation; the problem is thereby not the posited unity 
of "the people" which Mouffe and Laclau seek to undo with new 
discursive practices, it is the lack of it, the way in which the traumatic 
looming-up of physical danger, not the freezing of otherwise-fluid 
discourse, is the origin-scene of politically relevant difference in the first 
place.  Identity formation in this scene is therefore predicated not on 
articulation but on its opposite, barbarism.  And it can be met only by 	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barbarism: discourse about, and thereby deferral of, the decision to fight 
is structurally foreclosed. It is only in the moment that war begins that 
difference becomes concretely articulated, but then, as it were, it is too 
late for talk; the subject "does not have the will...to the avoidance of 
decision at all costs, but in fact is eager for decision; an eagerness for 
any decision regardless of content".54  Not just does not, but cannot 
have, the will - for the presence of the mortal threat whose visible 
difference defines the group of friends is logically prior to the 
concretization of the felt sameness of the friends; the very first mode of 
that group's self consciousness is the decision to fight and kill.  Any 
possible discussion of identity and motives is posterior to the declaration 
of hostilities, while the decision is arrived-at prior to all articulation.  
While liberalism cannot articulate for its own part its involuntary 
construction of inside and outside, radical democratic politics, insofar as 
it uses Schmitt's political metaphysic to interrupt liberalism, produces a 
politics that cannot contain articulation at all.  Yet these were to be the 
problematics of politics sine qua non! 
    The effect is horribly ironic.  Liberalism, recall, was paradoxical 
in its inability to see itself as founded upon an antagonistic relation of 
inside and outside; it thereby attempted a depoliticization which could 
only be a deflection of primordial antagonisms that must return to haunt 
liberal politics.  Schmitt diagnosed in this problematic a tendency toward 	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rarer, but more horrifically inhuman, modes of exclusion and warfare.  
Laclau and Mouffe agree with this diagnosis.   But the gesture of 
depoliticization in radical democracy is even more dramatic.  Laclau and 
Mouffe hope to deploy tropes of discursive instability such that the 
primordial antagonisms will not, in fact, appear as such, as the essential 
mode of the political, except in a modality that will require continual war.  
If the risk of liberalism is total war, the risk of radical democracy is 
fascism: a polity that can constitute itself only by continual "physical 
killing" of the stranger.  In attempting to have Schmitt without Schmitt's 
barbarous politics, Laclau and Mouffe have produced a theory of "the 
political" in which barbarism cannot but gobble up the very thing that 
was to restrain it. 
    A quite different approach to radical democracy, one that re-
orients the question of decision, of binding one's self to what is good, is 
undertaken by Simon Critchley in Infinitely Demanding.  Rather than 
organizing the political field around antagonistic subject-positions that 
find their common identity in the recognition of the danger posed by the 
other, Critchley wants to invoke a Levinasian notion of ethical 
subjectivity in order to undercut the idea that a hegemonic constellation 
of political blocs must necessarily be founded upon the mortal distinction 
of friend and enemy.  Instead, the moment of ethical decision is 
constituted by a confrontation with a neighbor who appears to the 
subject in the form of a radical demand, a demand which the subject can 
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only approve; in enunciating its approval of the neighbor's demand, the 
subject orients itself toward that demand as the source and delineator of 
its ethical comportment55.  The appearance of the radical demand is an 
appearance of a face, a face that simultaneously expresses need  for and 
resistance to the subject it confronts.  It is not that I feel responsible 
because I see myself in the face; it is that the face faces me with the 
simultaneous appearance of a common humanity and a sheer, material 
opacity.  As a surface, it both bodies forth a subject in need, and hides 
its interiority behind a mask of matter, and so is to me an other - 
something that is like me but that exceeds me in a way I cannot grasp; 
the face is that which is present before me but which is nevertheless the 
appearance of something unrepresentable.  The emergence of this face 
from the shadows becomes for me a kind of inescapable center of gravity 
to which I must respond but which I cannot touch; the demand of the 
face is that which pulls my own subjectivity into relief, yet 
simultaneously, in its excess, pulls my subjectivity inside-out.  I am 
ethically constituted and destabilized by the appearance of the face in a 
simultaneous double gesture.56 
Thus it is not a matter of, as for Laclau and Mouffe, the subject 
and the group being constituted by an originary antagonism with a 
dangerous enemy, the appearance of which marks and solidifies the 	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identity of the group, which is only then subject to deconstructive 
analysis and discovered to be questionable, contingent, and porous.  The 
subject and the group only come into being in the mode of their being 
destabilized, even traumatized, by the other that faces them.  The 
"hegemonic" moment of the constitution of the ethical subject is actively 
constitutive of it, not merely discovered in a moment of intersubjective 
articulation across boundaries.   
    At first glance, this would seem decisively and usefully to 
interrupt the Schmittian logic of the political, and reconstitute the 
project of radical democracy on firmer - ironically, constitutively shifting 
- ground.  But as Critchley presses his analysis of what might be called 
"Levinasian radical democracy" forward, a strange consequence emerges, 
as Critchley proposes his theory of political practice.  When the 
confrontation with the face of the other that pulls me into an ethical 
comportment is applied as a model for politics, what emerges is a kind of 
quietism.  Because the originary moment of ethical commitment is 
something I undergo, and continually undergo as I pass through the 
"social manifold," I am continually "undone" by "affective undergoing."57  
The organization of the political group is not a matter of becoming a 
unity in confrontation with a enemy; still less is it a matter of its own 
spontaneity; it is never sovereign over itself, never in the position of 
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affirming itself as a unity.58  The relationship of the group to the state, 
then, can only be one of self-conscious distancing;  insofar as a state is 
able to parse political demands made to it, they must be specific, 
whether they are material or recognitive; an indefinite demand is 
unintelligible, or, perhaps, is simply the demand for the overcoming or 
surpassing of the state without any concomitant notion of how this is to 
be achieved or what is to be done after.  Žižek, for one, criticizes 
Critchley for precisely this mistake, though I think Žižek misreads 
Critchley here: Critchley is not asserting that the political subject or 
group withdraw from the state and make impossible, infinite demands 
before which the state is seen as endlessly guilty59; Critchley is simply 
unconcerned with interaction with the state as a political factor at all.  
The point, rather, is to generate new forms of political subjectivity wholly 
outside the state, through the endless process of "affective undergoing"; 
in retreat from the state, groups challenge each other with Levinasian 
demands, such that subjectivity is in a continual flux, a state - if we can 
call it that - of being always pulled inside-out.60  It's for this reason that 
Critchley valorizes the Zapatistas, whose response to the vicious 
neoliberal policies of the central government have been continual, clever 
re-articulations of subjectivity, designed to draw us out of ourselves.  Not 
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because they fulfill any of the traditional political roles of popular 
organization and directed action. 
Critchley tellingly only introduces the question  "how might [such a 
politics] be effective?" in his conclusion61;  the question is simply not 
answered, except with the disquieting admission, that contemporary 
politics - the whole field, not just the liberal state - is in a "massive 
deadlock", and that, in consequence, "we are on our own"62. 
Slavoj Žižek, in his  In Defense of Lost Causes, makes this mordant 
joke about babies and baths: 
 
One should be careful not to throw out the baby with the 
dirty water - although one is tempted to turn this metaphor 
around, and [not forget] that the water was originally pure, 
that all the dirt in it comes from the baby.  What one should 
do, rather, is to throw out the baby before it spoils the 
crystalline water with its excretions.63   
 
As usual, Žižek is introducing a serious point with this  trope-play: 
we have come to a point in contemporary politics where liberal 
humanism is now the amanuensis of the most vicious capitalist 
oppression all over the world.  The way in which this has happened has 
been described by too many authors to count, but Žižek 's reconstruction 
is especially perspicuous.  The problem, say the liberal humanists, has 
always been too much purity in political aims; sincere devotion to causes 	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requires averting one's eyes from the suffering of individuals; the result is 
barbarism, precisely the opposite of revolution's utopian aim.  The 
original archetype for all such descents into barbarism, be they 
Stalinism, Hitlerism, The Shining Path, or the Khmer Rouge, is the 
Terror that followed the French Revolution; the arch-fiend of monstrous 
purity is therefore Robespierre.  His faith in the purity of the revolution 
was precisely the act of keeping the water in favor of the baby, the 
ultimate gesture of inhuman cruelty.   
    The project lying before political philosophers after Robespierre, 
it would seem, is to be impure, to be tolerant of the baby's propensity 
continually to dirty the water of political idealism; this is realized in a 
range of political philosophies which seek to unwind all moments of 
theoretical purity, while recommending as the best logic of the political 
regime a kind of irresolute humanitarian pragmatics: politics becomes a 
matter of instrumental, administrative management of society - what 
must be excluded is any view of politics as a matter of powerful 
antagonisms among enemy ideologies.  The result has been a deeply 
ironic alliance between contemporary liberal political philosophy and the 
capitalist administrative state.  It has been radical democracy's project to 
break this alliance.  It has tried to retain the former style in political 
philosophy, with its suspicion of purity taken as its anti-authoritarian 
orientation, while simultaneously insisting upon a more essentially 
democratic political praxis that does not yield to the state the mandate 
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over participatory forms of democratic decision-making.  (By now I think 
I have enunciated some reasons why this operation is foreclosed.) 
    Žižek 's project is utterly different: he really does want to throw 
out the baby and keep the water, the pure water of terror.  "There is, 
however, [an alternative] usually left aside: the choice "humanism or 
terror," but with terror, not humanism, as a positive term".64  What could 
this mean?  Not "the obscene madness of...a terrorist and inhuman 
politics," but a politics that lives with, even cultivates, the terror inherent 
in any revolutionary project: rather than rejecting such a project as an 
inhuman abstraction.65  The inhuman dimension of politics is to be 
understood here as a confrontation with the face of the other: but not the 
Levinasian other, in its dual moment of appearing both as a human in 
need and as 'other' that, as a mask, as a surface of matter, resists one's 
gaze, hides its interiority from one, and thus exceeds one's capacity to 
help and even to understand - for Žižek the face is that which appears 
only in that latter, obdurate, fully material mode.  This is the face that 
appears not as a subject, but as flesh, as matter, even as dead 
substance66.  To confront this face is to be confronted with what cannot 
be loved, what cannot be helped, what cannot, in other words, pull me 
out of myself in that primordial moment which radically fractures my 
self-sovereignty: it is, in fact, that which throws me back upon myself 	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most fully, and so confirms me in my agency to the greatest degree.  This 
is the moment of revolutionary potency: the gaze that takes the political 
field as a hecatomb, as already history, rather than a space of 
engagement of subject-positions that destabilize one another.  As Lukács 
put it, the ideal is "organized action in terms of the lessons it contain[s] 
for the future," as if the present is already the past, thereby overcoming 
the post-festum quality of proletarian self-consciousness.67  And, as 
revolutionary, it is to see one's self that way as well: as simultaneously 
acting and as a dead thing, an object of history.  This is Robespierre's 
sublime gesture: in his famed speech to the National Assembly on 11 
Germinal Year II, the day after Danton had been carried off, Robespierre 
says to the assembly that any of us may be next, that this is right, that 
to fear being carried to the guillotine in the name of the Revolution ipso 
facto makes one guilty.  Nor does Robespierre except himself: he may 
indeed be claimed by the forces he has unleashed, but this is proper; he 
is the object of the Revolution now, not the subjectivity that guides it and 
stands outside it - as is all the Assembly, as is all France.   
    To view the people as already being history - to see them as 
already having served their purpose - is, says Žižek, to give the inhuman 
dimension of politics its due.  The passage deserves quotation at length:  
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"Perhaps, then the time has come to render problematic the 
standard topos, shared by practically all "postmodern" 
leftists, according to which political "totalitarianism" ... 
somehow results from the predominance of material 
production and technology over intersubjective 
communication and/or symbolic practice...What if it is the 
exact opposite which holds?  What if political "terror" signals 
precisely that the sphere of (material) production is denied 
its autonomy and subordinated to political logic?"68 
 
    The disaster of the Terror or of the Cultural Revolution and of so 
many other projects appears to be that they unleashed hideous violence 
in the name of structural transformation, but were either unable or 
unwilling to make the structural transformations of material 
relationships that would actually be liberating.  "Crazy, tasteless even, as 
it might sound, ...Hitler...was not violent enough...[he] did not dare to 
disturb the basic structure of the modern capitalist social space."69  
Instead Nazism could focus only on an all-too-human, and therefore 
wholly fantastic, enemy: the Jews.  Similarly, the moment at which the 
French Revolution was a failure was not the rise of Robespierre but his 
destruction, along with Danton; this was a sign that the Terror had 
reached a maniacal pitch in the face of its own inability to disturb the 
economic order of everyday life and thus solve the genuine problems 
faced by France (174).70 
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    Žižek is not calling for a re-staging of the French Revolution, or 
the October Revolution,  or of any other outburst of revolutionary 
fanaticism.  Yet he is precisely taking issue with Critchley's ruling out of 
all such moments as pure fundamentalisms, as though the Maoists, the 
Nazis, the Communists, the Khmer Rouge, Christian Identity, and the 
Islamists are all equally terrible as agencies of undemocratic 
"revolutionary vanguardism."  The French Revolution, the Haitian 
Revolution, the October Revolution - each these has been in some, or 
many, respects, a horror and a failure, Žižek admits, but still, through 
each of them a "utopian dimension shines through"71 which cannot be 
understood as a fascist or religious-fundamentalist movement: these are 
oriented, as Schmitt diagnoses, toward nothing but the maintenance of 
the capitalist economic status quo within the overall state of war.  For 
Žižek, what is needed is, rather than the simplistic rejection of all 
revolutionary projects as disastrous barbarism, the recovery of the 
"virtual moment"72 of revolutionary, liberating possibility within them: 
their orientation not toward war but toward the reconstitution of the 
everyday, economic, material relations among people.  But this requires 
asking a double question: what are the productive, material relations in 
society supposed to look like, and who will be the representatives of the 
people responsible for carrying through their transformation?  And this is 	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the moment at which the question of working-class ideology returns to 
the fore. The question is to take up the moment of revolutionary excess, 
but also to domesticate it, to produce both a theoretical understanding 
and a functional politics of material transformation.  Neither dimension 
can be ignored.  The revolutionary situation must be given a coherent 
shape, a shape that respects the revolutionary event's "rational kernel"73 
rather than simply attending to the immediate needs and demands of the 
inchoate event. 
Critchley against Žižek is essentially the age-old question of 
revolutionary methodology; we've been here before.  Just to take one 
example, I'd like to cite Georg Lukács against Rosa Luxemburg.  The one-
sided quarrel between Lukács and Luxemburg occurred against the 
background of Marxist historiography:  the question was less the edmos} 
or the polity's relation to the state than than the relation of all three to 
the material processes of history.  In accusing Luxemburg of a vulgar, 
undialectical understanding of the relation between party, class, and 
historical situation, Lukács' History and Class Consciousness} 
enunciated a critique that is still of value in contemporary debates.   
    According to Dick Howard, Luxemburg was the first great 
"democratic revolutionary,"74 the fiercest critic of the anti-democratic 
aspects of Bolshevism and of any revolutionary movement which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Ibid.	  p.	  160.	  74	  Dick	  Howard,	  "Rediscovering	  the	  Left,"	  Praxis	  International	  10,	  no.	  3-­‐4	  (1991).	  p.	  193.	  
	  	   37	  
regarded the vanguard party as essential to the process of overthrowing 
capitalism. The revolutionary vanguard party, with its necessarily 
democratic-centralist tendencies, its "esoteric" (in the Straussian sense) 
deployment of ideological rhetorics that expostulated vastly different 
versions of its self-understanding appropriate for party insiders, party 
rank-and-file, and the working class more generally, and its generally 
conspiratorial praxis, appeared purely antithetical to the authentic self-
expression of the working class' demands, to the emergence of a coherent 
class-consciousness on the part of the workers themselves.75  The debate 
continues today, as more orthodox Marxist parties continue to argue for 
the necessity of vanguard-party activity against the anarchic 
autonomism of such famed standard-bearers as Hardt and Negri. 
    But the debate over the vanguard party's ability to manipulate 
or obscure authentic, organic working-class consciousness, for Lukács, 
mystified the vital question of where such consciousness was supposed 
to come from in the first place.  This, of course, is the question of 
ideology: of the systematic understanding of history, economics, and 
politics  in the interest of a particular class.  Leaving aside the enormous 
debate, beyond my scope, of whether there is any understanding of 
history, economics, or politics that is non-ideological, suffice to say that 
any such understanding which is partial - interested - and indexed by 	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that partiality to the practical point of view of a particular class and set 
of class aspirations is eo ipso ideology, whether it is false or true: there is 
no requirement in Marxian analysis that "ideology" be composed of lies; 
indeed, within the sphere of working-class liberation, it is the truth - the 
theoretical truth about relations of domination and mystification which 
enslave the worker, and the practical truth about the means of 
overcoming such relations.  Working-class consciousness not in 
possession of coherent ideology is dumb and blind. 
    It is therefore the very organicity and spontaneity of 
Luxemburg's democratic revolutionary consciousness that strikes Lukács 
as reified, an undialectical wish lodged in the theory, in the garb of an 
anti-reificatory program.76  Undialectical in a specific sense: rather than 
a theoretical explication of the manner in which demos and ideology, 
theory and practice, meet, the relation is simply posited as a given unity 
somehow "discovered" in the very process of revolutionary agitation.  For 
Luxemburg, it is precisely vanguard-party ideology that reifies the 
consciousness of the working class77; Lukács, on the other hand, sees 
this very explanation as the ossification of an undigested mere hope.  
"Organisation," as he puts it, "is the form of mediation between theory 
and practice"78 - here, specific party organization and the way in which 
the party mobilizes and organizes the working class, in which the very 	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form of this mobilization "objectif[ies] the roles played by...individuals, 
and their ability to determined organised action decisively"79. 
    Without an analysis of party organization and the role of party 
organization in the creation and dissemination of ideology in a way that 
makes ideology practically efficacious - that is, by mobilization - 
Luxemburg can only aver that such effective  understanding arises 
directly in the consciousness of the working class in and through the 
concrete reality of its historical situation as it appears at the moment of 
revolutionary crisis.  This is a curious thing to say: that effective 
ideological coherence arises spontaneously from class-position, at the 
moment when history is most up for grabs and when class-position is 
most a welter of differentiated strata.  This can only be so through a 
powerful reification of the category of history, such that it is able to 
punch through the confusion of the revolutionary situation to directly 
inform working-class consciousness.  For Lukács, by contrast, the 
vanguard party is the working class' organ of self-consciousness, the 
"autonomous form of proletarian class consciousness serving the 
interests of the revolution"80  Its ideological function is therefore the 
coming to conscious awareness of the working-class situation; this is the 
precondition of a conscious decision, a conscious action, of class 
autonomy and of freedom.  Where Luxemburg intended to extirpate the 	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totalitarian tendency of Bolshevism, she does so by introducing into 
revolutionary politics a strange fatalism, even a quietism, whereby the 
organic, spontaneous unity of class is dictated by the originary unity of 
history itself.  Expelling Bolshevism has been at the cost of re-
introducing the most essentialist, or totalizing, ground of Marxist 
historiography:  the pure causal inevitability of capitalist crisis creating 
proletarian revolution, at the expense of the autonomy of the specificity 
of working-class subjectivity as such.   
    This seems strikingly to track the debate between the radical 
democrats influenced by Schmitt and their critics, and clarifies what is at 
stake.  What is at stake is ideology, or the coming to political self-
consciousness that ideology permits.  For Schmitt as for Laclau, for 
Mouffe as for Critchley, ideology is the enemy: it is the solidification of 
subjectivity, when what is wanted is rather for subjectivity to be pulled 
out of itself, defined, even called into being, by the Other.  For Schmitt it 
was the Other as threat that defined by opposition the commonality 
shared by the group of friends; for Critchley the Other as ethical demand 
created the self in a situation of perpetual moral abasement.  But in both 
cases what is apparently not wanted is even a temporary stabilization of 
subjectivity in a mode of coherent self-consciousness and practical 
orientation to political life.  What is wanted in Critchley's case is an 
endless discourse about identity which makes no practical demand; for 
Schmitt, identity serves only as the ground of barbarous conflict which 
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makes only the infinite demand that the Other cease to exist.  And in 
trying to transform the latter into the former, Laclau and Mouffe break 
their theoretical interventions on the shoals of ideology: neither able to 
neutralize nor expel the indigestible residuum of barbarous violence at 
the heart of the theory they incorporated from Schmitt, they are able only 
to conceal it with a deconstructive gesture.   
What are we left with?  A crossroads in contemporary theories of 
democracy:  
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CHAPTER II 
 
KANT, REVOLUTION, AND THE STATE 
 
One of the most extraordinary documents of the Enlightenment is  
– probably unsurprisingly – Kant's "Was ist Aufklärung,"  a work of 
considerable subtlety and sophistication, despite its being composed for 
a mass audience.  Most readers have noted that the essay seems broken-
backed;  the first four paragraphs a clarion call to individual maturity, 
autonomy, and freedom, that could scarcely seem more modern; the 
remainder an absolutist screed seemingly out of the depths of the 18th 
century, relegating the hopeful passages of the first paragraphs to the 
status of merely formal, empty promises.  The first half, plausibly 
radically-democratic; the second half, not merely liberal, but 
authoritarian, enjoining obedience to political authority, not its continual 
reconstruction and radicalization. 
    To explore the ways in which Kant's political theory is not 
simply one of the ur-texts of liberalism against which radical democracy 
arises and reacts, but can – and should – be read as an answer to and 
critique of radical democracy, I wish to turn initially to an extraordinarily  
fruitful attempt to suture the halves of the essay together: that of the 
German critical theorist Ingeborg Maus, scandalously under-read in the 
English-speaking world.  In her magisterial Zur Aufklärung der 
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Demokratietheorie81, Maus is concerned to systematize and rejuvenate 
Kant as a democrat: not as a formally-liberal republican, but as a true 
radical democrat in his own right.  It is a remarkable reading, and while 
in the end I find it is unsupportable, it is surely the most creative and 
suggestive reading of Kantian political philosophy in many years. 
    According to Maus, Kant is the victim of an under-reading, 
conditioned by the modern tendency toward the almost-metaphysical 
separation of the governmental/expert decision-making apparatus, from 
the "social base".82   But this separation is not necessary, contends 
Maus; it has emerged within a particular constellation of late-capitalism 
and been read back into liberal democratic theory on that basis.  
Proceeding on this assumption makes Kant's (and Rousseau's before 
him) analysis of the rational necessity of obedience to duly constituted 
authority – to the extent of absolutely denying a right of  revolution or 
even a right of resistance to  authority when its exercise is patently 
unjust – appear as a demand to genuflect before heteronomously-
constituted power, and thus as a flat contradiction to the Enlightenment  
imperative to cast off tutelage and become autonomous.  As Maus notes,  
 
Through the example of Kant's political theory it can be 
demonstrated that the genuinely democratic thrust of the 
Enlightenment project is missed at present, because on it is 
placed the responsibility for that limited form of political 	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engagement which still appears possible today....it escapes 
notice that Kant negates the right of resistance neither in 
deference to ...absolutism nor of any other form of reform 
from above.  Rather, he waives the right of resistance in 
favor of the principle of popular sovereignty.83 
 
This is an ingenious turn.  Taking "What is Enlightenment" as the 
pole-star to interpretation of the second part of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, she finds that Kant's argument against the right of resistance 
against a monarch – that it is the attempt to set up a second sovereign, 
or even to construct each subject as politically sovereign, which is, on a 
transcendental analysis, the destruction of authority as such, and a 
return to the state of nature – is transformed when applied to popular 
sovereignty, the principle of democratic government.  Popular sovereignty 
already assumes that each individual is, if not a monarch in themselves, 
at least a functioning element of the authoritative decision-making 
process; the right of resistance in this instance is, first, necessarily to 
make a claim for the contrary of popular sovereignty, which is by 
definition a gesture towards an absolutist formation, and, second, to 
claim resistance against one's very self as an element of the popular 
decision-making process, an out-and-out practical contradiction.   
    This is the political face of Kant's demand to cast off tutelage: 
the politics which emerge from it just are those of radical democracy.  To 
assert that Kant's transcendental form of argument about political 	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authority leads him not to his avowed republicanism but, properly, to 
radical democracy, is certainly a strong claim.  For Maus this takes the 
form of a thorough anti-constitutionalism and an opposition to forms of 
liberal politics which take countervailence as their model: all these are 
extra-political structures that limit the scope of popular sovereignty.     
    But the heart of her argument is a re-reading of Kant's view of 
the formation of political rights.  For Maus, rights properly speaking are 
not mere authorizations of access to spaces of non-interference carved 
out against others; they are rights of equity to be heard in the public 
space of articulation and renegotiation of political practices and norms.  
In this sense she sees in Kant a theory of "institutionalization, not of 
institutions," which she finds less in his explicit political theory than as a 
consequence of his account of the reflexivity of Reason in the First 
Critique. 
No longer is the concern merely "reflection" in the sense of 
thinking about thinking, but "reflexivity," that is, [thinking] 
regarding the structuring principle of the independence of 
processes which are applied to one another.84 
 
 What is up for grabs is less the completed structures of 
apperception and judgment, but the canons which make them 
determinate; within the political field, a politics of reflexivity is concerned 
with the structuring principles for the formation of institutions, but lacks 
the cognitive resources necessary to give finality or closure to the 	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constitution of institutions.  What is left is a continuous process of 
reflexive institutionalizing: political institutions that  are continually 
concerned with negotiating the basis of their own reconstruction.   
    This puts the radical democracy Maus finds in Kant on a 
different basis than the heirs of Schmitt.  The primary objection I 
outlined to that scheme was that Schmitt's analysis, though taken by 
radical democrats to be the essential point of departure in critiquing 
liberal democracy, was founded on an a-rational moment of unanalyzed 
political violence, which in turn rested upon an undialectical reification 
of terms like "nation", "class", or "history" which were seen to organically 
or spontaneously give rise to the proper sort of consciousness for the 
active political group.  What was lost was precisely self-consciousness.  
For Maus' Kant, that self-conscious autonomy is intended as the 
principle of radical democratic politics, not its antithesis.  The question 
must therefore be, is Maus' reconstruction of a Kantian, Enlightened 
basis for radical democracy sustainable? Or, put differently, is she right 
to assert that the formal, countervailing structures inherent to Kantian 
liberalism, the very structures that militate against the rationality of the 
monism of the demos, are external to his commitment to democracy?  
Can the two be separated?  Is there a radical democratic Kant alongside, 
or beneath, the liberal Kant, a radical democratic Kant upon whose 
politics we might reconstruct radical democracy that escapes the 
Schmittian surd? 
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    It is my contention that she is not right to claim this, that Kant's 
countervailing liberalism is inherent to his commitment to autonomous 
political subjectivity within any democratic political practice.  Radical 
democracy, indeed democracy as such, cannot be reconstructed on this 
basis: the quarrel is not merely one within philosophical historiography, 
but will be seen to constrain the democratic alternatives.  But her 
attempt opens up the possibility of a reconsideration of the nature of 
Kantian liberal democracy that will make clear some of its surprisingly 
radical possibilities.  To put the point more plainly, Kantian liberalism 
was always more coherent, more radical, more liberating, and very much 
more democratic, than those radical democracies founded on the 
Schmittian critique of classical liberalism which took the reaction against 
Kantian liberal republicanism as their touchstone. 
    I further contend that, in Kant, the essentially empty 
utopianism of "democratic political monism" – the metaphysical unity of 
state and people – receives its starkest repudiation.  Kant is perhaps the 
most perspicuous, and surely the most forthright, theorist of the relation 
between authority and the people in a democracy; where his primary 
political principle for the individual is one of "throwing off all forms of 
tutelage," and his primary principle for the group one of maximum 
freedom for each consonant with the freedom of all others, he 
nevertheless sees no right of revolution or even of resistance against a 
political system which is unjustly or despotically constituted.  This 
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apparent paradox, its sheer strangeness, has placed Kant "beyond the 
pale" for many who are seeking a more radical form of democracy, for it 
makes of him the arch-liberal, exhibiting in the strongest possible way 
the contradiction putatively inherent to any liberal democratic ontology.  
This is precisely why I turn to him.   In his attempt to keep open the 
seemingly-paradoxical space between the claim, on the one hand, that 
individuals have a duty to achieve their own self-legislational autonomy 
(within a liberal order of maximum freedom for each consonant with the 
freedom of any other), and on the other hand, that the state (any state, 
even one hostile to autonomy) is absolutely sovereign, that he reaches 
the pressure-point vital to the theory and practice of democracy: that a 
democratic polity ought self-consciously to contain and continually to re-
instantiate the duality between political authority and the civic culture 
that underlies it.  The preservation and working-through of this 
separation is not an impediment to, but an essential constitutive feature 
of, any democratic polity worthy of the name.  If radical democracy is to 
be understood as the overcoming of political dualities to produce a kind 
of monad, a union of state and people, of governance and governed, 
within which horizon the people can authoritatively rearticulate and 
reconstruct authority itself, it is a doomed project, doomed to turn into 
its other - fascism - and that the recognition of the ontological unfitness 
of the domains of liberal democracy - authority and civic culture - for one 
another, is in fact the hallmark of a genuine democracy.  To put the point 
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more plainly, Kant foresaw the shoals of radical democracy, and 
understood that a critique along the lines of the one Schmitt would 
eventually advance bears down less upon liberalism as such, than any 
politics that seeks to constitute itself monadically: that the attempt to 
suture the cut between authority and civic culture simply produces the 
ghastly, unconscious politics of friend and enemy.  It is in order to 
preserve the possibility of democracy – and, more than democracy, 
politics as such – from the maw of sacrosanct war.  
    Now, liberalism as usually conceived is a theory about the state 
and about the people's relation to the state; the state is determined to 
have an essential internal institutional structure, which enables it to 
carry out the people's will, in whatever way this is conceived, and which 
prevents it from becoming tyrannical, in whatever way that is conceived.  
The people are thought of as having duties of legal respect toward the 
state and rights of noninterference secured against it.  In the liberal 
understanding, the purpose of the theory of democracy is to adumbrate 
those structures and those duties, which can be quite complex – but 
which will always form a set of limits and structuring relations which 
prevent monadic politics.  It is against this understanding that radical 
democracy reacts. 
Kant, by contrast, has only the most minimal theories of the state 
and of the relation between populace and state.  While there is an 
account of the state's internal structure, it is a transcendental account, 
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and does not prescribe specific institutional arrangements that any state 
ought to reflect in order to be regarded as legitimate – indeed, there is no 
notion in Kant of political legitimacy at all; a state, in virtue of its being 
the actually existing authoritative power, is eo ipso legitimate and 
deserving of respect.  Further, there is no set of rights that the people 
ought to secure against the state, in order to found a proper relation 
between people and state - indeed, the people have no prior or natural 
rights against the state at all, only an absolute duty of respect for the 
legal order and the authoritativeness of the state's decrees.  Kant, in 
point of fact, simply does not regard the state - in whatever form! - as 
opposed to, or competitive with, the people in the first place; rather, it is 
constitutive of them.  This reverses the traditional liberal order of 
precedence, in which the people's sovereignty and consent constitutes 
the state. 
Of course, as we will see, Kant pays a price for this: the gap 
between the individual and the institutions of governance, or rather 
between the standpoint of the individual as political singular and the 
individual as political sovereign, or, in the register of the group, between 
civic culture and the state, rather than collapsing into a monad, yawns 
so widely that Kant is unable, in the end, to advance a coherent view of 
the phenomenal state.  Rather, the theory of the state and the state's 
rights become, in Kant's hands, a retreating noumenon, its applicability, 
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even its commensurability, with any existing state or possible state, 
always radically in doubt.   
    I will begin with Kant's account of the impossibility of resistance 
against the state, for it sets up in starkest terms the commitments 
involved in his understanding of "the rightful or civic condition": 
 
Subjects may indeed oppose injustice [that is, the sovereign's 
acting contrary to natural law, for example the law of 
equality] but by complaints, not by resistance... People 
cannot offer any resistance to the legislative head of state 
that would be consistent with right, since a rightful 
condition is possible only by submission to its general 
legislative will.  There is, therefore, no right to sedition, still 
less to rebellion, and least of all is there a right against the 
head of state as an individual person (the monarch); to 
attack his person or even his life on the pretext that he has 
abused his authority.  Any attempt whatsoever at this is 
high treason... the reason a people has a duty to put up with 
even what is held to be an unbearable abuse of supreme 
authority is that its resistance to the highest legislation can 
never be regarded as other than contrary to law, and indeed 
as abolishing the entire legal constitution.  For a people to be 
authorized to resist, there would have to be a public law 
permitting it to resist, that is, the highest legislation would 
have to contain a provision that it is not the highest, and 
that makes the people, as subject, by one and the same 
judgment sovereign over him to whom it is subject.  This is 
self-contradictory, and the contradiction is evident as soon 
as one asks who is to be the judge...85  
     
Ostensibly, then, there is little to say about Kant and the right of 
resistance: he doesn't recognize one.  The standard reading of  Kant on 
this point is one I regard as implying a kind of resignation: that the 	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moral law rules out resistance by citizens against state power, and 
enjoins obedience to any and all states, no matter how appalling, not 
because of any particular immoral acts that may be committed as a part 
of a program of resistance, but because of a formal condition inherent to 
any state, what resistance to authority must always imply: a volition to 
destroy the authoritative unity of the lawful state by creating a nexus of 
contrary authority.  For Kant, resistance seems to be incompatible with 
the rational conditions of civic order at all.  How can such an 
understanding be seen to be democratic in any sense? 
    Let me begin with an analysis of the Kantian term recht.  His 
use of it just in the Metaphysics of Morals is protean, almost untraceable; 
but, importantly, this is not a matter of mere vagueness, but is a 
problematic which arises from deep within the way Kant analyses 
political right.  When Kant says that resistance is always unjust or 
always contrary to right, he always employs a particular terminology: 
that it is unrecht, contrary to recht, or contrary to the allied Latin with 
which it is used here virtually synonymous, iustum.  On the one hand, 
recht refers  to that which is ruled upon by practical reason, or by 
practical reason's political form: political principles discovered a priori by 
practical reason, what Kant will call - with some modifications, to be 
described below - "natural right".  Yet it can also refer to the merely 
extant law of a state, which Kant calls "strictly positive right," and which 
he notes can easily be contrary to the dictates of both the natural and 
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the moral law.  And still again it can refer to the progressive instantiation 
of natural right within the positive law: what Kant terms "public right."  
For Kant to designate resistance as "unrecht" is not thereby to say very 
much; what is contrary to strictly positive right is merely illegal, not 
necessary unrech] in the sense of violating natural law; still less may it be 
unmoralisch, unless it were the case that Kant thinks it absolutely 
obligatory to obey all positive laws in every possible instance, which, of 
course, he does not: one is strictly enjoined from violating the moral law 
simply to avoid punishment at the hands of the positive law.  Indeed, it is 
quite possible to reconstruct a reading of Kant's account of the rights of 
and duties toward a state in which his exclusion of the right of resistance 
starts to seem viciously, or even slyly, circular.   
 Though the territory is complex, it is worth going over in some 
detail.  As Leslie Mulholland points out in the Introduction to Kant's 
System of Rights86, at least three senses of the term are at play in the  
Metaphysics of Morals, distinguished only by their article: Recht, das 
Recht, ein Recht.  Quoting from the Handschriftlicher Nachlass:  
    "Recht"  is that free action whose maxim can coexist with 
the freedom of everyone according to a universal law.  -- "Das 
Recht"  ...is the system of laws according to which what is 
"Recht" or "Unrecht" is determined.  "Ein Recht" (of which 
someone can have several) is a capacity of the will to bind 
others rightfully.87   
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    The first concept, Rect simpliciter, corresponds to what Kant 
calls the Universal Law of Right: "So act externally that the free use of 
your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with 
a universal law."88 As a principle for a lawgiving will, the Universal Law of 
Right yields the formal condition for lawgiving, the instantiation of which 
as a system of laws yields Public Right89, embodied by a public 
constitution and authoritatively interpreted by lawfully sitting judges.   
Public right is the positive legal form that the Universal Law of Right 
takes in "the rightful condition": that situation in which every individual 
is able to attain a corresponding relation with every other in which 
everyone is able to enjoy their rights.90  
By contrast, "das Recht" is bivalent: Kant uses the term as the 
systematic adumbration of the laws of Rect as a system of a priori 
principles, Natural Right, but also uses the same term to describe the 
systematic legislative adumbration of positive law by the law-giving 
authority, which may or may not correspond to the principles of public 
right.  Indeed, the former condition, in which the laws of a state "flow of 
themselves from concepts of external Right as such"91 is "the state as 
Idea, as it ought to be in accordance with pure principles",92  that is, 
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according to Natural Right, the principles of just political association, 
discovered rationally.  This is a norm, not a description of any actually 
existing state.  The actual will of the legislator is positive, or merely 
statutory, right.   
    So, regarding das Recht, the system of laws, either arising a 
priori and giving the content to public right, or considered positively, as 
the will of the extant legislative authority, it would seem we ought to find 
that the ground of obligation with respect to each to be wholly different.  
And indeed we do.   There is, of course, only one internal ground of 
practical duty: the unconditioned a priori moral law, that determining 
ground of the will according to which a proposed deed becomes either 
obligatory or forbidden according to its suitability to universalization on 
the basis of its mere form.   
The external ground of duty is das Recht, in one of its possible 
forms.  First, if lawgiving is moral, that is, if the law is an instantiation of 
a moral imperative, or if it creates a lawful category of relation among 
individuals which embodies a moral imperative, that law is an ethical 
law93 and the grounds for obedience to it is simply moral duty itself; 
positive law which is entirely in agreement with moral lawgiving is 
simultaneously positive and ethical law.  Second, those laws that proceed 
analytically from the Universal Law of Right, which give form to the civil 
condition obtaining among individuals, and the rightful relation between 	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state and people, are "external natural laws"94, and are seen as binding 
on any community even without any external positive lawgiving; to cause 
the scaffold of positive law to approach full agreement with this position 
is the rational duty of positive lawgiving authority.  Third, those laws that 
are merely given by legislative authority and which would not otherwise 
in any way be binding are "strictly positive laws"95.  Strictly positive laws 
hand down external obligations that, in the absence of the positive law, 
would not be binding on the moral subject, and which the subject would 
not recognize as binding. Such laws have a merely juridical character: 
the determining ground of choice is the subject's general respect for the 
authority and majesty of the state, rather than the subject's own 
realization that the external rule resonates with either morality or any 
objective necessity of public justice.  Kant nevertheless describes 
violations of strictly positive law as unrecht, and he describes obedience 
to them as rechtlich: what is unjust is what is illegal with respect to the 
law, whatever the law's ground of duty.  
    In these later two cases, Kant is concerned less with the 
principles of action as such as determined by the pure subject, but by 
the universal principle of Recht's capacity for instantiation as a grounds 
for a civic constitution.  He says something remarkable: 
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Thus the Universal Law of Right...lays an obligation on me, 
but it does not at all expect, far less demand, that I myself 
should limit my freedom to those conditions just for the sake 
of this obligation; instead, reason says only that freedom is 
limited to those conditions in conformity with the Idea of 
it...and it says this as a postulate that is incapable of further 
proof.96  (K, Metaph, 231) 
 
Kant's account of duty toward, and respect of, the state is not, then, a 
description of moral duty, in which respect for the moral law just is the 
determining ground of political obligation; rather, Kant is here giving an 
analytic definition of what freedom is in a political association, and the 
shape that political institutions ought to have in respect to this freedom.  
But as an account of the duties of the individual in a political 
association, natural right is not necessarily congruent with the moral 
law, and as a ground of obligation operates in a totally different way.  It 
amounts to an inherent principle of tolerance within the very notion of 
freedom: As Mary Gregor has pointed out, much of what Kant talks 
about in the Rechtslehre has to do with enunciating a permissive 
principle for end-setting by subjects97.  While Kant of course thinks that 
actions can be classified as right and wrong according to the categorical 
imperative (at least, actions with any moral content at all), end-setting, 
that is, taking up and identifying one's self with particular projects, is 
slipperier.  Where such projects do not directly require actions contrary 	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to the moral law, the bias toward them should be permissive, such that 
they can be allowed to define spheres of property and operation over 
which the subject should have an exclusive right as essential to the 
realization of their end.  Projects, and the type of end-setting proper to 
them, are an essential part of human personhood.  It is in this sphere 
that the Universal Law of Right has its greatest influence, for it is here 
that it says that what does not interfere with the corresponding freedom 
of others ought to be permitted.  
    There is something of a threatened antinomy: if what is unrecht 
is what is illegal on any grounds, it will immediately be objected that the 
moral law within and the strictly positive law without will inevitably come 
into conflict; indeed, it is scarcely possible to conceive of a genuinely 
political order, that is, short of the kingdom of ends, in which the gap 
between natural and positive right will not gape open.  Why should the 
concept of political right contain within it the necessity of obedience, 
both within natural right and within strictly positive right?  The answer 
lies in Kant's peculiar form of anti-consequentialist contractarianism, the 
compliment to his peculiar notion of the state of nature.  What Kant calls 
"private right" - for example, the right to enjoy a possession, or land that 
one owns, as essential to the realization of one's projects - fully exists in 
the state of Nature, indeed, characterizes it; the having of projects of 
one's own, then, is a part of human identity that is pre-political.  This is 
not a Hobbsean account in which right can be said to exist only insofar 
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as there is a power which guarantees it; here, it is precisely the pure 
"mineness" of the right which makes it constitutive of the state of nature.  
When it comes to having or enjoying objects and ends as my own, the 
subject-matter of private right, what is lacking is not the right to them, 
nor even the force needed to secure them, but an external, judicial 
authority - not an awesome external power - entitled to make an 
authoritative decision as to where mine ends and yours begins, 
consonant with the permissive principle of the Universal Law of Right.98  
This is something that no purely internal imperative sorts out for us and 
which must, ultimately, have a partly arbitrary character.  The criteria 
used to define what an infringement on the other's freedom is, where the 
general expectation of a boundary, an end to "mine" and a beginning of 
"yours", should be, will give rise to natural, ineliminable disagreement 
among subjects about such matters, within the state of nature. What is 
at issue is exactly their differing particular projects and thereby their 
sense of the scope of their own agency. Even within a civic constitution 
the limits of "mine" and "yours" will be at least partly a matter of positive 
law and custom within a social context: without any recognized, external 
judge empowered to do the work of making a  binding declaration of the 
dividing-up the world, the only recourse is violence.  The fundamental 
purpose of the external judge is to provide a mutually-binding, 
recognizable criterion for separation other than what can be achieved by 	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violence.  Violence, of course, in the state of nature always has a 
potentially general character, with no resources for self-limitation; 
violence inescapably portends war.  And it is war, the ultimate condition 
of evil, that overthrows all stability, and thereby decidability, about 
relations of private right; to choose war is to cease to disagree rationally, 
but to submit the question to a means of decision that is wholly a-
rational, rather than only partly so.  The state of submitting to an 
external judge retains some of that arbitrariness, but does so under 
conditions of peace.  The external judge is therefore not a cognitive 
tribunal for sorting claims via some absolute political calculus, but is a 
means of backstopping inevitable conflict about political rights according 
to principles which must command the broadest agreement - without 
resort to war.  It is, in fact, in the existence of an intersubjectively 
recognized external judge of public right that Kant locates the transition 
from the state of nature - the condition of purely private right - to public 
right.    
    So for Kant, the State has the function of providing the 
conditions under which private rights can exist determinatively and be 
negotiated in peace: that is, that we may have rights against other people 
and rights to things99, such that I may take myself and what I take for 
my object as lawfully mine, consonant with the lawful freedom of other 
subjects. Public right, the structure of the laws, with their corresponding 	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institutions of coercion and legal judgment, is the sphere that contains 
and enables private right's political existence.  A system of public right, 
properly administered, which supports lawful private right, is what Kant 
terms "a rightful condition," in which all are enabled to enjoy their rights 
consistent with the freedom of others.  Public Right and Private Right 
thereby combine in this rightful condition to instantiate the Kantian 
Natural Right100, only the mere form of which is known a priori. His 
account of natural right is distinctive, in that the existence of these 
natural rights do not precede the subject's movement into political 
association, either in a temporal or logical sense: rather, natural right  is 
a creation of civic association, and the creation of natural right is 
thereby our interest in civic association.  Where a more typical theorist of 
the social contract might define the state of nature as that state of war of 
all against all which persists because there is no civil body of sufficient 
strength to end the contention by enforcing the natural rights which are 
known a priori to exist, for Kant, the priority is the opposite: it is only by 
being absorbed into the polity subject to legal authority that one's 
natural rights become fully determinate and determining.101   
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    Public right lives, gets its body within, a particular state.  In this 
sense, Ingeborg Maus was quite right to say that Kant's theory of politics 
was a theory of institutionalization rather than of institutions: what is 
discovered a priori to be natural right is rather the formal conditions for 
political "institutionalizing" rather than the finished form of those 
institutions: it is ultimately no contradiction to say that natural right is 
discovered a priori by practical reason in its political employment and 
that these rights come into existence and become determinate only in the 
"rightful condition."  Kant's theory of the state is the theory of the 
coming-to-determinacy of natural right.   
    There is a further key point here: the coming-to-determinacy of 
natural right is also the instantiation of the individual's complete power 
of choice. For Kant, the power of choice is never defined as a power that 
decides for or against obedience to law.  Rather, it is the determinacy of 
law that defines the capacity of choice, while the absence of law is 
incapacity102; this is a familiar argument with respect to the inner, moral 
law; the moral law is the form that reason takes in its practical 
employment.  Acting "contrary to law", could such be conceived, would 
be a sort of volition that took as its grounding principle the lack of any 
consistent maxim - but this is to behave unintelligibly, simply to lack 
anything that can be termed a purpose.  This cannot be action as such.  
Rather, the subject's capacity for self-legislation is its capacity for free 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  Kant,	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals.	  p.	  52.	  
	  	   63	  
choice.  But Kant fascinatingly extends this line of reasoning to political 
right.  Insofar as private right exists even in the state of nature, projects 
can be undertaken by the individual self, and the self can act - but the 
scope and nature of that power of choice are utterly transformed by the 
passage into political right, into the civic constitution.  What is gained is 
not so much the Hobbsean 'security' in one's own projects, there being a 
greater power which overawes all and thereby preserves private property 
and the space of private action - what comes to exist is not just an 
enforceable but a determinate scope for individual activity.  What one 
has in the state of nature is private right without privacy - not merely 
that the sphere of private right is permeable by other individuals forceful 
interventions, but that those interventions cannot be claimed as 
unjustified or even known to be interventions into what is one's own; the 
transition out of purely private right is thus the resolution, the coming-
to-determinateness, of one's own capacity to define and pursue one's 
own projects. 
    Practical reason's interest in the transition to a civic 
constitution is an interest in having its rights as determinate; the 
transition is thus something the subject enjoins on itself and to which it 
cannot, qua rational, but consent.  Practical reason, therefore, has an 
essential interest in the transition from the state of nature to the civic 
constitution: it is as much as in avoiding violence as making private right 
determinate beneath the formal dictate of the Universal Law of Right.  
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Kant even notes that there is no right of safety against coercion against 
those who do not acknowledge the sway of public right; one may, indeed, 
coerce by force those who otherwise will not enter into or cooperate with 
the civic constitution.  But, again, that to which the individual has 
consented, or that within which the individual must recognize as living in 
a condition of always-already-having-consented, is less a perfected state 
than a project for the achievement of a state.  Kant's original contract, 
then, is not a theory of the legitimate state, a norm against which any 
existing state can be compared and, in falling short, declared illegitimate, 
with the concomitant rightful withdrawal of consent by the governed.  
Insofar as a state exists, its legitimacy is not even a proper question; a 
fortiori the actual histories of particular states are not relevant.  Kant, in 
fact, discourages us from the inquiry on anything but antiquarian 
grounds.  Subjects find themselves in states whose positive laws bear 
greater or lesser degrees of resemblance to what the natural law would 
require.  But it is only by already inhabiting such states - even absolute 
monarchies - that they are able to affirm the transition from private to 
public right in any specificity.    
    To take a more concrete example, when I wish to claim some 
object as my own, or to stake out some particular objective as my own, 
within the state of nature I have no recourse with which to enforce such 
a claim - nothing to make such a claim even so much as clear and 
determinate - except my own power to grasp and to hold; but, what is 
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important to note, I am advancing a maxim of action that cannot be 
purely private; what I want in order to name an object or project "mine" 
is to be able to nominate my control it even when I am not in direct 
possession.  Thus "mineness" can only be conceived within a structure 
that gives it specificity apart from my mere grasp.  Private right always 
demands to become public right.  That is to say, my demand for 
"mineness" is not a claim advanced upon my own strength but a need for 
a law of possession, with an external judge of such cases to give my 
claim scope and definition.   In this way matters of purely private right 
such as promises and gifts become such public matters as contracts and 
deeds; in this way the positive law becomes more consonant with the 
natural law, which in turn becomes concretized, from the merely formal 
postulate that I ought to be able to enjoy my own freedom consonant 
with the corresponding freedom of others (the Universal Law of Right) to 
such claims as that I, and others, have a legal right to property; I, and 
others, can enter into legally-enforceable contracts; and so on.  This is 
the general form of right as such, and it forbids on purely analytic 
grounds the contingent, individual withdrawal of consent from the 
existing state.  
    Perhaps surprisingly, given this account, Kant's theory of the 
state contains a notion of countervailence, of countervailing right.  In 
more traditional liberal political philosophy, the ideal of countervailence 
functions from the point of view of the individual: it is a way of securing a 
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space of negative rights of noninterference by co-ordinatively limiting the 
authority and scope of the branches of political power.  From the point of 
view of political power, countervailence is an impediment to its smooth 
functioning.  Just as Kant feels that the rights are not secured so much 
against the state but are extended and guaranteed by the state as a 
constitutive and necessary element of its own functioning, which is to 
say, as instantiator of law over violence, the sovereign power of the state 
is essentially divided into regions of correlative functional responsibility.  
These, in a sense, act as checks on the others, but in a more proper 
sense give the necessary, indeed only possible, form to those other 
regions of authority.  Countervailence, for Kant, is another a priori 
feature of the Idea of the state, and is not justified consequentially or in 
terms of rights granted extrinsically to individuals in some pre-political 
way.  Rather, countervailence is justified as an analytically necessary 
feature of the state's own ability to exercise its rightful authority in the 
first place.   
 Within the Idea of the State, Kant defines three authorities, which 
are necessarily "co-ordinated" with each other and which, in their 
coordination, are mutually necessary; each in its moment of proper 
function is hierarchically superior to the other two.  The first is the 
sovereign authority, in the person of the legislator; the second is the 
executive authority, in the person of the ruler; and the third the judicial 
	  	   67	  
authority, in the person of the judge103. These three authorities require 
each other much, as Kant notes,  as the categorical syllogism has three 
parts.  There is a source for the general law, a means of deciding in cases 
what the law is in its particularly, and a means of instantiating those 
decisions by directive and enforcing those decisions through coercion.   
    Within the Idea of the state, the supreme legislative authority, 
the source of legal sovereignty does not derive from the person of the 
monarch, but from the will of the people; this is formally true, and 
describes a dictatorship as much as a republic.  By definition, the 
original contract specifies that "[t]he legislative authority can belong only 
to the united will of the people"104. Consent to the sovereign authority, 
therefore, is never a matter of a people binding itself to an external 
demand; the traditional liberal picture of the "original contract" is 
therefore both logically and temporally exactly backward.  Now, 
rulership, the power of lawful coercion, is invested in the institutions of 
government which serve to instantiate the law; this may be either in 
accord with the general will of the people or not - rulership's being in 
accord with the wishes of the people is not what, for Kant, constitutes 
consent to be ruled.  A despotism rather arises when the legislative and 
ruling functions are united in one: most properly speaking, though, a 
despotism arises only in a "direct" democracy, in which supreme 	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legislative authority and the persons of the legislators are both 
analytically and spatiotemporally one.  A monarch who both legislates 
and rules is a kind of illusion; even the tyrant is, theoretically 
considered, the agent of the people.  His function is, according to Kant, 
actually to issue decrees, and so to bring into being a legal order through 
application of coercion to particular cases, in conformity with the law. 
When it is said that the monarchs' word is law, what ought to be said is 
that the monarchs' rule is irresistible decree, that does not attain to the 
formal status of law.  Indeed, for Kant, what makes an absolute monarch 
absolute is not lawgiving power, but the ability to declare and prosecute 
wars against other sovereign powers, the activity of the state which is 
most essentially requires the issuing of orders apart from any legislative 
process or will. 
    To put the point another way, before the subject can become 
concerned about the form the laws take, it is necessary that there be an 
institutional context in which law, as externally binding force, can exist.  
But to will such a context is to will away what Kant terms "the lawless 
freedom" of the subject to act on the basis of its own notion of justice, 
which is of course just another way of describing the state of nature.  
Thus the subject is called upon to renounce the state of nature even as 
an ideal, and enter a state of civil constitution. Indeed, for the subject to 
arrogate to itself the right to act so as to make its own, private notion of 
public justice the actual, public one is to will itself back to the state of 
	  	   69	  
nature, in which externally binding legal authority did not exist, and to 
do this in the name of its own private ideals and for the expansion of its 
power of choice; this is purely contradictory. At the moment of 
recognizing the law's failure to live up to one's own ethical intuitions is 
the moment at which one should recognize one is most bound to the law.  
Indeed, practical reason is forced to recognize the binding authority of 
each of the three elements of the state, the executive ruler, the legislative 
authority, and the judge; to assert as a matter of public right that one is 
permitted to renounce or oppose any of these three immediately involves 
a contradiction, or, perhaps more precisely put, involves the dissolution 
of recognized external authority and withdrawal into the state of nature.  
There cannot be public right on condition that there be more than one 
contending judge, more than one contending ruler, more than one 
contending legislator; but the existence of contention within the poles of 
authority, rather than coordination of the poles of authority, is another 
way of willing the state of nature, which it is our imperative, in the name 
of the determinacy of our own power of choice, to eschew.   
    Something odd will be noted when the maxims of private right 
have, so to speak, called public right into existence and begun the 
process of instantiating natural right into the form of what Kant calls 
"public justice."  The process described here is, in a sense, toward a mere 
Idea - a normative ideal, which Kant refers to as respublica noumenon   - 
but in no way is it necessary that the corresponding empirical fact, the 
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respublica phenomenon, be wholly in agreement with the Idea.  That is to 
say, what one must work toward is a rational system of countervailence, 
what Kant calls "co-ordination" of the three authorities - the judicial 
authority, the sovereign legislative authority, and the coercive ruler.  In 
actuality this coordination will be imperfect, will not obtain to one degree 
or another; where a clear, reciprocal hierarchy should exist (that is, the 
ruler should be irresistible, the judiciary irreversible, and the legislator 
irreproachable, all with respect to the others), in fact, one or more of 
these will be hierarchically subordinate as such, or in the wrong respect 
to one or more of the others; this condition is, for Kant, the definition of 
despotism.  To emphasize, though, this is not a condition of the 
unrightful or illegitimate state against which the individual may 
rightfully withdraw consent; rather, it is an impediment to the state's 
own natural functioning and development as mandated by the principles 
of natural right.   
    A state can, of course, simply be excessively libertarian, in that 
its positive laws fail to 'line up' with the natural law on matters of 
relatively little moral import, so that the coercive power of the state is not 
bent to the dictates of natural law.  An example would be a state in 
which contracts existed but were not enforced.  Of course, from the 
internal ground of obligation, it would still be obligatory to keep 
promises; there would simply be no external ground of legal 
determination for this decision.  From the point of view of the positive 
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law, obedience to the moral law would have a supererogatory character; 
there would, however, be no essential conflicts between such a slack 
state and the dictates of the moral law.  But what of a state that was 
more essentially mutilated?  What of totalitarianism?  Consideration of 
such a limit case will help make clearer what Kant's commitment to co-
ordinated state authority amounts to. 
    Totalitarianism as such not having arrived on the political 
horizon, Kant nowhere deals with the possibility; it may be that he 
simply felt that such a state would promptly collapse.  We know now 
that, while unstable, such states can and do persist for far longer than is 
needed to do evil of a type and degree not seen before.  The case I have in 
mind is that in which the basic transition from private to public right is 
overridden by the executive ruler, which arrogates to itself the power not 
of both legislation and decree - this is the condition of the monarch - but 
of both of legislation and of judgment.  This is the situation in which law 
itself is "deformalized,"105 to use Ingeborg Maus' phrase; the case I have 
in mind is that of Nazi Germany after the accession to power of the Nazi 
party.  It is, as Maus cogently points out, not quite true to say that it was 
the basic insufficiency of the law which allowed Hitlerism to take the 
form that it did - that is, it is not quite true to say that Nazi rule 
functioned "within the letter of the law."  The supreme moment of Nazi 
disregard for the state and the political order would not be, for Kant, 	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Hitler's  arrogation of power to make law by emergency decree but rather 
his arrogation of power to apply it in cases; the analytically absurd basis 
of Nazi rule was therefore less the Enabling Act, which was justified by 
Article 48 of the Weimar constitution, but the constitutionally 
unjustifiable Reichstag Fire Decree, which dissolved civil rights, 
including the right of the citizenry to appeal to courts.  The kangaroo 
People's Courts that he created were thus a hideous mockery of the very 
idea of law, as had been the Stalinist show trials of the "Trotskyite-
Zinovievite" axis a decade earlier. 
    One criterion of a state in its more proper functioning is 
intelligibility to the citizenry: positive law ought to be seen to arise from, 
instantiate, and respond to the imperatives of natural law.  But in the 
case of the wholly degenerate dictatorship, the limit condition is reached, 
and the opposite obtains: a set of private maxims, unreflected in the 
moral law, bearing no relation to natural right, and therefore the 
antithesis of public justice, take themselves to be limitless, protean; they 
are thus incomprehensible to the people as grounds of the ruler's actions 
and appear to arise from no principle at all.  Insofar as the executive 
continues to exercise its function of coercion, this coercion comes to 
appear as purely arbitrary cruelty, rather than as punishment for law-
breaking or negative incentive to obey the law, because, in this instance, 
there really is no law.  Denied application to cases, law remains 
indeterminate; what is substituted is the pure whim of the ruler  - and 
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this way the analyticity of the ruler's function as agent of the people is 
broken, for the people can have no interest in losing the specificity of the 
law, the achievement of which was the motivation and the content of the 
flight from the state of nature.    
    The closest Kant gets to systematizing such a state of affairs is 
in the lengthy footnote on the execution of Charles I and Louis XVI 
appearing in The Metaphysics of Morals106.  The executions aroused all 
Kant's moral disgust and condemnation.  The executions of the person of 
the monarch, for Kant, strike so thoroughly at the very idea of a civil 
republic that they form a kind of moral singular, a kernel of inexplicable 
evil.  A mere criminal, he points out, can be understood to act unfreely, 
from an impulse of sensibility, or from a deviation from the rational will, 
taking themselves as an exception from a law they otherwise recognize; 
what is nearly impossible to understand is what Kant calls a "formally 
evil" crime, in which the transgressor takes as their maxim the 
repudiation of law which their repudiation formally recognizes, as when 
Louis XVI was decapitated "in accordance with the law."  This is so 
utterly contradictory that Kant seems to find it almost supernatural: 
"only what happens in accordance with the mechanism of nature is 
capable of being explained."  The execution of a monarch is a "chasm 
that irretrievably swallows everything...[it] seems to be a crime from 
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which the people cannot be absolved, for it is as if the state commits 
suicide."107 
    This becomes an unexpungeable crime because the ground of 
authority of the state has swallowed up and consumed its own agent, the 
ruler, and, by declaring this an act of lawful punishment, makes its 
maxim its own self-cannibalization.  The Nazi corrosion of law is 
strikingly similar in structure: the ruling executive swallowed up the 
legislative authority that can be vested only in the people, substituted its 
own power of coercive decree for lawgiving authority, and dissolved the 
very idea of judicial determinacy under the rubric of the ruler's merely 
private will.  The result was a state, or pseudo-state, whose rule was that 
of self-mutilation and self-consumption, such that the sphere of public 
right contracted to nothing, the void being filled by arbitrary political 
terror and cruelty.  Perhaps such a political formation ought not to be 
called a "state" or even a "pseudo-state," but only a mere "power," the 
term Kant reserves for states in their relations to citizens of other realms, 
to whom they owe no duties.  
    What of a right of resistance or revolution to such a degenerate 
political formation?  If we may term rule by private decree in the absence 
of lawgiving authority and independent judicial judgment "totalitarian 
dictatorship," a situation in which the decrees themselves become free-
floating instruments of pure terror, bent to mean anything that the 	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originating will requires, it is clear that in that case the strict positive law 
has either ceased to exist or been collapsed into an identification with 
mere force.  In either case, positive law and natural law become utterly 
disjoint even from the point of view of the Idea of the State, for the 
maxims of the ruling executive are not so much in a tension of 
contrariety with natural law - the ordinary condition of political life 
within any state, even a cruel and dictatorial one - but are, and blazon 
forth, complete contradiction to them.  Such a ruling executive operates 
on a ground from which the natural law is not merely held at a distance 
but is actively regarded as absurd. Such a state may be one that 
practical reason is unable to recognize as such, as being a coherent, 
intelligible authority - and these are hallmarks of authority as such. 
    Recall that, in the Kantian state of nature, the lack of authority 
is not constituted as much by the lack of a ruling power as by the lack of 
an authoritative judge: a judge who is publicly acknowledged by others 
and whose rulings become by accretion the body of law that constitutes 
legal authority.  Yet it is precisely the hallmark of the totalitarian style of 
rule by decree, by deformalization of law, which prevents this process 
from occurring: neither positive law, nor rulings of lawfully-constituted 
judges, nor precedent, means anything before the all-dissolving power of 
the "emergency decree."  Indeed, totalitarianism tends to revise such out 
of existence in a backward-looking  form of erasure: insofar as, for the 
sake of the formal appearance of legitimacy, totalitarianisms 
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acknowledge non-executive state institutions at all, it is to assert that 
their existence has always already been in tune with the ruling executive 
power; where extant histories say otherwise, extant histories will be 
altered to suit.  In short, the totalitarian system differs from the Kantian 
state of nature only in that the central executive is indefeasible, not in 
the sense that institutional capacities for public, lawful judging can exist; 
the former gets us only out of Hobbes' state of nature, not Kant's.   
 But it remains the interest of practical reason to transform purely 
private right into public right, which is to say, to enter that condition in 
which public rights can be brought into being, acknowledged, policed, 
and enjoyed.  Recall that Kant notes that there is no right of safety 
against coercion against those who do not acknowledge the interest in 
the sway of public right; one may, indeed, coerce by force those who 
otherwise will not enter into the civic constitution.  And when the 
individual who will not recognize the ethical imperative in moving into a 
civic constitution is the totalitarian dictator?   
    It is here that the space within the term "recht" yawns its widest, 
where the natural law and the positive law stand not just in tension but, 
in their very ideas, in absolute contradiction.  The gap can only be 
sutured by the destruction of the power which takes as its maxim the 
abolition of law as such.  Yet this is also to will the return to, or the 
continuation of, the state of nature.  It is as if a natural calamity has 
collapsed the very idea of political order, leaving rationality no resource. 
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    Interestingly, the reading I have sketched here of Kant's theory 
of the state has, upon detailed engagement with the text, the appearance 
of underdetermination.  Kant argues that whatever the nature of the 
state, whatever the quality of the legal constitution, the only proper 
comportment of the people towards their ruler and the laws is obedience.  
But what is generally less recognized is that Kant's theory of right is 
intensely restrictive - not only does it place an intense burden of 
obedience on the citizen, it brings with it as a transcendental question 
that of what counts as a state or a law at all: rather than being a 
question as to what states are legitimate, the question is what forms of 
association are states.  There is, in other words, in a theory that 
attempts quite consciously to destroy the difference between legitimate 
and illegitimate authority as such, an unacknowledged reinscription 
within itself of the deeper question of what is and is not a state, what is 
and is not political. 
    It is important, however, before plunging ahead, to qualify what 
I mean by this account of Kant.   I do not hold, for example, that there is 
an esoteric dimension to his work, a radical, revolutionary dimension, 
that belies his outward position.  Rather, I think that there is a necessary 
lacuna in Kant's work, an unstoppable valency between a liberal 
absolutism and a radical, revolutionary democracy, an incoherence, in 
other words, that is the price to be paid for his deeper and more 
fundamental insight about the nature of democracy as such.  If this 
	  	   78	  
insight can be prized out and the way in which it has created an 
instability in Kant's argument shown, I think we can place the theory of 
democracy on a better footing more generally,  and understand some of 
the present lacunae in contemporary democratic theory. 
 To return to the question of revolution within Kant: revolution is 
"always unjust", at least as an idea; whether or not the noumenal 
rightful condition ever has empirical import, I have argued, cannot be 
settled, but for Kant, in any event, the condemnation was neither 
ambiguous nor deliberately underdetermined.  We know this because he 
tells us so, in the case of the French Revolution.  But he also said 
something else of the French Revolution which I have not yet addressed: 
that he loved it.   
    Kant counted himself an enthusiastic Jacobin, at some risk to 
his own career; Kant's biographer Manfred Kuehn shows Kant as 
continuing his ardent support for the Revolution far past 1793 - even as 
late as 1798.  This was a therefore position he maintained at least until 
after the composition of The Conflict of the Faculties in 1797, long after 
what many writers call the "excesses" of the Terror were known to all.  In 
the Conflict of the Faculties,  the nearly-antinomical nature of Kant's 
understanding of revolution is at its height.  Kant heaps contempt on 
both on monarchist reactionaries as well as "1789 without 1793" liberal 
Girondists. He regards the revolution with pleasure, even with glee; he 
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describes his relationship to it as one of "enthusiasm."108  This is 
strange, for it was the moral interest of practical reason to enter into the 
civic constitution and to give up the right to judge issues of public right, 
and with it to lay down the capacity to use coercion to enforce those 
judgments, and it is precisely against this structure that revolution takes 
place; yet Kant says that approval of it from afar is something which "can 
have no other cause than a moral predisposition in the human race."109  
    We might, for example, wonder whether Kant's apparently 
reactionary attitude toward revolutions in general but his apparent joy at 
the French Revolution is a kind of gesture against the censorship to 
which he was no doubt subject. Thomas Seebohm has investigated this 
issue and regards the hypothesis as untenable110 (Seebohm 66). It is 
precisely in what we might regard his most esoteric writings that Kant is 
most apparently reactionary, most condemning of revolutionary activity, 
and this from the greatest heights of his own critical project; we get hints 
that he might in fact think otherwise only in more putatively exoteric 
writings like the Streit.  In fact, so well does his anti-revolutionary theory 
fit with the critical project and so poorly does his revolutionary 
enthusiasm that we would have to say that the "secret" revolutionary 
politics were fully post-critical!  And if Kant was engaged in limning a 	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secret, post-critical theory of justified revolution, why did he remain a 
Jacobin?   
    Seebohm's reading, which ties together Kant's anti-revolutionary 
theoretical stance and his pro-Jacobin fervor, holds that one occurs from 
the point of view of practical reason, while the other emanates from 
pragmatic anthropology.  There is a difficulty with this, though, because 
the relation between practical anthropology and moral metaphysics is 
not one of an antimony of reason in which outright contradiction is held 
in abeyance, each term subordinated as a regulative Idea within the 
strict context of a need of reason, as, for example, the discussion of the 
antinomy of unconditioned free will vs. externally compelled willkur in 
the antinomies of the First Critique.  Pragmatic anthropology is not 
simply an empirical discipline; it is a field upon which we project our 
highest moral interests. 
 
 
 
    Pragmatic anthropology, the study of the species and its history, 
ought not to be seen as a field other to, distinct from, the moral law, 
filled with objects over which the principles of practical reason have no 
sway.  Indeed, it is in the progressive subsumption of humanity under 
the laws of practical reason that we find our rational hope: we have a 
practical interest in this idea.  It would be backward, then, for Kant to 
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appreciate, as contributing to the progress of the species, an act which 
involved the withdrawal of individuals from the civil constitution which 
gives natural right its sway.  Ethics is a transcendental matter, but there 
is in Kant no transcendent moral subjectivity which justifies from the 
point of view of progress what is otherwise wrong, or composed entirely of 
wrong actions.  If such a consciousness was available to us, mere volition 
rather than unconditioned will would be our primary moral faculty: in 
other words, if progress were more than an Idea operating within a need 
of reason, but could be seen to be certain, the antinomies of ethical 
action would themselves disappear.  But this is obviously not the case. 
    Of course, the primary difficulty with such a reading of Kant's 
understanding of the French Revolution is that it ignores Kant's own 
words.  The French Revolution, according to Kant, was not properly a 
revolution at all; justifying it is not a matter of separation of principles 
from which one acts and from which one judges, whether those latter be 
those of pragmatic anthropology or otherwise.  The French Revolution is 
justified because Louis XVI abdicated by calling the Estates General to 
deal with public expenditure and debt, which, by the nature of the 
Estates General's remit, meant that the Estates General took up positive 
legislative authority and the "monarch's sovereignty wholly disappeared 
(it was not merely suspended) and passed to the people..."111.  For the 
same reasons one cannot resist the sovereign, the Estates General, 	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having seen sovereign power devolve into its hands, could not have been 
in the position of promising to return that power to the monarch once the 
crisis had abated; such a promise would entail a limitation of the 
sovereign authority of the Estates General to something outside itself, a 
promise which the Estates General could not therefore rationally give or 
be expected to keep.  Of course, the Estates General could have re-
invested sovereign power in the person of the king, but it could not be 
rightfully compelled to do so, even by its own declared intentions; once 
the Estates General had been called, the monarch ceased to reign. 
    It is interesting that within the extensive literature on Kant's 
view of revolution, this passage is seldom referred-to.  Seebohm, for 
example, does not.  It is as if nobody can quite believe what Kant says 
here - it is as if Kant is permitting himself a lazy escape into a mere 
legalism, quite out of keeping with the spirit of the revolutionary 
situation in France, if not its actual letter - that, while there may be 
something in what he says, it is a prison-house lawyer's stratagem, 
unworthy of the great man. 
    What this ignores, of course, is the protean yet restrictive sense 
Kant gives to recht - practical reason's interest is that there be a coherent 
structure of positive law, not that the structure of that law be any 
particular way.  While we are surely enjoined from carrying out duties of 
positive law that are immoral from the point of view of the moral law 
within, there is no criteria otherwise which would allow us to sort just 
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and unjust laws; indeed, the inquiry itself is one that Kant regards as 
culpable.  The question, again, is never the legitimacy of the legal order 
beyond the sheer question of the morality of any positive acts the law 
requires; "Obey the authority who has power over you" is, for Kant, a 
categorical imperative112, while the inquiry into the legitimacy of that 
authority may itself be lawfully punished.  In other words, there is no 
"spirit" of the law lurking behind the letter, or, to put the point more 
forcefully, the letter of the law is its spirit.  In a fascinating footnote to 
"Perpetual Peace," Kant wonders at the possibility of "permissive laws"113 
- that is, a law which allows a particular action, as opposed to a law 
which forbids or mandates.  Ultimately, Kant recognizes that permissive 
laws - as adjuncts to prohibitive laws, in particular, giving specific 
exceptional cases where the forbidden act may be carried out - are part 
of the positive law, but of course are completely incompatible with the 
universal character of the moral law.  With tongue in cheek, Kant regrets 
that a competition held to write legal contracts that were fully self-
interpreting was ended without the prize having been won. 
    Seebohm's solution is to deploy Arendt's distinction between the 
point of view of the observer and the point of view of the participant, and 
to classify the revolution, from the point of view of the observer, as 
something akin to a natural disaster - the culpability of the actors is 	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beside the point; the revolution ought to be seen simply as something 
that happened in the course of human history.  When Seebohm says that 
the perspective which allows us to view a revolution as permissible, or at 
least to view the affects and projects of the revolutionaries as laudable, is 
one that regards the revolution itself as a natural disaster, he has it 
exactly backward.  In a footnote to "On the Common Saying: That May 
Be True in Theory but it Does Not Apply in Practice" Kant discusses the 
result of political cataclysms, when the lawful political order is, by 
whatever agency, overthrown:   
 
At this point, the state of anarchy supervenes, with all the 
terror it may bring with it.  And the wrong which is thereby 
done is done by each faction of the people to the others as is 
clear from the case where the rebellious subjects ended up 
by trying to thrust upon each other a constitution which 
would have been far more oppressive than the one they 
abandoned.  For they would have been devoured by 
ecclesiastics and aristocrats, instead of enjoying greater 
equality in the distribution of political burdens...114  
 
    Yet it is precisely this danger that the French revolutionaries 
avoided: rather than running for cover by advancing existing institutions 
like the aristocracy or the church to sovereign political power, the 
Estates General under the Jacobins took up the challenge of creating a 
democratic, egalitarian commonwealth.  And it is precisely for this reason 
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that Kant's Jacobin faith did not waver at the events of 1792 - for, again, 
there was no, could be no, pre-given set of protective natural rights 
protecting counter-revolutionary elements; the cruelty of the Terror was 
lawful, and even if both cruel and at times stupid was still animated by 
Robespierre's intensely principled desire to complete the revolutionary 
project - while he lived - and to expunge from French society the corrupt 
kernels which would oppose, either forthrightly or covertly, the 
instantiation of the new order.  This is, in fact, the function of the state 
in general; it would have been inconsistent, in fact, from Kant's point of 
view, to favor the revolution and then shrink from the Terror.  What he 
found hideous, contradictory of the very idea of public right, was not 
revolutionary terror but the trial and execution of the former King. 
    There is thus a sort of simultaneous warmth and coldness in 
Kant's view of the Revolution.  He was prepared to look with equanimity 
on what to most observers was the excessive bloodiness of French 
revolutionary violence, provided it took place within the legal order; in a 
sense, the terror of the law is always, for Kant, the central character of 
the law.  He was, by contrast, warmly pleased by the project the 
revolutionary violence advanced.  Indeed, his enthusiasm took the form 
not just of abstract approval from a distance of the abstract nature of the 
revolutionary project - but even a kind of fantasized participation in the 
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act itself,  a "wishful participation"115 or projection of himself into the 
revolutionary situation.   Kant describes his enthusiasm as arising less 
from admiration or approval than a quite direct sympathetic connection 
with the revolutionaries.  Sympathy116 is itself a rather puzzling word for 
Kant to use.  His account of revolutionary enthusiasm based on 
sympathy does not match well with the more robust account of 
"sympathy" given in the Critique of Judgment: there, sympathy is merely 
one of the "languid" affects, not belonging to the noble or vigorous to 
which we can apply the label "aesthetically sublime," while sympathy 
"can at most be adjudged beautiful"117.   The distinction is that the 
sublime affects aim at ideas which are themselves fit to direct our 
intellect with superiority over mere sensibility; the merely sympathetic is, 
instead, the triumph of the latter, a matter of sensible attunement, not 
aimed at intellectual attunement.   
    Kant clearly finds both kinds of attunement when considering 
the Revolution, indeed, it is in his affective attunement, and the affective 
attunement of other observers who share his reaction, that he finds 
shining forth the Idea which gives the contemplation of the revolution its 
positive ethical weight.  That disinterested observers - observers outside 
France who have nothing at stake in the outcome - feel such partisan 
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fervor for Jacobin principles is itself an important fact, for as Kant puts 
it, it directly indicates a feature of human nature: the common moral 
interest in political progress, and our ability to recognize that common 
feature of ourselves.  The recognition of this common interest and the 
concomitant capacity is the origin of political hope.   
    The structure of this discovery of a moral interest and the 
coming-to-consciousness of this moral interest so closely maps the 
Analytic of the Sublime that it makes sense  to offer a brief detour. For 
Kant, the beautiful is that which appears to us as purposive without 
determinate purpose - placing imagination and understanding in free 
play as they attempt to subsume an object within a teleological 
framework that the object, by its presence, resists118. In the judgment of 
the sublime, by contrast, imagination, in a necessarily fruitless attempt 
to encompass the whole of what is either huge or powerful beyond all 
determinate magnitude, is referred directly to the ideas of reason where 
"which idea...is left indeterminate." 119  This is to be understood as a kind 
of violence against the subject, enacted from within.  It is a basic law of 
reason that objects presented to the cognitive powers be understood in 
their totality; it is in this regard that we may say that we live in a 
"common world" with other subjects, rather than merely understanding 
objects as they present themselves to us as particulars.  Now, the 	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sublime, for Kant, is a moment in which nature discloses itself as 
absolutely huge and absolutely powerful; where imagination and 
understanding fail in the conceptualization of the sublime, imagination is 
ruptured directly by the attempt to take on board as a whole the whole of 
nature.  Only reason has within it ideas that are absolutely huge or 
absolutely strong: that is, infinite, in the sense of unlimited; the only 
harmonization of cognitive powers possible in this relationship is a kind 
of analogy between the unrepresentability of the absolute whole of 
nature, which is anti-purposive for the imagination and even injurious to 
it, with the majesty of the Ideas of Reason: God, Freedom, Immortality.  
By invoking these ideas in a sensible context and not via a concept, the 
sublime in nature thus, by a presentation counter-purposive to the 
faculty of imagination, is nevertheless purposive for our own sense of our 
moral vocation. It is within what Kant calls the uncovering of the 
"supersensible substrate", that underlies both sublime nature and our 
own moral vocation, that we discover both within ourselves something 
unlimited, something counter to our own consciousness of finitude, and 
discover outwardly that there does exist a nature within, in which the 
notion of our unlimited vocation can have purchase. We find this 
purchase paradoxically, by rising above nature in our unlimited moral 
vocation, standing against its unrepresentable power and vastness120. 
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   In contemplation of the French Revolution the disinterested 
observer, too, discovers something about nature within - in their own 
affective attunement with the revolutionaries and their project, one 
discovers not just evidence of the moral law within, but discovers that it 
does, indeed, animate nature within - our passionate engagement with 
the world.  What the revolutionary observer discovers is an 
unrepresentable connection between nature and reason, a common root 
as it were, and a ground, therefore, for hope - hope that can now be 
something more than a merely regulative Idea, but which discloses itself 
by a kind of empirical clue.  What we feel in our sympathy for the 
revolutionaries is the falseness of what Kant called the terroristic 
conception of history121 - that historical progress is impossible, that we 
are doomed, that our own animal natures militate fundamentally and 
irresistibly against our rational selves, that our consciousness of 
ourselves as noumenal stands in complete contradiction to our 
phenomenal sense of ourselves as embodied beings, that we will always 
frustrate our own better hopes. What we are allowed, or empowered, to 
infer here is that providence, or nature, has given us a hint that the 
contradiction arises from the nature of our cognitive apparatus, but does 
not necessarily exist in nature; a thought that we cannot coherently 
explain to ourselves, but the validity of which we can sense in our 
reactions to a certain kind of event. 	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    It is in this vein that Slavoj Žižek reads Kant's reaction to the 
French Revolution122. Žižek reads "the Real" of the Revolution as 
occurring, for Kant, precisely in the enthusiasm generated in the 
spectators; the quotidian reality of the Revolution, by contrast, was 
horrific and murderous.  Žižek describes Kant's reaction to the 
Revolution - approvingly - as one of "fetishistic disavowal,"123 in that the 
unrepresentable moral vocation for political progress which was shown 
through the initial opening of the Revolution.  This seems to imply that 
what we might describe as the disinterested enthusiasm of the spectators 
was fulfilled regardless of the fate of the Revolution; that the Republican 
cause could have - as it did - collapse into political terror and eventually 
the reintroduction of the Imperial project in French history - without the 
joy of the onlooker being shaken.  The hopeful aspect was in the initial 
opening, what Badiou would have called the authentic Event of the 
Revolution, prior to its absorption into ideology and terror. 
    Žižek regards Kant as having gotten the Revolution half right: in 
locating the moral significance of the Revolution in the way in which 
spectators react with enthusiasm, he properly, on moral grounds, enacts 
a disavowal of the moral disaster of the Terror - but, in reacting with 
horror and repulsion at the Terror, Žižek says, Kant does not follow 
through his own thought.  The disavowal of the terror of the Revolution, 	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which allows the vocation of the onlooker to shine through in its 
enthusiastic comportment, nevertheless should force the recognition that 
Terror is the ineliminable concomitant of the revolutionary moment - 
that, in other words, the failure of the Revolution was not the Terror but 
the failure of terror, or, better, that the revolution turned to mere terror, 
a mad acting-out of the inability to carry through the revolutionary 
project deeply enough (by overturning and re-organizing property 
relations, for example).   
    I regard this as a strategic over-reading which mutilates Kant's 
essential insight into the French revolution.   Kant does not disavow the 
Terror - fetishistically or otherwise.  He is able to assign it a place within 
the process of creation of a new commonwealth.  Indeed, there is a sense 
in which the Terror itself was the sublime object of contemplation.  To 
carry through revolutionary change, as Žižek is at pains to remind us, is 
violent.  The revolutionary moment, as Kant reminded us, is irreducibly 
so.  To tie together the populace into a new legal order, when the 
sovereign order previously existing has already been dissolved, or 
abrogated, is irremediably violent, for the loosening of the bonds of law 
foreshadows the reappearance of the state of nature and the attempt by 
individuals and bands of individuals - factions - to force each other to 
recognize the claims of private right.  To reinstantiate determinate legal 
right requires one of the factions to win - and this can involve all manner 
of bloody deeds.  It is also partly for this reason that Kant enjoins inquiry 
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into the actual historical process whereby an extant legal authority was 
brought to power, for Kant knows full well that it will not have been a 
peaceful or moral process in itself, and that the realization of this cannot 
but erode respect for the law, which would then appear as the product of 
mere force rather than legitimate authority.  Legitimacy, in other words, 
if it has any role for Kant, is as an historical precipitate, or a kind of 
overlying veil that time grants to all regimes, whatever their origins.  And 
while Kant says that the consideration of private right within the state of 
nature requires that no one can be exempted from forceful coercion to 
enter into a legal order, it is still a practical requirement that the veil be 
drawn and that the ordinary duties of virtue be suspended within the 
coldness proper to the violent instantiation of law.   
As Kant points out in his discussion of the "sublime misanthrope" 
in the Critique of Judgment124, there is a misanthropy of benevolence, a 
benevolence that nevertheless veers away from liking - that is, from 
passionate attachment to any particular person.  This is a benevolence 
that is weighed down by the contradiction between what people are and 
what they could be - it is a frustrated idealism rather than cynicism.  
Kant describes this misanthropy, or rather, the sadness of it, as sublime 
- for it "rests on ideas" about what is truly great in humanity, its moral 
vocation.  But this is also, in an important sense, an account of the 
comportment of the hardened revolutionary, who withdraws from 	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attachment to the particular individual, is indeed constantly suspicious 
of the individual's secret inwardness, which may conceal 
counterrevolutionary deviations - but who, out of an overarching 
benevolence, is prepared, in the name of the universal principles of right, 
to act as pure reason demands - ruthlessly.   
    In summary, then, we can reconstruct Kant's theory of the state 
and its relation to civic culture as follows: within the pre-political space, 
the Kantian state of nature, "right" exists only in the form of private 
right; but private right requires for its coherent and complete 
manifestation an external lattice of laws and a judging authority, which 
between them determine where "mine" ends and "yours" begins without 
resort to violence - that is, in which the mere principle of possession can 
become control or ownership in publicly recognized way, beyond one's 
mere power to hold a thing.  This step is inherent, not so much insofar 
as each individual wishes an irremediably strong external power to 
guarantee private property, as in conventional social-contract theory, but 
rather in practical reasons' recognition of the originary principle of all 
right: freedom itself, which when applied to the interest in private right 
cannot but entail the recognition of a reciprocal mutuality inherent in all 
such rights, which is itself the Universal Law of Right: act so that every 
action can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a 
universal law.  But this principle is not even presentable except under 
the rule of a fully reciprocal and equal coercion under the law, that is, 
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under a the condition of public justice, and that cannot exist without a 
state.  Practical reason therefore has a direct interest in the passage from 
the state of lawless freedom to the state, because the state is the 
embodiment of that rightful, civil condition of public laws and 
authoritative judging which just is public justice's, indeed natural law's, 
determinate existence.  Practical reason's interest in the civic condition is 
such that the dismantling of the actually existing state, and with it the 
mechanisms of law-making, authoritative judgment, and legal 
enforcement, is the return to the state of nature, which is an outright 
contradiction for practical reason's demand for, and recognition of, 
freedom; revolution is ruled out, no matter the nature of the state. 
Resistance to legal authority must entail a will to erect a counter-
authority; even if done in the name of a putative freedom of conscience, 
this is still a contradiction to practical reason's interest in its own 
freedom's determinate existence within a condition of wholly reciprocal 
coercion.  The state, for its part, has obligations of its own, though these 
are not claims against the state by the populace; rather, they are, again, 
the essential principles of its own determinate existence and 
continuation: the reciprocal co-ordination between the legislative 
authority, which is irreproachable; the executive authority, which is 
irresistible; and the judicial authority, which is irreversible.  A 
breakdown in this coordination, or the absorption of these powers by one 
element of the triad, amounts to despotism - though despotism is not, 
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from the point of view of individual practical reason, illegitimate, merely 
awful and unstable.  It is further the state's obligation to permit free 
speech and publication on any question for all who are not the state's 
representatives on that question; this is, in a sense, a duty the state 
owes itself, as it is, first, a principle of governmental stability, and, 
second, lends resource to the capacity for authoritative judgment that is 
in accord with the universal principle of public right.   
The relation of civic culture to the state is therefore essentially one 
of separateness and dependence, not of monadic unity.  Civic culture 
requires legal authorization even to exist, and while the authorization is 
clearly to the advantage of the state, it is no strike against the legitimacy 
of the state should it not extend such authorization.  The duty of virtue 
that takes the form of reforming public speech is not one that holds firm 
in the absence of an authorized space of discourse: quite the contrary.  
From the point of view of the state, it is all to the good if it extends the 
maximum of public freedom of speech, but, while Kant thinks any state 
which does not is placing an unendurable burden on its people, and 
cannot therefore expect long to survive - whatever the moral status of a 
rebellion - it is not essential to the normative concept of the state that 
such a right be extended.  The artist or public intellectual - anyone 
engaged in the public criticism of authority in any aspect - must first act 
from a principle of respect for the law as it exists; this trumps even the 
imperfect duty to speak out in ways designed to improve the polity.  To 
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so speak is a duty of virtue - one that doesn't simply beg reforms of 
power, though Kant certainly thought that was its primary function, in 
his view of top-down political change.  It also has the effect of 
constituting and perfecting the "systematic community" of public 
beneficence and rational hope. The price, as we have seen, is that the 
substantive concept of the state is almost without body, and that civic 
culture is, even if conceptually dependent on the state for its 
subsistence, separated from it by a chasm so deep that it is always, 
historically, threatening to peel away: as Kant notes in a footnote in The 
Conflict of the Faculties, even for the ruler to suggest the state of affairs 
that necessarily, rationally obtains – that civic culture lies both 
dependent upon and split away from the state, that the sovereign has 
indefeasible rights over the people -is to inflict an intolerable psychic 
wound upon civic culture itself, one that risks the provocation of 
revolution, of the eruption into the order of history of the Idea of the state 
in which the people are co-legislational.  The state is in the paradoxical 
condition of being unable to enunciate what its very constitution as 
lawful authority shows to be true; in this sense, the formalization of law 
upon which Maus insists is paid for by a corresponding, constitutive 
muteness, and it is in this muteness that the ontological unfitness of 
civic culture and rulership resounds.  The radical democratic project of 
suturing them is doomed not just because it risks the creation of a 
political order with no interior limits to the abuse of power; it is doomed 
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because the removal of countervailing interior limits is the destruction of 
the conditions of the possibility of political order as such, including the 
possibility of a politics of the people's co-legislational authority, which is 
to say, democracy.  Thus, Maus' Kant falls to the same aporia within the 
Schmittian political horizon: the inability of political actors to realize 
political action correlative to any grid other than that of the instinctual 
enmity of friend and foe: that is, of political actors to be self-conscious in 
the first instance: which is to say, for them to throw off their self-imposed 
tutelage.  Thus, the half of "What is Enlightenment" that precisely does 
not receive its due in Maus' reading is the first half, the supposedly 
radically-democratic half: within the limitations of the radical democratic 
project as founded upon the Schmittian critique of liberal republicanism, 
it is exactly that principle of popular sovereignty that, for Maus, required 
the waiving of the right of revolution, that cannot come into determinate 
existence: rather, the "age of enlightenment" becomes an age of re-
barbarization.  And so, the last opening of the radical democratic critique 
is foreclosed, and becomes apparent that, rather than Schmitt exploding 
the Kantian liberal project from within, it is the Kantian understanding 
of the rational determinacy of right that has exploded Schmitt. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
CIVIC CULTURE AND TASTE 
 
It remains to answer the question as to what resources for civic 
culture, in all its separateness from (and dependence upon) the ruling 
authority, exist within Kant's theory of political right.  It was Ingeborg 
Maus' contention that Kant provides less a theory of the perfected form of 
the state than of the conditions for the perpetual pursuit of the 
achievement of a rightful condition, and of the political institutions 
proper to it; in this I think she has Kant right.  Where Maus errs is in 
asserting that the Kantian account of the structure of state power is a 
radically democratic one, in the sense that what Kant advocates is the 
progressive destruction of extra-political structures of countervailence 
and extrapolitical normativity.  Rather, the situation in Kant is precisely 
the opposite: it is in the name of the progressive achievement of the 
conditions of the instantiation of determinate political right that Kant 
cannot permit the dissolution of structures of countervailence and 
normativity.  And this is, in fact, preservative of the notion of democracy 
as such, for it is precisely in the dissolution of these structures that Kant 
sees not just the return into political life of mere violence and war, but of 
the loss of politics' very ability to resist them, indeed to distinguish itself 
from them at all.  
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    To put the point differently, Kant was, in an important way, an 
anticipator of the dangers of Schmitt's radical decisionism. The challenge 
for liberalism advanced by Schmitt, recall, was that liberalism conceals 
an illegitimate distinction between inside and outside, between those 
deserving of recognition by the law and those not, while requiring 
universal respect for the law as a background condition.  The 
consequence was that, by concealing its own inherent violence, liberal 
democracy was constitutively unable to recognize the ways in which its 
formal conditions necessarily disable the possibility of egalitarian 
inclusion, that its institutions, as enforcers of political norms themselves 
exterior to the reach of liberal discourse, foreclose the possibility of a 
more genuine form of democratic political engagement.  But the error 
that Schmitt made, and the followers of Schmitt inherited, was to believe 
that the paradoxical nature of liberal democracy is inherent to its 
countervailing structure, but not to democracy itself, that it is the 
assertion of enunciated formal conditions for democratic life that are at 
fault, that democracy and normativity are contraries.   
    This is the characteristic error that Kant opposed.  Kant's 
republicanism, therefore, is not an eliminable feature of his  
understanding of democracy, "institutionalization and not institutions" 
notwithstanding; the a-rational, organic, Gemenschaftlich decisionism of 
Schmitt always looms when the formal conditions of democratic 
constitution are laid aside in the interests of democracy itself.  The cost 
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is less political rationality, as in the Habermasian formulation, but peace 
- or, to put the point more forcefully, what is lost when the formal 
conditions of the civic constitution are set aside are politics as such. 
Kant does, however, give a developed theory of the relation between 
democratic discourse and democratic institutions; it is not one that a 
radical democrat of the post-Schmittian typecould rest with, but if 
radical democracy has turned out to be, as I hold, a doomed project, it is 
essential that this theory be explained in some detail and the peculiar 
but inescapable consequences seen for what they are.  It is to Kant's 
theory of civic culture that I will turn next. 
    Kant describes our duty as political subjects to "strive after a 
constitution which ... conforms most fully to principles of [natural] right" 
as a "categorical imperative"125.  But given that political subjects are 
bound to the law, and given that natural right has no complete and 
determinate a priori architectonic, it turns out that what the subject 
must strive for is not merely the occurrence or bringing-about of such a 
constitution; it must strive for a process whereby that imperative can be 
heard and can become concrete.  Full realization of the natural law in a 
civic constitution apart from the concrete political history that gives 
content to the forms of natural law is vapor; such a demand would be 
empty.  Rather, what the subject is demanding at that moment is a 
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political correlative,  a space within which contending ideas of public 
right can find expression and can become proposals for specific change.   
    Kant provides such a sphere of political freedom, which he 
defines as "the freedom of the pen"126  - that is, the sphere of free 
publication of ideas.  Within the community of public intellectuals, it is 
contrary to natural law that a ruler limit the right to publish, except 
insofar as the intellectual is bound by some contingent, public role: from 
this role the publishing intellectual must take pains to dissociate their 
publications (when such might not be possible, as in the priest speaking 
from the pulpit, they must renounce the role of public intellectual and 
toe the line).  The sphere of contending public intellectuals is as open-
ended as it is free, and runs up against the limit only of sedition: that of 
making a demand against sovereign power to be carried through by the 
overthrow of the sovereign ruler.  The public intellectual may 
recommend, however, what it pleases, just as it may lodge what 
complaint it sees fit. 
    Importantly, as Kant notes, the audience for the public 
intellectual is lawgiving authority, not the people as such: while in a 
democratic republic these are analytically conflated, they may be far from 
such practically.  While overthrow of the lawful order is forbidden, a 
reform process is to be expected - from above - by the free acts of lawful 	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authorities; the appeal of the public intellectual is therefore to rationally 
engage the conscience of those in authority, to deliver rational arguments 
as to the disposition of the state and its future as a viable and just 
concern.  Of course, in a democratic republic, "above" is also "below," in 
that the citizenry holds  power over the legislative process: but it is not, 
and cannot be, a demand for the overthrow the constituted authorities 
through nonlegal means. 
    Respect for the extant legal order is by the intellectual, in fact, 
the basis upon which their recommendations of legal change are 
conceivable; the alternative is, again, to inject by fiat into the sphere of 
public right a purely private notion of political right, and this is to will 
not an improved legal order but a return to the state of nature, a moment 
of re-barbarization - the rejection of the external legal judge and the 
reintroduction to the political sphere of civil war as the only possible 
alternative.  Even if after the existing legal order is to be swept away, a 
better one is to be put in its place, better even from the point of view of 
natural right, the willing of the destruction of the existing legal order 
creates an epistemic gap that cannot be rationally bridged: it is only 
within an actually existing legal framework that natural right is 
determinate in the first place, so that the destruction of the legal order 
removes not only the conditions for the inherence of natural right but the 
very determinateness of the idea.  Insofar as the public intellectual has 
the task of making concrete practical reason's aspiration for a closer fit 
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between the Idea of the State and the actual state, between natural right 
and the positive law, this would be to sweep away not just the legal and 
political order, the respect for which is the intellectual's condition for 
being - but would remove the very context for the specificity of the 
intellectual's proposals in the first place.  For the intellectual to assert 
the right of resistance, therefore, would be for the intellectual to will 
away the very rationale for public intellectual activity, as opposed to non-
cognitive means which exist outside even the formal possibility of 
rational engagement, not in the sense of willing against its own 
Habermasian conditions of public discourse but in the sense of replacing 
any possible conditions of public discourse with pre-political violence. 
The alternative, in other words, is not a violation merely of the conditions 
of sense but of the conditions of public speech, of peace.  Similarly, for 
the dictate of the ruler to repudiate free speech would be to erode the 
conditions of lawful judging within the republic, and thereby to erode the 
conditions for the coherence and application of the law itself; free speech 
is thereby not an extrinsic value for political authority but one of its 
conditions.  But, again, on the same grounds that obviate the possibility 
of revolution, the intellectual has no justification for agitating against 
such a ban on speech, other than by speech - and would thereby have no 
basis on which to resist or avoid the application of lawful punishment 
against such speech, should it be banned.  While this would be a 
violation of the sovereign's duty and an erosion of the state's essential 
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constitution, it would not, crucially, touch on the sovereign's legitimacy, 
which is not a category operative in Kant's politics. 
    It is already within the register of the public law that Kant 
makes his distinction between the public and the private sphere.  In 
"What is Enlightenment," he, to later commentators, describes those 
employed in what we would now be inclined to call a "public role" - 
established priest, government spokesperson, etc - as being within the 
purely private sphere, and that those who speak purely on their own 
account - on their own home ground, as it were - as described as 
speaking "publicly."  The distinction arises in this way because only the 
public speaker - the person who we would likely now say is speaking 
privately, only for herself - can be accounted-for purely on the basis of 
public right.  The twinned duties of sovereign authority to permit a public 
space of discourse and the duty of individuals to speak on behalf of an 
improved constitution better embodying the principles of natural right, 
are matters for the construction of the rational political order, the 
relation in right between the state and its subjects taken as a whole.  
While the relation in which the person fitted within a "public role" is that 
of private right: the sphere of reciprocal rights and duties between 
particular agents.  The priest of the established church, for example, is 
in the position of having contracted to fulfill that role, and the duty of 
doing so is the duty of promise-keeping - a private obligation of justice, 
one that ought to be covered by civil law, the law of contracts, but 
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nevertheless not in the form of a duty to sovereign power as such.  The 
public intellectual, on the other hand, has contracted to no-one and in 
terms of her or his capacity to speak owes only the same general respect 
for the law that all other subjects do.  In the event of a law suppressing 
such speech, such a law is contrary to the proper ends of the state, but 
still ought to be respected. 
    Is there, then, a higher duty to speak, even if the law forbids it?  
Such a duty would have to be a moral duty, one which would trump the 
duty of respect for what would therefore be a purely positive civil law.  
But it could not be a perfect duty, or a "duty of Right"127, for perfect 
duties invariably take the form either of an outright proscription against 
a certain category of action (lying), or of some formal requirement that 
any action must obey if undertaken, which takes the form of a 
hypothetical (if speaking, tell the truth; if promising, keep the promise.)  
The duty must therefore be what Kant terms a duty of virtue or an 
imperfect duty, such as the duty to beneficence, or the duty of sympathy 
discussed in the Tugendlehre.  The accounts for these duties are subtle, 
but at least it can be said that they enforce ends that require some 
positive actions for their realization, "according to the means" of the 
agent128, which are needed to promote these ends as general conditions; 
they are not simply forms that actions must take, whether or not they 	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are performed.  Kant calls these "wide duties"129  - not only is there 
considerable latitude in the choice of actions to undertake so as to 
promote the necessary ends, there is wide latitude over the domain of 
action itself, the targets of actions.  The width of the domain of action 
varies with the content of the duty entailed by the end; a filial duty to 
family is lesser in extent than a duty of general beneficence - and Kant 
seems to suggest that the intensity of the obligation to act varies 
inversely with the width: the duty is more exacting in respect to a family 
than to humanity.  Wide duties, though, can conflict, and it is not 
guaranteed that the intensity of the obligation indicated by the scope of 
the duty's domain will resolve the conflict in every case, or even that the 
resolution is perfectly analytic in any case.  This seems to depend on the 
maxim contemplated: a better action on behalf of a wider constituency is 
more pressing than a less perfect action on behalf of a narrower one.  
And given that none of these qualities - intensity of obligation, scope of 
obligation, perfection of the act - produce anything like an architechtonic 
of categories with which their exact hierarchy could be determined, we 
are left with only a judgment call to help us know what to do. 
 
    I use the term "judgment call"  precisely - the matter is one for 
the power of judgment in its reflective capacity, examination of instances 
in which actions conforming to "wide duty" ought actually to be entered 	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into - and, similarly, examinations of instances in which wide duties 
apparently conflict.  According to Paul Guyer130, the situation of reflective 
judgment is the presence to consciousness of a particular thing, or state 
of affairs, which resists conceptual subsumption through ordinary, 
"determinative" judgment.  Reason is thereby thrown open, upon the 
mercy, as it were, of the cognitive powers in general: which, for Kant, 
means those powers,  judgment and reason, which are other than 
inherently presentational.  Because no determinate concept is given, the 
instance can only be met by judgment if it is guided by nonconstitutive 
but heuristic principles derived from Reason itself: the Ideas of Reason, 
which function regulatively rather than determinatively.  Kant names a 
number of instances of reflective judging: the search for the causal laws 
of nature, aesthetic judgment in the cases of the beautiful and the 
sublime, and teleological judgment.  Each is undertaken against the 
background of a "form of systematicity"131  which is assumed as a need 
of reason and applied to cases.  In the case of the search for the order of 
nature, the assumed systematicity is of nature as a whole; in the 
teleological judgment of an organism, in the systematicty of the organism 
as a purposive unity; in the judgement of the beautiful object, of the 
assumed system of human judges to whom the subjective universality of 
the judgment of taste can be communicated, and so on.   	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    I wish to add two elements to Guyer's account: first, that 
judging when to engage in political speech, or any "wide duty" to others 
insofar as they constitute a political community, must have a similar 
structure; and that, unlike determinate judgments, reflective judgments 
about the application of wide duties must be accompanied by a clue, a 
material or sensuous guide, to their proper application.  Additionally, I 
hope to get more out of this analysis than simply an account of when the 
public intellectual ought to speak out, regardless of the civic law (of 
course, there will be no cases in which it will be just to speak out and 
not expect the consequences limned in civil law to be justly applied).  I 
hope to get a fuller account of what a political or civic "community" might 
be for Kant. 
    Susan Meld Shell132 remarks that there is in Kant a sense in 
which what might be called the systematicity of community is of 
fundamental, even transcendental, interest for him, an interest that 
underlies the First Critique as much as the Third.  Shell argues that, 
from the discovery of the 'scandal of reason' in the First Critique onward, 
the transcendental effort has only partly been about dividing the 
presentational and cognitive powers into relative domains of influence 
and so to enact limits against the mind's falling into speculative aporias. 	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Rather, she argues, the deeper purpose of Kant's systematically divided 
account of mind is, paradoxically, to account for the seamlessness of 
experience, to collapse, once and for all, the philosophical basis for the 
great aporetic dualities: mind and world, self and others, to achieve a 
philosophical account of a wholly communal and worldly experience.   
 
So long as one regards the objects of our knowledge as 
things in themselves, there is no way (other than moral) to 
understand how one thing can stand in necessary but 
nonlogical relation to another: no way, in other words, to 
explain the "fact" (as he puts it in the essay on negative 
quantities),  'that, because something is, something else is', 
or  'because something is, something else is canceled.'   It is 
only when one understand objects as constituting a whole 
whose reciprocally binding principle is grounded in the mind 
that this problem of necessary connection...can be 
overcome.133 (Shell, 134)  
 
    I would argue that this is, too, a description of the systematicity 
of a solidaristic political community, in which a fundamental advance for 
one is an advance for all, or in which an injury to one, is an injury to all?  
This is the transcendental principle, the Universal law of Right, 
appearing not as an atomistic, competitive individualism, merely as a 
system of noninterference, but as a positive principle of coexistence, of 
common life - a community of individuals reciprocally bound, or 
coordinated, as we might say, by mutual duties of common moral 
advancement.  It should be clear that the political community, in 	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instantiating natural right, is not thereby merely giving body to 
determinate  "spheres" of mutual avoidance; still less of mere partial 
interest. This is not the whole of what it means for the "rightful 
condition" to exist; it is also for each individual to be caught in a 
coherent space of mutual responsibility to one another, in which mutual 
demands can be intelligibly heard and met. 
 
    Regarding the Tugendlehre, Shell holds that Kant imagines a 
"community of sympathy," sympathy being the intersubjective form of the 
broad duty of love - that this community of sympathy is the basis for 
what might better be called a society of friends.  For Kant, the origin of 
the mutual respectful  sympathy that is friendship is not propinquity or 
tradition or anything like these, as it is on the standard communitarian 
account; it arises from the ideal of the systematicity of community united 
according to the virtuous dispositions of all its members, that is, those 
who act in the light of the broad duty to love.  Friendship is therefore, if 
not a universal, at least a universalizing category which is animated by 
reason's overall requirement that judgment and action take place against 
a background of appropriate systematicity, according to which the action 
will appear to be coherent and meaningful.   
    To put the point another way, Kant's discovery is that what we 
might call a merely procedural criterion or heuristic by which the laws 
and institutions of the democratic polity may be constituted or judged is 
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really only the beginning of what is required of us in consideration of the 
a priori form of natural right.  There is a necessary dimension of 
mutuality, of mutual friendship, as a positive dimension of mutual 
action, rather than the purely negative, non-interfering dimension of 
mutual respect.    
Rawls134, in this sense, does not go far enough in his 
reconstruction of Kantian political ethics: consideration of a putative 
political order from the veil of ignorance can instantiate only the purely 
procedural dimension of mutual respect and noninterference, and can 
judge the justice of political proposals only on that narrow base.  This is 
not to say that the results of the consideration of political proposals from 
the perspective of the veil of ignorance produce what Kant would regard 
as erroneous results - it is hard to see how even the inclusion of the 
dimension of the politics of active friendship would thereby invalidate the 
results of consideration of politics from behind the veil; rather, the 
construction of politics from behind the veil is always radically 
incomplete.  Critics of Rawls who object that the veil excludes the 
facticity of real identity-positions perhaps miss the point: there is no 
requirement, at least in Kant, that their exclusion from part of political 
rationality. Indeed, the contrary. Restriction of political judgment to the 
zone behind the veil means their exclusion from political rationality 
generally, even from a transcendental point of view.  For example, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	  John	  Rawls,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Belknap	  Press	  of	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1999).	  
	  	   112	  
one's particular encounters with other "thickly" constituted subjects, it 
would be a violation of the Kantian account of political rationality to 
ascribe one's duties toward them on purely formal, deracinated grounds: 
the question of one's positive duties of virtue towards them must 
certainly be based on, and could reasonably be based on nothing other 
than, the features of identities that can be made mutually intelligible - 
however this is achieved.  One could reconstruct such a moment 
according to modes of interpretive charity, but that, of course, is an 
additional premise not laid down by the argument to this point.  We need 
only aver that this is a moment that is mediated by, indeed enabled by, 
culture.  Kant notes: 
 
If we regard nature as a teleological system, then it is man's 
vocation to be the ultimate purpose of nature, but always 
subject to a condition: he must have the understanding and 
the will to give both nature and himself reference to a 
purpose that can be independent of nature, self-sufficient, 
and a final purpose.  The final purpose, however, we must 
not seek within nature at all...Hence among all of his 
purposes in nature there remains only this, as that which 
nature can accommodate with a view to the final purpose 
outside of nature, and this may therefore be regarded as 
nature's ultimate purpose: It is a formal and subjective 
condition, namely, man's aptitude in general for setting 
himself purposes, and for using nature (independently of  
nature within man's determination of purposes) as a means 
in conformity with the maxims of his free purposes 
generally...Producing in a rational being an aptitude for 
purposes generally (hence leaving that being free) is culture.  
Hence only culture can be the ultimate purpose that we have 
cause to attribute to nature with respect to the human 
species...  
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But not just any culture is adequate for this ultimate 
purpose of nature. The culture of skill is indeed the foremost 
subjective condition for an aptitude to promote purposes 
generally; but it is not adequate (by itself)...This other 
condition could be called the culture of discipline.  It is 
negative and consists in the liberation of the will from the 
despotism of desires, a despotism that rivets us to certain 
natural things and renders us unable to do our own 
selecting. 135   
 
    Culture, then, is a means to an end, the end of increasing the 
scope of human self-legislative, rational freedom, a project dictated by 
the moral law: the project of creating the formal but subjective conditions 
of being a moral subject.  This thought allows us to put more flesh on the 
bones of the notion of a Kantian society of friends bound together by 
mutual duties of virtue.  Henry Allison, in a forceful article136 on the 
moral subject's capacity to set for itself unconditioned ends, provides a 
partial account of how this cultural project might work in Kantian terms.  
Moral action itself has no particular end other than duty itself.  To 
search for moral ends and organize action around them is impermissible, 
a formal violation of the conditions of good will137.  If there are to be any 
moral ends at all, they must share the same ground as the ethical 
maxim: the very concept of duty, apart from any particular duty. Kant 
finds two such ends: the moral improvement of the self (self-perfection), 
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and the removal of obstacles for the moral self-improvement of others.  
These exist as duties precisely because they are analytically connected to 
the subject's practical interest in the sway of the moral law: they aim at 
bringing about the condition whereby the moral law enjoys its greatest 
scope, and eo ipso the condition of the greatest scope of our rational 
freedom.  Indeed, each of these duties is the same aim considered 
inwardly or outwardly: inwardly it is the  suppression or removal of 
elements of the empirical self which militate against the carrying-out of 
moral duty; outwardly, it is the removal of hindrances that lie in the path 
of others doing this for themselves.   
    Several duties of virtue derive hierarchically from these two: to 
cultivate moral feeling, that is, to increase our susceptibility to be moved 
by duty; to cultivate conscience, that is, to become more attentive to our 
rational capacity morally to judge ourselves; to love, that is, to be 
benevolent to others just because they are fellow humans; to respect, 
both self and others, simply because, as human, they are free moral 
agents.  Interestingly, these duties of virtue are not identical with being 
predisposed toward certain feelings; while Kant says that all humans 
have these feelings, needing only to cultivate them, the source and 
ground of duties of virtue is merely the concept of duty, and it would be 
simply absurd to demand of someone lacking in fellow-feeling to get it, 
for the 'conscience' here under consideration is not a disposition or 
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feeling so much as a mode of attention to the moral law within, to pure 
practical reason itself, which all human beings have qua rational138  
    The duties of virtue pertaining to outer freedom - beneficence 
and respect, those deriving from the duty of virtue one has toward others' 
powers of moral self-improvement - have the peculiar structure of 
requiring one's self to treat the self as a means (though, of course, not a 
mere means).  One attaches one's self to the moral interest  of another 
person.  This is not a case of the reach of private right, for it is not a case 
of contractual binding, but it is analogous - one takes the other's project 
of moral self-improvement as at least partly one's own.     
    The only route available whereby one acts out of a sense of 
binding one's self to the whole, to the community, as a case of moral 
virtue rather than private moral or public law, is within the sphere of 
public expression: as the public intellectual or artist.  As direct action 
within the strictures of government is always constrained by the 
standards of private right (one's relation to the sovereign is as if one were 
in a private contract, an agreement to fulfill a role, or promise, the terms 
of which are not negotiable) and public justice (one may not act against 
the positive law, and, further, direct action against the government is 
enjoined by the nature of the subject's interest in legal order), the only 
domain open for the communal expression of moral virtue is through 
speaking and publishing, and through expressive activity generally.  This 	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is the content and function of Kant's civic culture, and it is the only path 
through which his claim that there is a duty for all to strive for the 
realization of a more perfect civic constitution can be realized.  In this 
sense, one's cultural activity is public just insofar as it is bound not to 
none but to all: to undertake to carry out duties of virtue in the name of 
the entire polity; what is public about this is less that one acts free from 
any external constraint but that in speaking on one's own part one 
speaks in the part of all: that one's expressive activity arises from the 
consciousness of the identity of the possibility of one's own power to set 
projects for one's self and the similar power of all, the mutual 
coordination of which under a civic constitution just is the determinacy  
and scope of our power to act. 
   I think it is from this point of view that one can best approach a 
strange and puzzling remark of Kant's in the 59th section of the Critique 
of Judgment - that the beautiful is the  "symbol" of the morally good139.  
The section is famously difficult to interpret.  Kant intends what he calls 
"the indirect exhibition of a concept."   A concept, if not simply 
"characterized" in language, can be exhibited via a sensuous form, which 
Kant calls "symbolic hypotyposis".  Symbolic presentations are, if not 
absolutely ruled out in other cases, at least only fundamentally 
interesting where the concept to be symbolized is one that does not admit 
of direct sensuous representation. That is, there is no object in the world, 	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via the mediation of a schema, that can be subsumed under the concept.  
The example Kant gives is the principle of the absolute monarchy, which 
is a set of social facts and a rule for the organization of objects of 
experience, not an object of experience itself.  In the case of such a 
concept, the presentational powers on their own account are stumped, 
and judgment must perform a double function - it must find an 
alternative presentation and attach it, as it were, to the unschematizable 
concept by an "analogical" relation.  But given that the concept is not 
merely one that happens not to occur as an object of experience but is 
formally of a nature to rule out such a relation entirely, the analogical 
relation does not occur between the new object of experience and the 
concept, or between the concept and the new object's schema; this an 
error commonly made in the secondary literature.  The resemblance is 
cognitive only, and occurs in the synthesis or connection of the two 
concepts by a "mere rule" of association - that is, by their points of 
discursive identity, they are compared directly.   
    But this seems at once to raise an insuperable objection to the 
claim that Kant makes, which is that the beautiful is the symbol of the 
morally good. Why?   The beautiful lacks any determinate concept. How 
can this be?  A complete account of Kant's theory of taste is beyond the 
scope of this chapter.  But briefly, a judgment of taste is a very special 
kind of judgment. 
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    Kant's most sustained account of judgments of taste comes in 
the first division of the Third Critique.   Confronted by a object as a 
candidate for aesthetic judgment, we may feel in ourselves a liking for it, 
a pleasure, but it is a mysterious sort of pleasure.   In general, for Kant, 
a pleasure is "...the agreement of an object or of an action with the 
subjective conditions of life"140; it is something that satisfies a need or 
fulfills a determinate human capacity.  The pleasure in a judgment of 
taste is not so determinate: it is a liking that has a peculiar subjective 
form, a liking that involves us in the communication of our reasons, if 
such they are, with others, and that makes us desirous of their assent to 
our judgment: it is held in a universal voice.  Yet when we wish to say 
what it is about the object that has dictated such a judgment and given 
such pleasure, we are at least partly at a loss.  The very desire for 
communication of the judgment, not merely appreciation of the pleasure, 
implies that we find it more than merely agreeable but, in some sense,  
good - neither morally good nor good for any particular purpose, but still, 
somehow, good - and that others ought to think the same, despite the 
object's unfitness for our particular purposes and needs.  Indeed, the 
object is one we have no special interest in; we have no use for it, see in 
it no moral or improving function.   On what could such a liking be 
based?   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  Critique	  of	  Practical	  Reason,	  trans.,	  Mary	  J.	  Gregor,	  Cambridge	  Texts	  in	  the	  History	  of	  Philosophy	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1997).	  p.	  140;	  Mary	  Gregor's	  note.	  
	  	   119	  
    For Kant, the clue is in the very propensity to communicate 
judgments of taste.  If the pleasure indicates in some manner the fitness 
of the object for us, but not for any of our particular aims or interests, 
the nature of a pleasure that demands communication hints in what that 
fitness consists: a fitness for our cognitive faculties in general.  The 
moment of aesthetic pleasure is thus a kind of productive cognitive 
failure: the object fits our "conditions of life" but not in any particular 
way.  The understanding, the "power of rules", part of our presentational 
ability, simply has no resources to deal with the object; it cannot 
subsume it under concepts or in any other way discover a determinate 
rule for it; yet it is the demand of reason, the "power of principles," that 
cognitive unity must be served and that the object must be made the 
occasion of systematic thought.  It is therefore judgment's function, as 
mediator between the understanding and reason, to discover a "mere rule 
of association", a rule not of attaching the presentation to particular 
concepts but of attaching it to conceptuality.  To do this is to discover, 
under the unifying, systematizing dictates of Reason, which contain the 
laws of the power of desire, a unity without unification, a formal fitness 
for cognizability without a determinate cognition, an artefactuality that 
gives away nothing about, not even the possibility, of the artificer, a 
purposiveness, in short, without a purpose.  If pleasure comes from the 
discovery - the successful search for - objects that satisfy the conditions 
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of our life, the discovery made in the case of the beautiful object is the 
unconditioned within. 
    Given that the beautiful is that which lacks a determinate 
concept, how can the beautiful be the symbol of anything?  There is no 
concept of beauty according to which any discursive analogy can be 
constructed, so no analogy can be made.  This, however, would be to go 
too far: Kant does not say that there is no connection between beauty 
and the cognitive powers at all, merely that the judgment is reflective 
rather than determinative.  To nominate something as "beautiful" at all 
is, of course, to judge, but it is a judgment of a peculiar kind, a reflective 
judgment of taste.  Kant seems clear that reflective judgment of taste is a 
kind of procedure of failure: an object appears which, at least in the 
respect relevant to taste, finds no concept; but something must still be 
done with it.  The intuition is thereby referred to the cognitive powers in 
general, which are set into "free play," that is, they are not bound by 
determined conceptual rules of association.  But it is vital to note that 
this process is still essentially a cognitive one; the process of free play is 
precisely that of finding a lot to say about an object of experience's 
fitness for a judgment of taste in the absence of conceptual determinacy.   
    The judgment of taste involves a liking, but the liking is not the 
basis of the judgment - just the reverse.  It is in the moment of open-
ended communicative excess which is a kind of obverse of the failed 
moment of judgmental determinacy that both funds the content of the 
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judgment of taste and produces the pleasure of the experience.  But what 
exactly is felt here?  The very universality of the cognitive faculties in 
their communicative universality: or, since Kant calls this pleasure the 
link between judgment and Reason, Reason finds in a sensuous 
appearance the manifestation of the "systematic community", to use 
Schell's phrase, which is not merely an audience for communication but 
is a condition of communication.  The "universality" in the judgment of 
taste is not just a moment of normativity, insistence upon the other's 
agreement which is founded upon the judgment's communicability; it is 
the discovery of a certain kind of communicability, or a communication 
with a particular structure.   Applied to the world, these principles aim at 
the discovery of the purposive unity of nature, a feature which will be 
discovered to function as a need of reason and not as a theoretical 
dogma; of course, in their practical employment, these principles just are 
the principles of the moral law itself. 
    The beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, then, only in a 
kind of indirect sense, or rather, a redirection of an indirectness: the 
beautiful object of experience serves as the occasion for the judgment of 
taste by showing a kind of unity: not a formal unity in its empirical 
presentation,  but a "mere" form, a purposiveness without purpose, 
something like "bare artefactuality."  The purpose is not merely lacking 
but is constitutively absent - it is as if the purpose is such that it can be 
known only to an intellect fundamentally different from our own, a mind 
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that apprehends the noumenal directly, that is, apprehends noumena, 
rather than merely thinking them, via a power of non-sensible intuition - 
it experiences directly that which for us is merely the theoretical 
"something in general", the "x",  which, considered as an "in itself" must 
be the "supersensible nature".141 But in the case of practical reason, this 
can be none other than what Kant describes as "the highest good" in the 
dialectic of practical reason: the fit combination of virtue and happiness, 
the supersensible moral order.  One of the thrusts of the Critique of 
Judgment is to unify these two  supersensible grounds: there must after 
all be a basis uniting the supersensible that underlies nature and the 
supersensible that the concept of freedom contains practically.  
Kant says this with good reason: the combination of 
supersensibles directly in the theoretical and practical registers produces 
antinomy.  Kant is clear that the combination, at least in the form of 
cause and effect, is impossible, and in either direction: happiness, partial 
interest, cannot be the cause of the maxims of virtue, whose determining 
ground is none other than the unconditioned free will; and moral virtue 
cannot be the ground of happiness, for happiness is a matter either of 
luck or of the prudential manipulation of cause and effect - which has no 
connection with the good will at all.  The antinomy is solved only in the 
posited supersensible order, which functions as a need of reason.  The 	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supersensible order comprises a collection of concepts necessary to the 
functioning of morality as such: transcendental freedom, god, 
immortality - but it also provides a sort of transcendentally utopian 
thought: that in the supersensible order, we can have the happiness we 
deserve, that there will be a consonance between moral virtue and the 
order of cause and effect.  What we find in the judgment of taste, I hold, 
is not merely, within the communicability of the judgment of taste, a felt 
unity of cognitive powers with other judges - it is also a felt possibility 
of a moral kingdom, discovered in the symbolic relation between beauty 
and the supersensible - a relation which, Kant notes, we are to discover 
and communicate "as a duty."   
    Of course, the movement toward the Kingdom of Ends - not just 
as an Ideal but as an ideal for human life - is one in which Kant says we 
must hold rational hope.  Just as the supersensible moral order is a need 
of reason for morality, something like historical progress is a need of 
reason for politics: the alternative is the terroristic conception, in that it 
would intend to establish that human political achievement - justice - is 
as fleeting as all other phenomena apparently are, and that there can be 
no expectation that political achievement is durable.  At least in general 
and in the longest possible run, progress must be real.  To believe 
otherwise is to crush the motivation for, even the coherence of, action: 
the power of desire, the source of empirical motivation and satisfaction, 
requires that the arena of its activity be such that the representation it 
	  	   124	  
wishes to actualize be actualizable there, and not an impossibility.  To 
imagine justice is necessarily to imagine the achievement of a kind of 
political order that is both good and enduring - its appearing and passing 
away in a moment is of no help.   
Hannah Arendt, who imagines that all political achievement is 
tenuous and what endures is only symbolization, is therefore politically 
terrorist on Kant's account.  We must, in the very structure of our 
actions, assert the possibility of durable progress.  But that is not to say 
that we can have direct knowledge that history is "whiggish" in the 
required sense; in a way, this is beyond even the lessons of history, in 
precisely the same way that the laws of causality are not established in 
mere empirical regularity.  But, amazingly, this is not all we get - in the 
symbolization of the supersensible order by beauty we find a kind of hint 
that both the order of nature and the order of human making are such 
that the prospect of improving both our species' happiness and its 
worthiness to happiness is possible.  There is a way in which this 
discovery is supererogatory; to act is already to apply this principle 
practically; but now in an additional moment reflective judgment finds a 
means of  tasting that possibility.  As Kant notes:   
 
The concept of freedom is to actualize in the world of sense 
the purpose enjoined by its laws. Hence it must be possible 
to think of nature as being such that the lawfulness in its 
form will harmonize with at least the possibility of [achieving] 
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the purposes that we are to achieve in nature according to 
laws of freedom.142 
 
    I have taken this lengthy detour into the symbolization of the 
morally good to show the deep role of Kant's notion of civic culture within 
his overall political project, which is in turn embedded in a theory of 
moral history.  The robust autonomy of  culture is not just necessary to 
drive the progressive reconciliation of the respublica noumenon with the 
actually existing state; it is the cradle of all our rational hopes qua moral 
beings, and as the site of humanity's expressive powers, it is the means 
by which we show to ourselves the material possibility of these hopes.  
Further, insofar as civic culture remains the sphere of acting-for-one's-
self, it is the sphere of what we might term not our moral vocation but 
our vocation of virtue: the taking on of the other's moral perfection as a 
project of my own.  This notion of community, in which each is bound to 
each not just out of material need but out of our own sense of our moral 
perfectability, thrives only when civic culture has the dimension of 
separateness from rulership that Kant asserts that it must.   
    It is perhaps at this point that a substantial mistake or 
misreading obtrudes, one which, I think, leads to the account of the 
Kantian political philosophy that is advanced by Hannah Arendt in her 
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famed Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy143 and, more restrictedly, as 
an appendix to volume two of The Life of the Mind144.  Arendt devises her 
account of Kant in large measure by a reconstruction of Kant's theory of 
civic culture, rather than according to his theories of civil right.  One 
must begin by wondering why Arendt began with Kant - why she 
attempted to devise a Kantian political philosophy on the basis of The 
Critique of Judgment, rather than on the explicitly political works, why, 
indeed, she says that Kant's political philosophy is "literally 
nonexistent"145.  Why, for example, does the Rechtslehre not rate as a 
political philosophy?  True, she did not think much of it -  
 
As far as The Doctrine of Right is concerned...if you read it, 
you will probably find [it] rather boring and pedantic - it is 
difficult not to agree with Schopenhauer, who said about it : 
"It is as if it were not the work of this great man, but the 
product of an ordinary common man."146  
 
  But more than this, Arendt is operating with a peculiar, even 
idiosyncratic, notion of the political, one that is explicitly non-Kantian.  
Her attempt, in the latterly-published \emph[Lectures on Kant's Political 
Philosophy], is a kind of transplant operation - to take from Kant notions 
of deliberation and judgment more congenial to her project, while leaving 
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behind Kant's political moralism and his emphasis on obedience to 
heteronomous authority.  
Arendt is one of the leading theorists of the return to the 
democratic agon, a project she shares with the radical democrats.  For 
her, the political sphere is to be a sphere of radically free action, 
unconditioned by the demands of other spheres of life, self-sufficient, 
valuable in itself, the sphere of human freedom par excellence.  The 
purity of this concept imposes some heavy demands on what politics can 
be.  The primary distinction is against the social, which is her collective 
term for the activities of human life which are purposive but unfree, 
performed under the rule of necessity, needed for continued individual 
and collective life.   
The model institution of society is the household, concerned with 
the getting the necessities of life and making  the artifacts and 
contrivances essential in making life both sustainable and comfortable.   
The active categories of the social are labor and work: labor she regards 
as the continually repetitive metabolism of nature into the raw material 
for human life; work is the transformation of that raw material by skill 
into tools and other artifacts, the second nature in which we live.  While 
an artifact produced by work may be novel, the art of its creation is the 
disciplined skill of a vast number of repeated techniques; work shares 
with labor the sense of the grinding, endless, endlessly repetitive struggle 
to alter the given according to rules that can only partly be our own: 
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much of work and labor are determined by the obdurateness of nature 
and matter themselves.   
    Arendt's diagnosis of modernity is of the hypertrophy of the 
social over and against the political, which has withered.  Thus, the state 
and the public sphere appear to us now as attenuated, as agents of 
social administration in the face of which we are relatively powerless; 
vast institutions which take as their rule the dissolution of the individual 
and the individual's identity in a utilitarian calculus of human 
prosperity.  The whole of the polis is administered as a vast household. 
This is a position she shared with Ingeborg Maus, who noted that it was 
precisely because of this hypertrophy of the social that we are now 
almost unable to cognize Kant's political theory, which thereby appears 
to us as an absolutism, a quasi-Hobbesian account of complete 
abasement before power, rather than, as she thought Kant actually 
envisioned it: as an ideal of the unity of authority and deliberation within 
a functional institutional framework dedicated the endless 
reconstruction of political relations so as continually to expand inclusion.   
    Arendt is not so sanguine about the possibility of an account of 
deliberative democracy arising from Kant; it is precisely, she says, in his 
political moralism, his notion that one ought to treat others always as 
ends and not means only that is the perfect expression of an 
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"anthropocentric utilitarianism"147 - one that separates the world, 
political and otherwise, into means and ends, right from the beginning, 
and which can only protect humanity from becoming a mere cog in an 
integral, administrative state apparatus by advancing the "paradoxical" 
formulation "end-in-itself."148 Kant's moralism, and his injection of that 
moralism into politics, is the degradation of political life into political 
craft, into a sphere of means-ends rationality with no independence on 
its own account or any independent worth.   The human community 
becomes an immense "metabolic" engine for the transformation of nature 
into the implements of prosperity, with no remainder. 
    Action is distinct in that it intends the bringing-about of novel 
events by novel means; the background here is not the senseless 
repetition of the natural world but the continual flux of human history.   
But to perform an action which appears as new, as a spontaneous 
intrusion into the historical timeline, and which, by showing a new 
possibility of action, thereby alters the past that is to come (if we may 
speak this way), this is to define an action's meaning and import as 
foremost a function of its appearance, its reception in the minds of its 
spectators. Insofar as this reception is an historical process, the 
operative category is historical memory.  Action, therefore, is the 
bringing-about of a novel event, one which will have deep meaning within 	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historical memory.  Action is what alters by retrospection our own arche, 
by opening up transformative possibilities within our own sphere of 
political action, whose effects will redound on our heirs in turn.  Politics 
is thus a sort of historical theater; the meaning of actions is the 
disclosure of new meanings; the audience, history.  
    It is significant to note that where Arendt extols "actions" she is 
generally thinking of war and revolution, but war and revolution 
considered as guiding symbols.  Indeed, within the sphere of action, 
speech is "coeval and coequal," great deeds do not come without great 
words, but the priority here is not to view speech as a kind of action, an 
intervention in political life to be gauged according to its effects, but 
rather the reverse: both words and actions are agents of disclosure in the 
same manner.  The actual transformations brought about by wars, 
revolutions, and other great deeds, after all, are merely transitory, indeed 
quite brittle; what lasts are meanings, examples, stories about what can 
be done.  Actions, therefore, insofar as they are taken up by history, are 
activities of persuasion, appeals to the mind: one is not "persuaded" by 
the sword but rather what the sword can be seen to have meant, by the 
honor or dishonor accruing over time to the example.  The model 
persuader, interestingly, is neither the philosopher nor the politician, but 
the mythic warrior: the great words and great deeds of Achilles.  The 
form of the state and the legal order are, in an important sense, 
"prepolitical" (Arendt 27) - they are part of the mere background which 
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gives form to the scene containing deeds and words, which are 
themselves the vital content of politics.  Even the effects of words and 
deeds are relevant for what is truly political only insofar as they add 
meaning to the normative. Politics may be a struggle, full of violence and 
violent words, but it gains its properly political sense only at a distance, 
in the spectators who absorb them as a narrative and interpret its 
lessons. Political action, therefore, is not a relation of agent and patient, 
but of agent and spectator.   
    Spectation, though, is a kind of activity of its own, a sort of gap 
of open space between past and future action.  Arendt shares with the 
radical democrats the notion of an open space of political deliberation, 
one that must take its own norms of application as internal to the 
process of deliberation itself; in her case, the subject of the deliberation, 
of course, is the field of great deeds offered by history.  What one is to 
make of them, how they are to guide one's own capacity of doing deeds, 
of making symbols for the delectation of future history, is a matter of 
one's consideration of the historical examples in view.  
    Of course, even if Arendt's argument that Kant's moralism 
paradoxically renders the political into an appendage of instrumental 
culture is thin, surely she is right to say that for Kant politics and civic 
life are nothing like spheres of absolute unconditioned free activity - 
insofar as politics is not the world of the morally unconditioned, it could 
never be.  To return for a moment to the apparent contradiction in Kant's 
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politics: the paradox between the twin moral interests in increasing 
freedom and in complete obedience to the state.  This paradox exists 
within what Kant described as the private sphere.  There has been much 
puzzlement in the literature about why Kant chose to describe as 
"private" those communal political roles that we would describe now as 
quintessentially public - for example, we speak of politicians and leaders 
of important institutions such as the church as being "public figures."   
But for Kant  people in such positions are rightfully constrained by their 
positions, which are as contracted to sovereign authority: the 
rightfulness of this constraint arises from the same grounds as the right 
to property, and while one could not say that public functionaries are 
"owned" by the state or institution for which they speak, their activity is 
representative of the state or institution in such a way that the state or 
institution has an indefeasible contractual claim on the individual, 
precisely on the grounds of universal respect for law.  To imagine that a 
person acts in such a capacity has civil rights against their contractual 
constraint is therefore a category error; they are held in a situation of 
private control.  Rather, the civil right of free speech and publication, 
even if granted generally, holds only for those who speak entirely on their 
own account, outside of any particular role, from, as it were, their home 
ground.  Should one be able clearly to separate the performance of one's 
public (private) duties from one's private (public) self, well and good, one 
may speak; but if not, one is absolutely compelled to remain silent on 
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one's own account and say only what is mandated, even if one does not 
believe it.  On a principle of basic fallibilism, Kant holds that most of the 
time we will be able to say what is asked of us by our roles, as we are 
often unsure of the truth in those situations, but where our conscience is 
ineluctably violated we must resign the role, or remain silent and be 
punished, rather than violate our pure duty to truth-telling.  
    Kant's notion of politics is therefore not just attenuated, for 
Arendt, it is absolutely antithetical to her account of politics - which 
makes her recourse to his Critique of Judgment as a political text more 
surprising still.  But in a sense this is the only place in Kant she could 
have gone, for it is the only one that offers a sphere of pure cognitive 
freedom, and if no theory of political action in Arendt's sense is to be 
forthcoming in Kant, at least a notion of free deliberation may be, and for 
Arendt it occurs precisely in Kant's theory of judgments of taste. 
    For Arendt, again, the objects that satisfy in this case are the 
deeds of history taken as symbols, symbols which, as objects of 
spectation of political actors, become guides to what has been done and 
what can be done; in this sense they are the matter of political 
deliberation upon which decisions to act are taken and against which 
new actions are judged, as to their power, honor, and, importantly, their 
novelty: the scene of history, of historical exemplars, both defines the 
scope of human action by communicating what has been previously 
shown to be the force and extent of the human capacity to act: it also 
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brings forward the possibility, indeed the necessity, of that limit's 
transgression by the imperative, or the burden, to act with honor when 
ones actions are judged according to the exemplars of history.  Against 
that background, within the gap between actions that have been and 
actions yet to be, there is a space of deliberation about politics, an open, 
nonterminating dialogue about the political good: this is the task of 
philosophy as it stands, in the memorable image Arendt appropriated 
from Kafka, between past and future.   
What we might call the sphere of disclosure - what Arendt calls the 
public realm - therefore engulfs politics, becomes what politics most 
essentially is.  This is the discovery we make in our "investigation of 
political things," as Strauss described the pursuit of political philosophy: 
it seems that what is most properly human, what makes us the zoon 
politikon, is that we enact symbolic disclosure for audiences, the most 
important of which is history itself, our memory for actions worthy of 
being imperishable.  It is this dimension that, for Arendt, Kant 
specifically neglected and which relegated his account, at best, to the 
pre-political.  But it is important to notice what price has been paid: the 
philosophical re-enfranchisement of war as the central political category 
of action, and violence as the model form of civic discourse.  Schmitt and 
Arendt on this point have a great deal in common. 
    This was a notion of which Kant was more than simply wary.  
Rather than seeing war as the highest achievement of culture, war was, 
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for Kant, precisely the absence of culture, and more, the absence of 
reason.  The figure of the powerful individual rising up to create, by 
force, new senses of reality, was simply for him the "lawless freedom" of 
the individual acting by "private right" but not yet subject to 
heteronomous political order; but it is inherent in private right 
considered rationally to seek to move into a rightful condition, in which 
questions of right can be submitted to external, coherent judgment.  The 
contrary case, one unable or unwilling to recognize the rational 
requirement for respect for law and lawful institutions, is a kind of surd 
spot on rationality, the inability or unwillingness to think consistently 
about ethics, or about action as such.  But this is precisely for Kant a 
demonic figure: Arendt's political philosophy, which finds in Kant the 
lack of anything human, has instead elevated the essentially evil to the 
status of the properly human.   
    This should help to clarify what is at stake in the issue with 
which I left the second chapter: the nature of civic culture and its 
relation to politics.   In the Arendtian vein, what matters in politics is 
symbolic disclosure, the production of meanings.  This process gets the 
name "action" and is the sine qua non of the public realm.  Even violence, 
particularly war, is  thereby assimilated to political speech.  War 
becomes a kind of epitome of culture.  And this was a tendency we saw 
strikingly in Schmitt and the radical democrats that explicitly descend 
from him: the valorization of symbolic disclosure as the essence of 
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political experience, the elevation of war as the proper form of cultural 
life.   A less Kantian thought is difficult to conceive.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
LOVE, WAR, AND THE PANTHEISMUSSTREIT: 
A LESSON FOR THE THEORY OF (RADICAL) DEMOCRACY 
 
In previous sections of this project, I have attempted to lay out a 
problematic that must be taken up by contemporary attempts to forge a 
new philosophy of democracy.  I first examined radical democracy as 
descended from Mouffe and Laclau, showing how it could not sustain its 
attempt to enact a Schmittian critique of liberalism without itself falling 
prey to a barbarous decisionism.  Later, I showed that this fate was 
common to attempts to reshape political philosophy and politics itself so 
as to collapse the distinction between culture and authority,  into a sort 
of political "monism" between authority and civic culture.  This was, I 
hold, a danger forseen by Kant and avoided in his version of 
republicanism.  There were other prices to pay in his point of view, in 
particular an underdetermining theory of the state, but without a careful 
attention to Kantian liberalism and the reasons for its seemingly 
paradoxical moments, political philosophy that attempts a post-liberal 
democratic synthesis will simply re-invent the barbarous petard on 
which to hoist itself. 
To make still clearer what is at stake, I wish to follow out a pair of 
historical situations within the history of political philosophy, which 
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appear as repetitions of one another: the Pantheismusstreit of 19th 
century German letters, centered around Jacobi's accusation of 
Spinozism against Lessing, and Mendelssohn's reply, and today's 
resurgence of interest in Spinozism as a means of resolving the 
contradictions inherent in contemporary democratic theory.   
The Pantheismusstreit raged across German letters after the death 
of Lessing in 1781.  The debate is sometimes described as being of only 
antiquarian interest, or, at best, as being the occasion for Kant's 1786 
essay "What Is Orientation in Thinking?", itself generally read as a 
capsule of his rational approach to religious faith149.  That the  
Pantheismusstreit between Jacobi and Mendelssohn, including Kant's 
interventions in it, is of  importance for contemporary political 
philosophy has gone generally unrealized.  In particular, I see a parallel 
between Mendelssohn's discovery of a "refined Pantheism" in Lessing - 
one that went quite against the grain of Spinoza's philosophy - and the 
latter-day interest in the Tractatus Politicus, as it appears in the world of 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire and Multitude, two 
enormously influential recent books.   
 The public  Pantheismusstreit150 began when Jacobi, anticipating 
the publication of Mendelssohn's Morgenstunden, released his own Über 
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die Lehre des Spinoza,  which contained both Jacobi's account of a 1780 
conversation he had with Lessing in which Lessing - said Jacobi - had 
admitted being a Spinozist, and the record of a correspondence between 
Jacobi and Mendelssohn on Lessing's putative pantheism.   Given the 
secondhand evidence, whether Lessing really admitted this is contested; 
Mendelssohn spoke of his friend's love of disputation for its own sake, 
but Frederick Beiser is willing to take Jacobi's word as accurate, as 
reflecting sentiments located throughout Lessing's works151.  The 
Pantheismusstreit was itself the most intense moment of the broader 
cultural conflict over rational religion, in which Lessing had been a 
famous participant: his Christianity of Reason,  for example.  Manfred 
Kuehn152 situates this as a stage in Jacobi's great project, a massive 
reductio argument designed to show up the pretensions of rationalism 
and create a system that results in anything but fatalism, atheism, and 
ultimately nihilism.  It was Jacobi's contention that Spinozism in fact 
necessarily terminates in this fashion, and Lessing's apparent 
acceptance of Spinozism late in life showed, on Jacobi's account, this 
movement had, in at least one great philosophical mind, become 
conscious and manifest at last.  The great Lessing had died godless, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  Frederick	  C.	  Beiser,	  The	  Fate	  of	  Reason	  :	  German	  Philosophy	  from	  Kant	  to	  Fichte	  (Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1987).	  p.	  56.	  	  152	  Kuehn.	  pp.	  306-­‐307.	  
	  	   140	  
argued Jacobi; he was led to such a zero-point by his rationalist 
commitment, his commitment to the religion of reason. 
Interestingly, the Pantheismusstreit itself was a repetition of the 
prior conflict between Lessing and Goeze153.  Lessing had published the 
infamous Wolffenbuttler Fragmente in 1778; it was his commentary upon 
the Reimarus'  Apologie, a stringent critique of theological orthodoxy and 
defense of natural religion.  Lessing used his commentary on the text as 
occasion to promulgate his own view that both orthodoxy and religious 
neologism were false extremes; rather, the proper path was a rational 
religion oriented by the indemonstrable principles of Christian faith.  In 
their rerunning of the Lessing/Goeze controversy, Jacobi threw in with 
the orthodox, holding that the indemonstrable principles of revealed 
religion constituted a kind of limit to reason, that they were so different 
in kind as to fund a different realm of truth; reason and faith were to 
part ways.  Mendelssohn, rather, was sympathetic to Lessing's notion of 
an oriented reason.   
Whether or not Lessing was a Spinozist or a pantheist is outside 
the scope of this project - indeed, it was not quite central to Mendelssohn 
either, who found "most offensive"154  not the suggestion that his friend 
was a pantheist or a Spinozist, but the suggestion that Lessing's 
pantheism or Spinozism amounted to a covert nihilism.  Thus the central 	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debate between them was only partly whether Lessing's remarks and 
published works were compatible with Spinoza's; it was the 
interpretation of Spinoza himself, or, rather, the assertion of an internal 
wholeness to Spinoza's philosophy, a wholeness terminating in 
materialism and nihilism, that was at issue.  Mendelssohn, at least 
implicitly, believed that Spinoza's writings broke into two halves: those 
defensibly in accord with a rational theism congenial to both Judaism 
and Mendelssohn himself, and those not: the former seemed to include 
the first three sections of the Ethics and the Tractatus Theological-
Politicus, while the latter included the final two sections of the Ethics and 
the unfinished Tractatus Politicus.  Jacobi, by contrast, seems to have 
appreciated them as a seamless whole, but one which led inevitably to a 
steady closing-down of any possible position but the most radical 
skepticism.  Again, given the kaleidoscopic violences being perpetrated 
against Spinoza's texts here, the issue is not who had Spinoza right; 
likely in this debate nobody did, at least insofar as it might be the case 
that Spinoza's philosophy does form some kind of whole that does not 
terminate in nihilism.  This is an interpretive course not taken by the 
participants of the Pantheismusstreit. 
It is important to note that Jacobi was not in fact the theist 
reactionary he is sometimes portrayed as being.  In Jacobi's 1782 essay  
"Etwas das Lessing gesagt hat: Ein Commentar zu den Reisen der Papste", 
he argues for an internationalist civil society characterized by free speech 
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and respect for property; his primary opponent is the attempt to instill 
virtue by autocratic means.  His differences with Mendelssohn and even 
Kant were rather less in the bare realm of political principle; instead, his 
orthodox dialetheism clashes with their analyses of the scope and power 
of reason to unravel philosophical problems.  His own belief was that 
reason could be no more than a sort of theorem-proving mechanism, 
and, unprovided with experience or innate data, could produce nothing 
synthetic.  Thus, for Jacobi, what he saw as Spinoza's attempt to 
rationally encompass metaphysics from  first principles was doomed to 
be nothing but the manipulation of empty symbols, free of significance, 
leading to no real knowledge: if the thought is made conscious, to 
nihilism.  The assumption that philosophical knowledge has no other 
basis implies that philosophical knowledge cannot exist.  Jacobi, of 
course, sought, in his polemical way, to re-found philosophical inquiry in 
Glaube, faith: it was only through Glaube that speculative thought can 
have any basis.  Without Glaube, thought is nihilist, working over empty 
signifiers, affirming nothing, atheist in consequence.  With  Glaube, the 
hand of Providence guides thought and allows it to step over the 
otherwise absolute division beyond which is only silence. 
This is utterly un-Kantian, but one might see a certain consonance 
between the two - despite the fact that Kant intervened in the 
Pantheismusstreit in defense of his friend Mendelssohn.  Jacobi saw his 
project as:   
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 [not to] explain the inexplicable, but simply to know the line 
of demarcation where the inexplicable begins, simply to 
recognize its presence: such a person, I think, has created 
within himself the maximum space for the harbouring of 
human truth.155 
 
And this would be the space open for the fullness of Glaube.  
Nothing but dogmatism to Kant, but the attempt to clip the wings of 
mere speculation cannot have failed to strike a chord.  It was simply that 
Jacobi was unable to provide a bridge between reason and experience, 
such that reason unaided could be anything other than empty; Kant's 
answer is, of course, the discovery of the synthetic a priori, the essay 
"What is Orientation in Thinking."  Kant may perhaps have seen in 
Jacobi a rationalist of the Cartesian tradition, a strain of argument he 
dealt with in the Refutation of Idealism.156  
 
 
 
Rather, Kant's "What is Orientation in Thinking?" is explicitly 
hostile, even insulting, to (the then late) Mendelssohn.  Mendelssohn's 
Morgenstunden and his An die Freunde Lessings, his reply to Jacobi's 
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Über die Lehre des Spinoza, reveal a kind of transcendental realist, whose 
metaphysics was populated by demonstrably-existent intelligibles such 
as God.  For Mendelssohn, Judaism, the rational religion, does not rest 
centrally on faith: rather, it rests on an historical accretion of revealed 
law, which exists as fact, and a rationally-demonstrable theological and 
ethical core, non-theophantic, which no more needs faith than 
mathematics.  Rather, Judaism emerges out of historical fidelity and 
ratiocination, obedience and reason; faith is not part of it157.  As to his 
theological system, Mendelssohn in the Morgenstunden quotes a series of 
unpublished remarks taken from Lessing's posthumous Christianity of 
Reason, with which he intends to show the consonance of his own belief 
with that of Spinoza - at least those parts of Spinoza he considers 
reasonable and not apostasy - and that of Lessing, all three sharing a 
"refined pantheism."  Refined pantheism is a strange combination of 
Liebnizian entities and emanationism: an "infinite series of beings"158 
standing in hierarchy, each containing the sum of the attributes of those 
beneath it in perfection, with God at the top of the range and a pre-
established harmony of simples at the lowest: a series which is itself the 
eternal thought of God reflecting upon God's own divine perfection. 
In an oddly unreflective moment, however, Mendelssohn says 
something singular about the relationship between rational religion and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	  Mendelssohn,	  "An	  die	  Freunde	  Lessings",	  in	  Jacobi,	  Mendelssohn,	  and	  Vallée.	  p.	  137.	  158	  Mendelssohn,	  Morgenstunden,	  in	  ibid.	  p.	  75.	  
	  	   145	  
law, that is, between speculative reason and right practice.  It turns out 
that the origin of right practice is not simply a matter of obedience to the 
revealed law.  The relation is a journey from rational theology to 
revelation, laid out for us like a road, and from which we deviate chiefly 
by too-dainty metaphysical ratiocination:  
 
On the long road which takes one from these overly subtle 
speculations to the praxis of religion and morality, there are 
many points where one can effortlessly re-enter the open 
highway from a by-way.  Just as an error in calculation can 
be canceled out and corrected through another error, one 
inaccuracy in such abstract meditations can quickly be 
corrected by another, or one small digression which might, 
in the event, have led us far form our goal can be rectified by 
an equally small turn, and we are back on the road.  Hence 
the corruptibility of excessive consistency which from time 
immemorial has spawned, or at least nourished, all the 
persecutions and religious hatred of the human race.159  
 
What is important, ultimately, is right practice, and this has no 
internal connection with right, rationally defensible doctrine.  It is as if, 
for a proof that leads to the right result, the chain of reasoning need not 
be correct or even explicable - erroneous steps can average out.  Indeed, 
while Judaism's ethical and theological core are rational, Mendelssohn's 
attitude toward anyone who would reach this core by rational means 
alone is one of deep suspicion, for it is to deemphasize the power of the 
cultural precipitate of revealed law, to privilege metaphysics over history.   
Indeed, consistent reason unaided is itself to be rejected as too error-	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prone, for it has the effect of preserving, even amplifying, tiny errors, or 
the vices of a thought process not founded in a correct orientation. 
For Kant this could be nothing but objectionable.  During the 
composition of "What is Orientation in Thinking?" and "Remarks on 
Jakob" he was engaged in composing the B edition of the First Critique, 
including the famous remarks in the new Preface on his hopes for setting 
philosophy on the "high road" of science160.  The notion that 
philosophical speculations were but an origin-point for a journey to 
correct religious practice, and that error subtending error could just as 
well lead to a proper result as a correct deduction, must have struck him 
as extraordinary.  And how much more extraordinary the claim that it is 
the job of reason to, as it were, keep out, after its initial - and 
dispensable! - moment of impetus.  Kant notes: 
 
If we deny reason its due right to make the initial 
pronouncement in matters relating to supra-sensory objects 
such as the existence of God and the world hereafter, the 
way is wide open for every kind of zealotry, superstition, and 
even atheism.  And yet in the controversy between Jacobi 
and Mendelssohn, everything seems calculated to overthrow 
the authority of reason in this way.  I am not sure whether 
this affects only rational insight and knowledge (in view of the 
supposed strength of speculation), or whether even rational 
belief is also rejected in favor of an alternative belief which 
anyone can fashion as he pleases.  One is almost inclined to 
draw the latter inference on discovering that Spinoza's 
concept of God is said to be alone consistent with all the 
principles of reason but nevertheless worthy of rejection.161  	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The defense of the protean Lessing has led Mendelssohn far 
indeed.  And Kant's reply is so firm as to risk an all-too-clear declaration 
of his own skepticism of the possibility of a personal God: recall that as 
this debate is being conducted, a shadow is falling across Germany's 
right to free expression: the era of Frederick the Great, dedicatee of the 
First Critique, is about to come to an end, and that of Frederick William 
about to begin.   
For Kant, the initial pronouncement is of course the 
transcendental one: the tribunal of reason is to slam shut the gates 
before theological speculation can bolt forth.  Better from that 
perspective to attempt to reason demonstratively to a doctrine he regards 
as absurd and indefensible - that of Spinoza - than to simultaneously 
give license to the most unconstrained speculations, while devaluing the 
entire enterprise of a rational theology. But Mendelssohn seeks to divide 
various cognitive and practical purposes from one another on what 
appear to be purely pragmatic lines.  There are hints of the same 
difficulty in Kant's other famed interaction with Mendelssohn, the two 
"What is Enlightenment" essays, published the same year.  The 
"dissemination of knowledge", for Mendelssohn, is to be related to 
"[men's] vocations...", and where "the enlightenment of man can come 
into conflict with the enlightenment of the citizen" it is the dissemination 
of knowledge, indeed the desirability of thinking itself, that must be 
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curtailed.   The reason?  Civil peace: it is thinking, too much thinking, 
that incites against it.162  
It is perhaps important to note that the way in which thinking 
threatens civil peace is not, for Mendelssohn, the same as is embodied in 
that governing metaphor of Plato's Republic: the philosopher who stands 
outside the walls of the polis, unbeholden to it, whose unbridled 
thoughts, driven only by their own necessity, are such a threat to the 
founding myths of the polis that the philosopher is a mortal threat to civil 
order.  For Mendelssohn, the danger is rather the reverse - that the 
philosopher, as speculator, will create myths of the state for his or her 
own part, that can only mystify what is already rational or falsely 
rationalize what is essentially mystical.  Philosophy's job is more or less 
over.  There is, to speak crudely, apparently no longer anything of 
importance outside the cave: the danger is that someone will stand 
between the captive and the fire and so confuse the shadows on the wall.  
Kant describes the whole effort as the result of a lack of "agility in 
thinking" due to age163.  Harsh words for a friend. 
What, then, is orientation for Kant?  In thinking, orientation is 
provided by the needs of reason, in their theoretical use and practical 
import.  Kant's thinking is anything but disoriented.  Nor is his politics; 
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the transcendental argument produces a theory of the political, of the 
necessity for an autonomous culture, for a co-ordinated, countervailent 
state, for a private order based on the contractual and a public realm 
based on free expression.  Indeed, it is not his argument that 
Mendelssohn's "healthy reason" illicitly provides an orientation; it is that 
it is not orienting enough.  "Healthy reason," which leads us on the road 
from dainty metaphysics to obedience to revealed law, is, for Kant, like a 
chair in a dark room: we may orient ourselves with it only if we already 
know the whole of the room and the chair has not been moved.  
Orientation seeks something more robust still, as in the distinction 
between left and right that we carry within us: a subjective condition of 
orientation that nevertheless functions objectively.  For Kant, this 
function is taken up by the needs of reason. 
But one must ask what kind of political orientation one gets from 
reason's needs.  It is not the kind of orientation that answers most 
political questions, particularly those about means and not ends.  For 
example, as I noted before, Kant's theory of the state is not one that can 
make a distinction within recht between legitimate and illegitimate uses 
of power; it cannot advance a programmatic theory of the right state, 
beyond certain internal contradictions to be avoided in the adumbration 
of rulership.  There is a deep reason for this:  for Kant, as precisely not 
for Hobbes, the function of political order as such is to create the 
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possibility of the determinacy of right; natural right164 for Kant, does not 
even exist determinately outside the civil constitution, and only comes to 
have real being within a determining political order.   
Kant's needs of reason  "orient" thinking like a compass - but 
through the dark space of the supersensible.  Kant's philosophy of 
history functions analogously in politics.  As I have said in the previous 
chapters, both arise, for Kant, as functions of rationality itself, as 
reason's own needs.  They are therefore not substantive "posits" in the 
sense he ascribed to Mendelssohn's healthy reason. But more than that, 
they have an entirely different function within politics and within 
practice: the thought that our actions can endure, that before our 
species, in some deferred future, is goodness, is simply part of the 
concept of action as such: it does not guide our actions in any way other 
than the way in which practical reason itself does, through 
universalizable maxims.  These notions are, in short, answers to 
speculative questions given by reason to itself, and not the answers to 
political questions.  Still less do they serve as potential justifications for 
any particular action that might otherwise seem evil.  We may indeed 
commit terrible acts and bring about disaster.  What Kant asserts is that 
this must be risked, not that it will, through operation of some powerfully 
optimistic posit, be avoided or denatured in some kind of greater 	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synthesis: the risk is real.  Even if our acts bring about catastrophic 
results, we have warrant to think that even this will not be the end of the 
matter, that we, or others, can yet act differently. This is not to excuse 
the disaster in virtue of its eventual absorption as a moment of 
something better; the disaster happens as a disaster precisely as it 
appears as having been our evil, our failure, to do what could have been 
done, or to avert what could have been stopped.   
 With a kind of eerie precision, the conflict of Glaube and 
Orientation has recurred in our time, in the explosion of interest in neo-
Spinozistic politics that has arisen from the work of Negri and Hardt.  
Negri and Hardt have produced what they regard as a new synthesis of 
Spinozism for today, a theory of "absolute democracy" based in Spinoza's 
theoretical approach to the question of sovereignty and its metaphysic as 
it appears in the final book of the Tractatus Politicus.  The huge 
popularity of both Multitude and Empire might obscure their 
philosophical profundity.  I will argue that these books are deeply flawed, 
but I wish to emphasize that their flaws are deep, revealing an important 
tendency within contemporary political philosophy that is worthy of 
examination and critique.  There is a curious way in which the 
reappearance of Spinoza in these recent political debates has the quality 
of inevitability - not the happy rediscovery of a forgotten answer to a 
question that has at last recurred, but a specific conflict that has 
remained with us, encysted, in the very terms of the contemporary 
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philosophy of democracy. I think the way in which the debate has 
recurred highlights what Kant himself called the issue of "orientation in 
thinking" - in this case, orientation within political thought, as well as 
orientation within the practice of politics.  The quest for orientation, even 
within the most putatively radical political theories, has tied political 
philosophy to a doomed quest, one that, within Spinozist radical 
democracy in particular, once again causes the whole edifice to redound 
into its opposite. 
For Negri and Hardt, Spinoza - particularly in the Tractatus 
Politicus - is the political philosopher of immanence par excellence, and in 
politics the philosophy of immanence goes under the name "absolute 
democracy" or "the multitude."  Hardt and Negri refrain from giving 
absolute democracy and the multitude any analytic definition.  Rather, 
the terms are descried negatively, by a careful exploration of "present 
conditions," what Negri and Hardt give the grand name "Empire."  
Empire is no longer imperialism, but what we might call "our politics 
under present conditions" - the techniques of military, financial, social, 
and informational control  - including the state, but much beyond it - 
that stand over and against the self-determination of the populace. Yet 
Empire also contains this populace as a moment within itself, indeed, as 
its most essential moment; Empire is a name for the means by which the 
populace currently divides and controls itself, while experiencing itself as 
ruled by external power.  Control is maintained by what Hardt and Negri 
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name "sovereignty",165 which is less a form of power or even an idea of a 
form of power but "an ordering function"166,  under which power presents 
itself as unimpeachable to the ruled populace.  This function is not 
merely an ideological identification but something like the possibility of 
ideological identification as such: the "transcendental representation"167 
of the chance for order, peace, prosperity, happiness, in whatever guise 
these may take, liberal or authoritarian.  This transcendental 
representation is an ontological illusion, a fiction Empire tells itself of 
both the need for an the unsuturable absoluteness of the separation of 
rulers and ruled, or, put differently, of the impossibility of a distinction 
between Empire and Multitude, which is used to channel and 
domesticate a properly ontological demand: that the people heal the 
fictive cut and rule themselves.  It is only through the maintenance of 
this ontological illusion of essential division that Empire maintains itself 
as the form of authority sine qua non; it is thus that Hardt and Negri 
argue that the reinvigoration of politics is an ontological project first, a 
project for philosophy, before being properly a political one.  Philosophy, 
and in particular metaphysics, properly carried-through, will serve to 
smash the organizing appeal of the fictive ordering function of sovereign 
power.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  Michael	  Hardt	  and	  Antonio	  Negri,	  Empire	  (Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  p.88.	  166	  Ibid.	  	  167	  Ibid.	  p.	  84.	  
	  	   154	  
The multitude must find itself in its originary wholeness; doing so 
is to bring about the realization of "absolute democracy" and banish once 
and for all the need for a transcendent ordering function.   But as this 
movement away from Empire to Multitude is a transformation performed 
by the multitude upon itself, the seeds for it must already be inside 
Empire.  For Hardt and Negri, the transformations we have already seen 
within sovereign power in the last generation reveal that this is so.  It is 
in the transition from the mere "power of command"168  of the absolute 
sovereign ruler to the form of sovereignty offered by the neoliberal global 
order that the transcendental ruling function has come to appear as a 
function at all: but this movement has opened a breach within Empire at 
the very moment of its coming to its own maturity.  Inevitably, this 
breach will open out into the self-realization of Multitude.  The 
transcendental ruling function is what Hardt and Negri call a 
"network"169 operation: it operates precisely as the power of command 
could not, apparently from everywhere at once.  Empire's central 
distinction, between rulership and ruled, is not a conflict of strong 
individuals against masses, or of classes against classes: rulership is 
ubiquitous, appearing less as orders than in the guise of non-negotiable 
abstractions that surround everyone, in the form of social facts whose 
existence is not tied to the will or the purposes of any individual or 	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group.  These social facts appear as "natural" to each individual - not 
rules to be obeyed but simply a reality to be recognized.   But these social 
facts confront even the state, which comes to appear as a vestige of the 
mere "power of command": the state both relieves itself and is relieved of 
the functions of decision-making and becomes an element of the ruling 
function's spectacular livelihood.   The loci of actual power continually 
diffuse outward.  The process is akin to Marxian "valorization", in which 
the commodity form becomes universalized; here, however, the network 
form of power becomes universalized.  And the network goes everywhere. 
I am glossing over Hardt and Negri's perspicuous new political 
history of the West, but the crux is that the universalization of network 
power, even if it brings with it enhanced "juridical regimes" of private 
property170  and new technologies of social control and economic 
exploitation, opens up the place and the means for the multitude's own 
project of self-realization.  This space can be spoken of loosely as 
"information technology" or "new means of communication", but the 
heart of the matter is not any technology or technique but - simply the 
intensification of contemporary capitalism itself. Capitalism is the name 
we give to the ordering function that has dissolved the state.  But 
capitalism's triumphal expansion, its success at blowing away 
boundaries, has created a recognizable, even obvious, separation of 
interest between itself and the state: a crisis that is temporized only by a 	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great change in capitalism.  Whereas the state had been capitalism's 
handmaiden under the prior form of sovereignty, capitalism's ever-
increasing speed and reach have led it to a transformation of degree that 
is now of kind: an uncontrollable  "hybridization"171  of constitutional 
function between state and capital through a set of institutions and 
institutional relationships which are not those of the state, nor purely 
corporate.  It is not so much that, as if often noted, that the nation state 
is being corroded by capitalism; capitalism's own purity of nature has 
been likewise altered, as the functions of capital and the state have been 
sintered together in a new form of political power that is essentially 
neither. 
But the hybrid constitution of power poses a crisis for the ruling 
function: Hardt and Negri offer a crisis theory not of the state or of 
capital but of sovereignty itself, or, rather, of the sort of social myth that 
sovereignty actually is: the ruling function now appears in a third form, 
neither somewhere (state power) nor everywhere (capitalism),  but  
nowhere, as if it has begun to withdraw from political life altogether.  
Suddenly it appears as if nobody or nothing were in control, that there is 
no control.  Both capital and politics, such as they still appear to us as 
differentiated, appear to be destroying themselves.  Neither is a reliable 
source of order; still less does either appear as a social fact, but only as a 
kind of hypothesis that is now being disproved. 	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The point for Hardt and Negri is twofold.  First, that 
countervailence, the usual means by which the state and economic 
agents contrive to limit one another and in so doing absorb the potential 
shocks of each others' crises, is no longer available as a political strategy, 
even for the liberal reformist: the body of government is thoroughly 
penetrated, even animated, by the ramifying network of capitalism.  
There is simply no available point of interface between state and capital 
through which the mutual collision of countervailence can be 
accomplished.  This may be disheartening, for it portends a radical 
increase in the combined power of the state/capital hybrid nexus to 
intensify exploitation without limit.  Yet it is this very development which 
brings hope. 
Of course, to the Marxian, the removal of the capacity for mutual 
limitation is foreseeable, and leads to crisis - and crisis is the potential 
revolutionary moment.  Hardt and Negri's theory is not a Marxian crisis 
theory.  The possibility of the achievement of absolute democracy is not  
to be attained through class-based revolutionary activity - this is a 
reversion to a form of sovereignty, or attempted sovereignty, which has 
already been done away with; it is at best a utopian illusion and at worst 
a rallying cry for the most terrible political violence.  Rather, the 
attainment of absolute democracy, the multitude's moment of self-
realization, will occur through the intensification of capitalism's own 
inner drive for immanence.  The network form of power is everywhere, 
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diffused, all around us - ordering from within and without, everywhere at 
once, not remote and commanding from on high.  And as it becomes ever 
more diffuse, ever more pervasive in its embrace, it will, in the end, 
become us.  Empire is an empire of capital, but it is capitalism that will 
heal the ontological division, or the illusory division, that maintains the 
ordering function of sovereignty.  Indeed it has already done so - by 
eroding and hybridizing with the state, erasing its capacity as the bearer 
of the transcendental representation of power. 
How will it happen?  This Hardt and Negri do not tell us; they are 
engaged, rather, in the philosophical work of organizing the possibility of 
the ontological demand, creating what they call "a new science of 
democracy."172  The precise path history will take in unfolding the 
multitude to itself is not foreseeable as such.  Indeed, the proscriptive 
elements of Empire - Multitude has none - are so under-formed as to be 
anticlimactic: the book ends with a stirring call for the expansion of the 
internet and the institution of a social wage.   
But the heart of the argument is the  new science of democracy.  
That is to be distinguished from the old by its reconsideration of 
sovereignty.  The metaphor that most impresses Hardt and Negri is 
Hobbes' of the body politic, the animate creature whose organic unity 
symbolizes the unity of authority possessed by the state, and whose 
division into functional parts - head, hands, nerves, muscles - mimics 	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the divisions of political power and of labor in society173. The body politic 
is, for Hardt and Negri, a figure of unified repose: the brain wills, the 
fingers move.  The purpose of the image of the body in repose is to ward 
off the image of common struggle: the war of all against all, individual 
units battling for whatever temporary supremacy their own strength can 
bring them.  The image of calm, assured life over struggle and death.  For 
Hobbes, for Hardt and Negri, the contrast is between the democracy of 
the multitude and war174 (Multitude 238-9). 
This, though, is just the model of sovereignty that Hardt and Negri 
seek to break down, to dissolve in a kind of solution of metaphors.  
Absolute democracy, whatever it might be in its fullest realization, it at 
least "the rule of everyone by everyone"175: reduced to fleshly metaphor, 
this is a body without a brain, without differentiation into functional 
tissues.  It is not even composed of elementary cells, each much alike - it 
is a combination of singulars176.  It is a "living flesh," self-organizing, self-
governing, yet not governed, no part able to impose function on any 
other.  What such a living flesh might look like is frankly unimaginable; 
to theorize it is the task of the "new science" of democracy.  It would at 
the least be monstrous, terrifyingly unlike any organism we know, as 
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Hardt and Negri forthrightly admit (their preferred metaphor is the 
vampire; a better one might be the zombie)177.  
To push off consideration of the means of such self-organization 
into horror-movie metaphor may seem like a dodge, but it is at least a 
forthright one, motivated by a deep philosophical point: the kind of social 
organization proper to absolute democracy as such, if that is the proper 
term, is unknown, and if it is to question the very notion of the sovereign 
power, as it seems that it must, it is one that goes beyond the limits of 
political philosophy as it has been handed down to us.  Therefore a 
gesture toward a future theorization - one for which the capacity may not 
even yet exist, for it will depend on "a new human nature"178  - is not 
absurd.  Yet there are reasons to think that theorization-to-come is going 
to be monstrous in a way other than the palatably postmodern. 
There is, however, a vital distinction to be made between Hardt 
and Negri's radicality and that of the radical democrats I addressed in 
the first chapter: for Hardt and Negri, the creation of the new flesh is not 
a disclosive or discursive operation, but a productive one.  It is a matter 
of the organization of the productive forces of the economy and society 
into a "common" in which the self-ruling impulse of the multitude is 
expressed in creative activity.  This is much less a matter of the 
mediation of contending subject positions than the problematic of 	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discovering a means for the "common" to become the communal site of 
what Arendt called the "metabolism" of nature into human world; the 
issue here, therefore, is not one of translation or decisions about friends 
and enemies, rather one of management and mobilization.  As Lukacs 
might have noted, the problematic is better chosen: not the potential for 
praxis to appear spontaneously as the organic expression of the will of 
the proletariat, but the question of the mobilization of proletarian forces 
for political ends. 
Yet the change of registers here, from discursion to production, 
still hides within itself a reinscription of the same problematic, this time 
in the form of a kind of master signifier of political orientation, one that 
ultimately cannot but fall to the very objection of Laclau and Mouffe: that 
"there is no theoretical reason why the mythical reconstitution should 
not move in the direction of fascism."179  Yet this seems precisely what 
Hardt and Negri, in a most unmaterialist moment, hope.  To see how this 
occurs requires unspooling their critique of sovereign power's 
"coordinating function." 
There is a problematic inherited by automatically identifying liberal 
democracy with the Hobbsean body politic.  The Hobbsean theory is 
based essentially on force: on the over-awing force that holds all 
particular impulses in check.  The transition is from an omnium bellum 
contra omnes to a state of security guaranteed by legitimate, but no less 	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terrible for that, war.  Hardt and Negri indeed identify the coordinating 
function of sovereignty with at least the promise of legitimate war, the 
war of power against contrary power, for it is this distinction within war - 
between legitimate wars of the state and the illegitimate war of each 
against each - that funds liberal order.  When liberalism seeks to 
disenfranchise war as a viable ideal within politics, it can sound only 
hollow, for the distinction which enables it is not between war and 
politics but between modes of war. Hobbes' political disenfranchisement 
of war, they note, did not mean the expulsion of violence from the body 
politic, for the war of each against each is only banished at the cost of a 
vast and terrible power of violent coercion, a war from above.   The ouster 
of the bellum omnium is the legitimation of a state of terror. "War and 
death," they note, "[are] the primary weapon[s] used to coerce the 
multitude to obey the rule of the sovereign."180  
To replace the Hobbsean form of sovereignty, Negri and Hardt seek 
a form of political organization - absolute democracy - which is not 
animated by a post-hoc distinction between modes of war, but which 
distinguishes itself from war at its origin.  This requires the dissolution of 
the ordinary notion of sovereign power and its attendant distinction, 
legitimate war, and requires reconsideration of the purpose of politics as 
such. 
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But there is a problem.  If the dissolution of the traditional notion 
of sovereignty - both in practice, through the intermediate stage of 
network sovereignty and in theory, as the new flesh that is not sovereign 
- aims at dissolving the ontological gap between ruler and ruled, it must 
perforce take with it a concomitant distinction, not between one form of 
politics, democracy, and war, but that between politics as such and war.  
Hardt and Negri are attempting the complete philosophical 
disenfranchisement of war.  The irresistible authority ruling Hobbes' 
body politic has as its purpose the end of the war of all against all.  Hardt 
and Negri understand this; it is in carrying over violence as the check 
against the bellum omnium that they see the central tendency of liberal 
democracy to lead to violence repression and exclusion.  Absolute 
democracy will in some sense – never be at war. 
What does this mean?  It turns out that the answer is precisely not 
"the absence of political violence."  Hardt and Negri offer another bodily-
political image: "tragic" but unavoidable, the burst flesh of the 
"asymmetric" warrior whose own body is the cannon which fires the blast 
that ushers in the new age.  It is a strange involution.  It is the 
contemporary world, they argue, in which war has become the 
"constructive" condition: war is for us a totalizing framework and even a 
form of socially necessary labor.  To even speak of the state's legitimate 
monopoly on violence is to cover over the hideous reality of "security": a 
social world so consumed by war, so thoroughly penetrated by a regime 
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of punitive violence that even to call it "secure" is absurd.  Certainly.  Yet 
Hardt and Negri's alternative is violence as a constitutive condition - as 
the founding event, but this time not covered over, and this time: a 
pervasive, absolute violence which is not war. 
Or perhaps one last war.  In a deliberate and conscious re-
invocation of Schmitt, Hardt and Negri note that the struggle for absolute 
democracy, there will be war, but not just any war, a "war against war."  
This was precisely the formulation Schmitt used to designate the 
unimaginable war, the war too terrible to describe, the war that because 
final and because oriented to the expulsion of war from the liberal 
constellation would be the most inhuman and total war: but while on 
Schmitt's analysis this was the unacknowledged self-betrayal of liberal 
cosmopolitanism, for the Multitude it is a constructive political motive.  
Whatever form absolute democracy should take, it will be ushered in by 
an indefinite spasm of barbarism.   
This is remarkable, for it makes explicit a vital premise in Hardt 
and Negri's work: that the bellum omnium is not the "outside" of politics 
that liberals see it as.  The terror of violence in which the sovereign 
authority holds the populace is a moment within the multitude itself, as 
is the very distinction: multitude "has no outside." Multitude is a 
monism: in a sense, there is nothing to exclude and to war against.  
Multitude just is war: Multitude and absolute democracy carry within 
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them the bellum omnium constitutively.  To have distinguished the bellum 
omnium from politics was already a blunder. 
Yet, this violence takes the form of - an "act of love."  "Love" is "joy 
... incarnated in the common material political project of the 
multitude"181.  Whereas love had been delegitimated as a political 
concept or force by relegation to the private sphere, now love will be the 
passion proper to the installation of the common as the ultimate scene of 
popular "constituent power".  Love is both a product of and ground for 
this political project: the bringing-to-fruition of the Multitude is the 
"project of love."182 "This world of rage and love is the real foundation on 
which the constituent power of the multitude rests... It is 'the democratic 
will to power.'"183   Love leads us to the new flesh, love grounds us in its 
production.  Live binds the common, makes it common.  Love, for Hardt 
and Negri, orients us.    
Love is evidently vitally important, for it is the only available 
distinction to move violence in a positive direction; the notion of civil 
peace was itself torn down as part of the fictive "coordinating function", 
and made ludicrous by the construction of the constitutively violent new 
flesh of democracy.  Yet by the conclusion of Multitude, love remains 
substantially untheorized.  There is something deeply strange about a 
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"philosophical book"184  which ends in a call for violence against Empire 
but cannot limn what it is that it seeks, except in terms of a literally 
unimaginable new flesh and a common project of "love" whose outlines 
we cannot yet grasp.  There is something honest in the incapacity, yet 
there is something cynical about it, too.  Philosophically cynical: 
enlightened false consciousness, in the terminology of Peter Sloterdijk.  
"Logically it is a paradox, for how could enlightened consciousness still 
be false?"185  Here we see the answer: Hardt and Negri have produced a 
powerful and profound critique of Enlightenment politics.  They have 
diagnosed every pathology, listed every failure.  And the response is a 
flight into what can only be called a philosopher's utopia, one which we 
have seen before in the radical democrats: the thought that the world will 
be transformed if only we have the right theory, or, in this case, the right 
orientation for the theory we do not yet have.   
Ultimately, for Negri and Hardt, as for Mendelssohn, "love," is a 
kind of guarantee in an Enlightened world which has otherwise given up 
on guarantees.  The traditional function of the state, after all, was to be 
that sovereign power which guarantees civil peace; for Hardt and Negri, it 
is that form of civil peace which is the problem, and it is why a new 
moment of constitutive violence against sovereignty itself is the only 
answer.  Why, then, "love"?  Why not simply rest as Schmitt did, in the 	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distinction between friend and enemy, with the moment of violent 
overthrow valorized as such, without the need for guarantees, or even 
hope?  Because that possibility is still too terrible for Hardt and Negri: 
they seek, after the re-founding of society, a new, un-civil peace, but a 
kind of peace nonetheless.  Indeed, democracy for them functions as a 
name for peace: it is the current form of sovereign power and its sham of 
liberal democracy that is the institution of continual war.  Yet nothing 
stands to guarantee the possibility of that hope other than the 
orientation of political love. 
For Kant, by contrast, love is almost lovingly theorized: as a broad 
duty of virtue, constitutive of a soladaristic polis.  (See chapter 3.)  Love, 
political love, is the kind of caring one gives to one another's moral well-
being: not their happiness but their fitness for being happy.  It appears 
in the form of all kinds of signification, but never as an attempt to 
inculcate virtue or moral fitness by juridical means, and still less by 
force, which are inappropriate to it.  Rather, it is the state proper to our 
communal project of growing up, of, in Kant's rather grander phrasing, 
"throwing off our self-imposed immaturity".  Love is a kind of private debt 
we all owe each other for being the systematic community in which we 
ourselves have our lives, our political being.  
Thus, love stands for Kant as a virtue thoroughly imbued with 
historicity: we grow in and through love, our culture grows in and 
through love.  Growth is ultimately a matter of moral fitness to act, to act 
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on one's own reason's maxims: freedom to act from the pure law within.  
It is a progressive discovery of what, for Kant, it is that makes us all most 
human and most like each other.  Yet what it is not is a kind of ideology; 
still less a sort of significatory guarantee of better things to come, the 
progressive conception of history from Kant's "Universal History" given a 
substantive life of its own, beyond its function as a need of reason. 
Kant's love is not an angel of history or an Absolute or a new flesh.  It is 
a rational virtue that can move us to recognize and act on the needs of 
our fellows, that we make amongst ourselves an interdependent 
community.  But what shall that community become? 
Not peaceable, at least not for an almost infinitely deferred time.  It 
is of course our unsocial sociability, which we might read here as our 
hateful love, or our childish cry of "mine!" which becomes, in the rightful 
condition which makes natural law determinate and determinative, the 
political  act which funds culture. Of course, unsocial sociability in the 
rightful condition is a condition of civil peace: but the movement into the 
rightful condition, a movement which has substantially greater purchase 
on history, given Kant's underdetermining theory of the state, and the 
defense of the rightful condition from its exterior, that require war.   
For Kant, war is the "greatest difficulty" of the theory of recht 186, 
and he surrounds it with limitations, stipulations, and instructions: yet 
he cannot and will not banish it.  We have a rational interest in the 	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instantiation of the rightful condition, which is the interest in our own 
freedom and moral development; Kant's answer to the question "Why 
war?" is not even the weary one of Freud, but is advanced in the full 
consciousness of war's terror and war's power; even, as he hints, with a 
kind of bloody naïveté, its power to ennoble.  Yet what Kant has avoided 
the radical democrats, who rail against the state of Terror that liberal 
democracy requires, have fallen prey to: what we might call "network 
war," war gone everywhere, war as the constitutive principle of politics, 
and not just an element of it.  And Kant saw that in the issue of 
"orientation" there could be the cover story for the constitutivity of war, 
for politics' complete barbarization.   
There is a bit more to it than this.  When I spoke previously of a 
"clue" given by beauty to reason, that clue's import was partly affective.  
Yet that affect is simply to license action as such, and nothing more than 
that.  It is the reasoned and felt possibility that action is not vain, that 
the terrorist conception of history is false.  What is to be done? still 
stands before practical reason as an unanswered question, 
unanswerable programmatically, except by the categorical imperative 
itself. 
It is a project for a politics in which nothing is given except our 
own rational - that is, human - commonality.  It is a project which does 
not have at its center the valorization of war.  It is one that vouches for 
the possibility of significant and durable change.  It is one that does not 
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demolish the autonomy of culture in favor of its militarization.  It is one 
that brings to consciousness its own synthetic status as a human 
community.  It is one that grows. It grows in love. 
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